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**КАРЭН НЕРСЕОВИЧ
БРУТЕНЦ**
**СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ
НАЦИОНАЛЬНО-ОСВОБОДИТЕЛЬНЫЕ
РЕВОЛЮЦИИ**

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REVOLUTIONARY
DEMOCRACY IN THE NATIONAL
LIBERATION ZONE

The problem of contemporary revolutionary democracy in the newly independent countries is especially relevant for the theory and practice of the world communist movement. In recent years, the Communist parties have taken note of the activization of a new and influential socio-political force that has emerged in the course of the national liberation struggle. This new force not only combats imperialism and colonialism, it also favors socialism; its social character is neither proletarian nor bourgeois. In a number of emerging countries, it has already become the crucial lever in the turn toward socialist orientation, in others it is now an important factor expressing anti-capitalist social tendencies.

Generalizing the political conclusions of the Communist parties, conclusions drawn from social development and the liberation struggle in the former colonial and dependent world, the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties stressed in its Document that in a number of young states "the role of revolutionary and democratic forces has been enhanced".¹

The meeting of Communist Parties of Arab countries held in early April 1975 announced in its Statement: "One of the most important phenomena in the Arab national liberation movement is the emergence of parties, forces and elements which, in class terms, belong to the petty bourgeoisie, but have raised themselves to the position of revolutionary democracy."

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 28.*

It should be noted that some scholars consider the term "revolutionary democracy" not entirely adequate. One of the difficulties is that the concept is most often associated with Russian revolutionary democracy, and its application to other political phenomena and a different body of public figures prompts certain misgivings. But we may recall that Lenin employed the term "revolutionary democracy" when speaking of peasant and petty-bourgeois figures in the national liberation movement in the countries of the East.¹ On the other hand, some are troubled—and this is quite natural—by the use of the term "revolutionary democrats" with respect to political groups and figures that at times have a reserved or even negative attitude toward democratic forms of public life, toward independent initiative on the part of the masses. Yet the revolutionary and democratic character of the struggle of peasant and petty-bourgeois parties and forces against imperialism and internal reaction must be recognized. This character is evident in their platforms and basic political line and in their practical activity, which in effect comes down to the solution—even if inconsistent and contradictory—of democratic tasks, often by revolutionary means. This, as well as the social base of these parties and forces, and the class interests they express, provides substantive justification for using the term under consideration.

Finally, it should also be noted that dissatisfaction with this term has not led to the proposal of another, more suitable (from theoretical and practical considerations) term². It is not happenstance that this term has entered the political vocabulary of the international communist movement and is widely used in the documents of the CPSU and other Communist parties.

This gives us the right to employ the term "revolutionary democracy"—naturally, within the proper limits—to designate the social phenomenon with which we are dealing—the more so as in this case the term itself is not what is most

¹ See, V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 165; Vol. 41, pp. 281, 282.

² Aside from the term "national democracy", which is most often used in an analogous sense and is likewise not entirely adequate.

important, but *how* we analyze the phenomenon so designated, whether we disclose all of the phenomenon's complexity and contradictoriness, its positive and negative features.

An attempt is made in this volume to analyze some of the most important aspects of revolutionary democracy.¹ The considerations here developed are necessarily of a general nature and must of course be appropriately modified when applied to specific revolutionary democratic groups and parties. And there are no few instances where particular features do not fit within a general description. But that is the inevitable cost of any generalization.

¹ Revolutionary democracy is little studied in the scholarly literature, though some aspects of revolutionary democratic policy and of its social basis have been examined by Soviet scholars. (See, A. Arzumanyan, "The World Socialist System and the National Liberation Movement" in *The Paths of Development of Countries That Have Won National Independence, and World Socialism*, Prague, 1964, pp. 281-300; V. L. Tyagunenko, *Problems of the Contemporary National Liberation Revolutions*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 250-341; G. Kim, A. Kaufman, *Leninism and the National Liberation Movement*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 213-253; *Classes and the Class Struggle in Developing Countries*, Vol. 3, Chap. 5, Section 5, "Revolutionary Democratic Regimes", etc. (All in Russian.)

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY

Revolutionary democracy's movement to the fore as an important and more or less well-delineated force in the national liberation movement, in the political and social development of the emerging states, has become especially evident in the last 10 to 15 years.

Revolutionary democrats headed the first post-colonial national governments in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Tanganyika, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola; in Egypt they crystallized as the preeminent group in the course of the Egyptian revolution. They came to power in Burma after the fall of the government of native bourgeoisie; in the Congo (Brazzaville), Zanzibar, Somali, Ethiopia and People's Republic of Benin (former Dahomey) through the overthrow of pro-colonialist, pro-imperialist, corrupt regimes; in Syria and Iraq after the removal from power of bourgeois and right-wing Baath figures; in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen after the victory of the left group within the General Directorate of the National Front.

Revolutionary democrats lead national states with a socialist orientation. Their appearance on the scene is a phenomenon in the development of the contemporary national liberation movement that is new in principle and of great import. These states are the vanguard of the movement and have a substantial progressive impact on the development of the movement as a whole.

As we know, the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969 gave special emphasis to the

outstanding role of the Arab national liberation movement in the struggle against international imperialism.¹ It is the progressive Arab states, guided by the revolutionary democracy, these states' forthrightly anti-imperialist policy, that have been basic to the movement's advance so far forward. Speaking at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969, the head of the delegation of the Lebanese Communist Party stressed that progressive regimes are the principal force of the Arab national liberation movement.²

Revolutionary democratic parties and organizations have led the struggle—including armed struggle in Portuguese colonies in Africa—for freedom. Such have been the African Party of Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Front of Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO)—they direct the liberation movement in South of Africa—the African National Congress of South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and others. Revolutionary democracy has also been active in a number of other Arab and Asian countries and in some African states. It is a serious force (acting either within the ruling parties or as an opposition), too, in countries in which bourgeois or pro-bourgeois forces hold power. More or less influential revolutionary democratic groups and organizations have emerged throughout the national liberation zone.

In a socio-political sense, the rise of revolutionary democracy and its advent to power is an expression of the weakness or crisis of the political authority of bourgeois and pro-bourgeois groups, of their inability to deal with the cardinal problems of society and of national liberation. In some countries—Ghana, Mali, Guinea, etc.—this in fact occurred on the basis of lessons drawn from history and from the experience of some other liberated countries (and partially on the basis of the events of the anti-colonial struggle) even *before* the native bourgeoisie had the opportunity to demonstrate its potential.

¹ Sec, *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 75.

At the same time, the preeminence of revolutionary democrats is a consequence of the proletariat's lack of influence, a reflection of the level of the revolutionary workers' movement in the countries concerned.

There are differences—at times important ones—between revolutionary democrats in different countries; these differences extend to political and ideological orientations and activities. This is to be explained by the varying situations in these countries, their different levels of socio-economic development, by differing correlations of class forces. It is also connected with the history of revolutionary democracy in each country, the influences that have shaped it, with the character and strength of its link with its social base, and with other factors. Yet revolutionary democracy as a whole has some common substantive features that allow us to view it as a *uniform phenomenon: similarity of social bases, of basic political positions, of important aspects of its ideological platform.*

Moreover, revolutionary democracy demonstrates its "uniformity" through solidarity on a number of substantive problems, by parallel or even coordinated responses to some international events, especially those that affect its interests as a specific current within the national liberation movement.¹

A good measure of this are the political and ideological contacts among revolutionary democrats and, especially, their aspiration for rapprochement and the development of a more or less common, if not single, ideological platform, not the least purpose of which is to shape their ideological identity more precisely and to strengthen their prestige within their countries and without. The following seminars were held to achieve this

¹ Typical in this respect is the unanimous and bitterly hostile reaction of the revolutionary democratic regimes to action directed to the overthrow of any one of them. For instance, the military coup in Ghana was condemned bluntly at special sessions of the Politbureau of the Democratic Party of Guinea (DPG) and of the Sudanese Union of Mali. The Arab Socialist Union of Egypt called the events in Ghana an imperialist conspiracy against the freedom, unity and progress of Africa (*Al-Gomhouria*, Cairo, March 1, 1966). The National Movement of the Revolution in the Congo (Brazzaville) took a similar position, condemning the coup as "an offensive conducted by imperialists against the rising forces of Africa and against genuine independence". Finally, President Nyerere of Tanzania expressed his support for Nkrumah's regime (*The Nationalist*, March 1, 1966).

goal: "Africa: National and Social Revolution", in October 1966, in Cairo (in addition to Communists, its participants included representatives of the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt, the Democratic Party of Guinea, the FLN of Algeria, the Sudanese Union of Mali, Congolese patriots, Syrian Baathists and others); "Socialism in the Arab World", in May 1967, in Algeria (with the participation of the Algerian FLN, the Egyptian ASU, Syrian Baathists, the People's Democratic Party of the Sudan, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Communist Parties of Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, etc.); "Arab Ideological Conference", in March 1970, in Khartoum (representatives of the Sudan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, Kuwait, the PLO and so on took part).

At any rate, revolutionary democrats have set themselves this task. The organ of the FLN of Algeria, the weekly *El Moudjahid*, calling for a meeting of the "progressive revolutionary forces and parties of Africa", justified the call by the fact that revolutionary democrats must make their contribution to creating the theoretical bases for solving the problems facing the Third World, thereby ensuring coordination of actions and harmonious development, by the fact that they must help crystallize general concepts for the purpose of elucidating the problems of development, resolving the questions of building socialism and frustrating colonialist conspiracies.

The final communique adopted by the participants in the Algerian seminar stressed that the goal of the seminar had been "to achieve clearer and deeper mutual understanding with respect to the problems of the Arab revolution and of all that can promote the rapprochement of progressive Arab forces and lay the bases for their unity" and that "the seminar of Arab socialists states its firm resolve to continue its role as an instrument for achieving unity of ideas in the Arab revolutionary movement in all parts of the Arab nation".¹ Simultaneously, the participants in the seminar described themselves as "the vanguard of socialists of the Arab world".²

One may add to this that the 5th Regional Conference of the Syrian Baath Party (May 1971)—as the statement by its

¹ *El Moudjahid*, May 28-29, 1967.

² *Ibid.*

regional leadership said—"approved the idea of calling a general conference of progressive Arab parties and forces for the purpose of developing a single platform on the principal present-day questions".¹

The social basis of revolutionary democracy is provided by the peasant masses, the petty-bourgeois and semi-proletarian urban population and radical circles of the nationalist intelligentsia, all of whom consciously or more often spontaneously coalesce into a social bloc. The actions of the revolutionary democratic parties reflect in first order the interests and attitudes of these forces. From whatever milieu revolutionary democratic leaders may come, in one way or another they are responsive above all to the impulses coming from the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie.

Revolutionary democrats themselves, even though belonging to different groupings, universally emphasize—and this is to a certain extent indicative of the social basis of revolutionary democracy, though one of course can not exclude tactical considerations—that they speak in the name of the peasants and small producers and wholly represent their aspirations.

A characteristic of no little importance is the accent that revolutionary democrats place on the special role of the peasantry in social development and the liberation struggle in colonial and dependent countries.

Representatives of the ASU of Egypt, speaking at the seminar "Africa: National and Social Revolution", repeatedly stressed that "despite the growing importance of the industrial working class ... the task of defending progressive regimes falls mainly on the peasants".² The resolutions of the conference of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in Mwanza in October 1967 juxtaposed the peasantry to the working class, to which was attributed an "illegitimate" aspiration to improve its standard of living at the expense of the peasantry.

Of course, this scarcely means that the *policy* of the revolutionary democratic parties can not also reflect, to varying degrees, the interests of working people as a whole. Moham-

¹ *Al-Baath*, May 19, 1971.

² See, *Africa: National and Social Revolution*, Prague, 1967, p. 190.

med Harmel, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Tunisian Communist Party, stressed at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969 that "progressive forces of a petty-bourgeois and nationalist origin have emerged and are developing that lead the process of deep-going social and economic reforms reaching to a degree beyond the framework of the national democratic revolution". He added: "This process does not properly reflect the interests of these social strata, it reflects the interests of larger sections of the people."¹ For this reason, and not only because of their common anti-imperialist, patriotic line and the existing level of class self-consciousness within the working class, some proletarian strata follow the revolutionary democrats in a number of newly independent countries.²

It should be specially emphasized that revolutionary democratic regimes (some of them at any rate) strive to take into account, too, the aspirations of certain native entrepreneurial circles, to include them in the social basis of the coalition and in its political representation. We refer chiefly to circles that may with equal justice be considered either the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie or the lower strata of the middle bourgeoisie (e.g., "non-exploiting national capital", as the Egyptian National Charter terms them).³

Is the native bourgeoisie as a *class* a part of the social basis of revolutionary democracy, however? The experience of almost all countries with a socialist orientation shows that attempts after the advent to power to cooperate with the native bourgeoisie and to involve the capital of the latter in national reconstruction—attempts characteristic of revolutionary democracy, at least in the more developed countries such as Egypt, Syria and Burma—do not meet with a favorable response by the native bourgeoisie. And subsequently the political and economic programs of states with a socialist

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Moscow 1969, p. 186.

² The leadership group in Tanzania, according to the journal *Rināscita* (August 11, 1972, p. 18), "represents the small working class, the numerous rural proletariat and poor peasants, and the Tanzanian intelligentsia".

³ See, *The Charter*, Cairo, 1962, p. 68.

orientation are met with outright opposition by the bourgeoisie.

Well-to-do peasants and even kulaks have in a number of instances a more significant voice in revolutionary democratic parties and regimes. In relatively developed countries, they are sometimes a part of revolutionary democracy's social basis and are represented accordingly in its political structure.

It is not enough, however, to confine ourselves to this sort of catalogue—to do so would be to present an oversimplified and incomplete picture. We must also recognize that there are within the framework of revolutionary democracy some petty-bourgeois groups and intelligentsia circles that are subject to bourgeois influence and in effect champion policies meeting the bourgeoisie's interests. And *through* such groups the *bourgeoisie* is, to some extent, also represented.

Yet again, forces favoring a bourgeois orientation may begin to play an increasingly important role in the social basis and, especially, in the political structure of revolutionary democracy as a consequence of a negative evolution of some trend. But most often this occurs through the neo-bourgeois, bureaucratic circles that arise, so to speak, within revolutionary democracy itself and as a result of its policies, that is to say, within the framework of the social, political and economic structures that revolutionary democracy creates. This process as a rule simultaneously marks the degeneration of the revolutionary democratic system, the loss by that system of its original character.

It is important to take the following circumstance into account, too. The groups and strata that comprise revolutionary democracy's social basis do not—because of their specific social features (the more so given the conditions in former colonies and dependencies), and especially because of the specific nature of revolutionary democracy itself—provide the *immediate socio-political basis* of revolutionary democratic regimes. Most often—even as a rule—the situation is otherwise: narrow political or military-political groupings and apparatuses serve as that immediate basis.

Revolutionary democracy maintains its link with its social roots differently in different countries. In Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of

Yemen and Tanzania, the link is easily traced, for from the start it has been maintained directly through mass revolutionary democratic parties and other organizations and groups: the Democratic Party of Guinea, the Convention People's Party of Ghana, the Sudanese Union of Mali, the National Liberation Front in Algeria, the left wing of the Syrian and Iraqi Baath parties, the united political organization of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Tanganyika (later Tanzanian) African National Union, and so on. In Egypt, Burma and Somali, where the leading political parties were in the hands of reaction and the non-proletarian revolutionary elements sought and found organized support in the army, this contact could at first be implemented only within the armed forces and only later emerged (or may yet emerge) outside this framework, through the establishment of suitable political organizations.

Understanding of the social basis of revolutionary democracy by itself provides the key to understanding the major role that basis plays in the present social development of many new states. We spoke above of the place that the peasantry, petty-bourgeois and semi-proletarian "intermediate" strata in the city and the intelligentsia hold in the former colonies and dependencies. Enough has been said of the distinguishing features of the working class and the local bourgeoisie in these countries, of the weakness of their position in many former colonies and dependencies—a phenomenon typical of the majority of countries where revolutionary democrats have been active.

It has been noted, too, that through their extensive participation in the anti-colonial struggle, the weight of the peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and, even more, the intelligentsia in the public life of the formerly enslaved countries has grown considerably. At the same time, there has been an important shift in the public mood of these social forces, primarily among those groups that have been directly affected by the national liberation struggle. In this milieu, demands for a radical solution of the agrarian question, for the elimination of feudal and pre-feudal forms of exploitation, for the defense of petty production and the petty proprietor from the pressure and ruinous competition of major dealers, have gained unprec-

edented acuity. There has emerged a readiness to support a determined struggle against imperialism and for the deliverance of working people from oppression and exploitation by foreign monopolies, landlords and the feudal and tribal nobility, and a struggle for the solution of other democratic tasks. In other words, the politically active strata of the peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie, and patriotic intelligentsia have, in the specific situation that has taken shape in the course of and as a result of the struggle for independence, consciously or spontaneously moved to the position of *revolutionary democratization*.

Simultaneously, a sharp turn toward anti-capitalism, toward the slogan of socialism, is observed among these strata, a turn prepared by the experience of the colonial years, by the struggle for national independence and the achievements of the socialist states.

The following statement by H. Boumediène is typical in this respect. Speaking at a conference of FLN leaders, he emphasized that the advancement of socialist slogans in Algeria was a direct result of the tenacious national liberation struggle, the whole course of which prepared the way for them. "The Revolution that began in the past as an armed struggle," he said, "can not be isolated from the present stage, the stage in which socialism is being built.... The introduction of self-rule is only a consequence of the struggle of our people.... Self-rule—this is the path that we have selected for the attainment of the social goals of the armed struggle...."¹

The process of radicalizing extensive social strata in the enslaved countries in the course of the national liberation struggle has been noted by bourgeois scholars. For instance, Basil Davidson, an English scholar who has authored a number of books on Africa, states that most enslaved countries have demanded not only independence, but also changes in social conditions. He has written: "The rise of popular nationalism was accordingly not just a political reaction to colonial rule. It was also a movement of social regeneration."²

¹ *El Moudjahid*, December 10, 1965.

² Basil Davidson, *Which Way Africa?*, London, 1964, p. 105.

Given the correlation that at present prevails in the emerging countries between the potential offered by capitalist development and the urgent democratic tasks of the struggle against imperialism, socio-economic backwardness and out-lived forms of exploitation, sympathy for and advancement of the slogan of socialism is a typical feature of the revolutionary democratic platform. At the same time, this sympathy is actually a phase and a form, within the framework of fluctuations specific to the given classes, of the process of the peasant and petty-bourgeois masses toward socialism, a process that occurs as the proletariat extends its strength and influence on the global scale.

Thus, in a broader sense revolutionary democracy is the politically active strata of the peasant masses, urban petty bourgeoisie and radical nationalist intelligentsia, all of whom have adopted a platform of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-capitalist struggle. The elaboration and substance of this platform is determined both by the experience and current tasks of the national liberation struggle and by the current international situation. The call for revolutionary democratization is expressed clearly in the actions of the elements of these strata that are most active politically, in the action of the political representatives—revolutionary democracy in the narrow sense of the word—of the revolutionary democratic parties, organizations and groups.

It should be borne in mind, however, that revolutionary democracy is not a static but a dynamic socio-political category, in which the possibility and necessity of movement are inherent. This is of course a consequence of the class propensities of the social forces that comprise it and of the political instability peculiar to them. But to an even greater degree, it is determined by the very essence of the revolutionary democratic platform, which does not make an ultimate class, political choice: unlike the proletariat and bourgeoisie, revolutionary democrats have an *intermediate, transitional* platform. It is a platform concerned with relatively *specific* tasks of social development at a *specific* stage of the liberation struggle (and the platform quite naturally varies at different stages of development and even to a certain extent at different points in one and the same stage). Carrying out these tasks, and

even more a change in stages, introduces modifications in the substance of the revolutionary democratic platform which means that the forces of revolutionary democracy change, too, some groups leaving, new ones joining.

Thus, it may happen that the social basis and political structure of revolutionary democracy is comprised, or rather is still comprised, of forces that in fact hold to a platform which with respect to the *new* tasks can not be called revolutionary democratic.

Naturally, revolutionary democrats, both in political parties and in groups, reflect not only the strong but also the weak points of the social strata whose interests they represent. In turn, the weaknesses and negative features of these strata and the revolutionary democracy that corresponds to them can not be isolated from the overall situation of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, from the social climate peculiar to these countries. We have in mind factors already touched upon in the preceding exposition.

The social roots of revolutionary democracy, of the political parties and groups that manifest and simultaneously shape and develop the outlook of the politically active strata of the peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and patriotic, nationalist intelligentsia, are quite evident in the ideological platform and political program of these parties and groups.

They advance an extensive program of reforms that are *democratic* in their socio-economic meaning and *revolutionary* as applied to the formerly enslaved countries. And revolutionary democrats are often prepared to implement their program by revolutionary methods, through determined struggle against imperialism and domestic reaction connected thereto, relying—though in varying degree—on the support of the masses. We shall have more to say later of the substance of this program and on the direction in and degree to which it has been implemented. Here it is important to emphasize that in the conditions of the former colonial and dependent countries, where the cleansing of the Augean stables of colonialism in public life has just begun, where the burden of distorted socio-economic forms imposed by imperialism or rooted in tradition is unbearably heavy, where every step forward must be taken against the desperate opposition of

reaction, inspired and supported by imperialists—in such conditions, no consistent democrat can be anything but revolutionary.

Revolutionary democrats, as mentioned above, also advance the slogan of building socialism. In some cases (Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Ghana, etc.), the socialist orientation in effect gained the upper hand among revolutionary democrats during the struggle against colonial regimes and for the conquest of power, and as a rule the progressive currents in the metropolises have had a particularly noticeable influence. In other cases (Egypt, Burma, Tanzania), socialist slogans came to the fore only after revolutionary democracy's advent to power. Along with nationalist credos, various conceptions of socialism serve as the ideological banner for revolutionary democratic parties. Enough evidence has now accumulated—both in the sense of the appropriate documents of the revolutionary democratic parties and in the sense of practical activity by these parties—to consider all this on an adequate factual basis.

REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY'S IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL PLATFORM

1. Some Aspects of the World Outlook and Sociology of Revolutionary Democracy

Most of the ideological concepts that revolutionary democrats employ have poorly developed theoretical underpinnings. This does not stem solely from the fact that the practical tasks of the struggle, especially during the elimination of colonial or semi-colonial dependency, do not provide favorable opportunities for theorizing. Important, too, are the heterogeneity of the social basis of revolutionary democracy, a basis that is not adapted to an integral understanding of the world, and the complex historical evolution of the revolutionary democratic current, an evolution that has, moreover, occurred in circumstances in which events have often outstripped ideology.

It was easier to unite the socially ill-matched forces of the national liberation movement without a detailed platform—a consideration that, not infrequently, is important to this day.¹ Of consequence, too, of course, has been the fact that many revolutionary democratic parties did not advance socialist slogans at the beginning of the struggle, but only at a later point, in light of and in an attempt to provide a theoretical foundation for their own activity.

¹ "The parties have avoided the adoption of clearly outlined programs or platforms because of the divergency of interests.... Government parties ... minimize divisive issues and attempt to postpone unpopular decisions until a greater degree of stability is achieved," writes Dorothy Dodge, an American professor of political science. "It is feared that detailed platforms might split the coalition and weaken their power in the state." (Dorothy Dodge, *African Politics in Perspective*, Princeton, 1966, p. 92.)

The heterogeneity and petty-bourgeois character of the class basis of revolutionary democracy, combined with other sociopolitical and gnoseological factors,¹ gives rise, too, to one of the most important characteristics of revolutionary democracy's ideological constructs—their inconsistency and contradictoriness. They range side by side theses from different and often mutually exclusive sources—from Marxist propositions to social democratic ideas, from religious dogmas and traditional notions to the views of the enlightenment and classical political economy, from Gandhian principles to the ideas of the utopian socialists. Further, theses that have been so borrowed undergo a certain transformation as they are adapted to the overall spirit of the doctrine.

For all the overall lack of system in the theoretical bases of revolutionary democracy's political conceptions, ideas farthest removed from scientific socialism are those relating to philosophy and world outlook. Recognition, at least verbally, of philosophical materialism and the dialectical method (often with deviations in the *concrete* interpretation of specific propositions or features) can really be only found in the official documents of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Congolese Workers' Party, the Democratic Party of Guinea, the former Sudanese Union of Mali, and a few others.

"Our world outlook," Marien Ngouabi, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Congolese Workers' Party, has said "is materialist, and we consider religious or other idealistic world outlooks to be wrong.

"For us man is not the product of nature and matter, but, above all, the product of society, of which he is the creator and organizer. Man, consciousness cannot exist outside of society."

Complete or partial rejection of philosophical materialism by other revolutionary democratic movements is linked with their attitude toward religion. These movements (with the excep-

¹ We have in mind, for example, the multiplicity of ideological influences, the emergence of revolutionary democracy at the height of the acute conflict between two world systems, the aspiration for a "home-grown" ideology, the strength of nationalist concepts and forms to which revolutionary democrats try to add anti-capitalist substance and, finally, the lack of a scientific methodology.

tion of the united political organization of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Congolese Workers' Party, the Democratic Party of Guinea, the Sudanese Union of Mali, the left Baathists of Syria and, to a certain extent, the Burma Socialist Program Party) often take as one of their main tenets the principle of religiosity, emphasizing not only their compatibility but also their inseparable link with religion. This religious "sanctification" is often combined with attacks on atheist principles, on materialism, which is crudely interpreted as a striving to obtain only material goods to the detriment of spiritual values. Without question, this is a manifestation of prejudices nourished not only by lack of knowledge and misunderstanding, but also by deliberate reactionary propaganda.

Nkrumah, for one, more than once called himself a Marxist and at the same time a Christian, adding that he saw "no contradiction between the two".¹ It is true that in his *Consciencism* Nkrumah took a bold step forward. In effect, he juxtaposed materialism (though under the name of "philosophical conscience"²) to idealism and religion. However, even in this book Nkrumah, in the estimation of his intimate collaborator Habib Niang, affirms that though his philosophy "rests firmly on materialist bases, it is not necessarily atheistic".³

"The human equality before God which is the basis of all the great religions of the world is also the basis of the political philosophy of socialism," emphasized Julius Nyerere in a lecture on socialism delivered in April 1967 at Cairo University.⁴ In an interview with *Jeune Afrique*, Nyerere stated that his religious outlook was one of the matters on which his ideology differs from Marxism.⁵

Many revolutionary democratic leaders of the Arab world have repeatedly underscored their adherence to Islam and the fact that Islam is an important source of their ideas.

¹ *Démocratie nouvelle*, March 1966, p. 47.

² Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, London, 1964, p. 1.

³ *Jeune Afrique*, October 31, 1965, p. 30.

⁴ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. Essays on Socialism*, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, London, New York, 1968, p. 79.

⁵ See, *Jeune Afrique*, January 15, 1972, p. 14.

The constitution of the United Arab Republic adopted in 1964 proclaimed in its first article that "The United Arab Republic is a democratic, socialist state based on the Alliance of the working powers of the people" and simultaneously (Article 5) proclaimed Islam the state religion.¹

The central organ of the FLN, *Révolution africaine*, has emphasized that socialism in Algeria is based on actuality and on Arabo-Islamic civilization.²

Despite the presence of important materialist tenets, despite the utilization to a certain extent of the dialectical method, idealist motifs with a Buddhist coloration are quite extensively reflected in the documents of the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). Idealist influence is noticeable in many sections of its philosophical platform *The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment*. In particular, the tasks of the moral perfection of man and society as a whole are considered from the idealist point of view.³ At the same time, the Policy Declaration, as distinct from earlier documents, openly rejects bigotry and hypocritical religiosity.⁴

One can trace a definite tendency characteristic of revolutionary democracy as a whole. The degree to which a leader or group emphasizes religion, or the degree to which the entire platform is imbued with religion, the persistence of the religious element, are as a rule directly proportional to religion's place in the political spectrum of revolutionary democracy.

Of course, the stand taken on this question by revolutionary democrats must be examined with a view to the milieu in which they operate, with a view to the enormous force of religious ideas and beliefs in their countries. Socio-economic backwardness, religion's emergence in a specific period as an important form of expression for anti-colonial ideas—a form accessible to broad strata of the population—and the consequent increase of religion's (and, not infrequently, of the clergy's)

¹ *Al Ahram*, March 24, 1964.

² See, *Révolution africaine*, June 9-15, 1972.

³ Ne Win, *Burma Has Taken a New Road*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 198-223 (in Russian).

⁴ Ne Win, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

prestige explain this phenomenon well enough. It is utilized not only by reactionary but sometimes also by progressive forces.

It must be conceded that, to a certain extent, the overemphasis on the religious factor, the accent on Islamic civilization, on the Islamic "roots" of socialism, is in some instances nourished by nationalist inclinations and is a form of their manifestation.

Some scholars are inclined at times to conclude, on the basis of the platforms advanced by many revolutionary democrats, that their conceptions are religious; from this, they draw conclusions as to the social role of these conceptions. This approach often confuses *form* and *content*.

In fact, many of the religious principles in revolutionary democracy, and especially in its radical wing, are dictated principally by the effort to secure the broadest possible popular support, to wrest this dangerous weapon from the hands of reaction; this of course scarcely excludes the possibility that revolutionary democrats may have personal religious beliefs or that some may wish to turn this weapon against more progressive forces.

In particular, the leadership of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somali, as its President Mohamed Siad Barre has said, considers its attitude toward religion to be one of the manifestations of the original application of socialist theory under Somalian conditions, a result of the profound religiosity of the population.

Revolutionary democratic leaders often decisively reject attempts to exploit religion in the interests of reaction, in defiance of the peoples' aspirations for social progress. In an interview with the editor of the journal *Blitz*, for example, Gamal Abdel Nasser forthrightly condemned the plans of pro-imperialist forces to turn Islam into a tool of reaction. He opposed "the perversion of Islam to provide a religious cover for a reactionary, feudal, colonialist plot against freedom and sovereignty, social development, the liberation movement and the revolutionary objectives of the people of this region".¹

At the same time, revolutionary democrats' attitude to

¹ *Blitz*, May 7, 1966, p. 12.

religion is undoubtedly one of the most complicated and contradictory aspects of the socialist concepts they advance. This is the more true since their stand on this question is of broader import and may affect not only other elements within the general framework of ideas but also revolutionary democracy's political line and may even serve as a philosophical basis for its transformation.

Revolutionary democrats are much closer to scientific socialism in their understanding of the processes of social development. Naturally, the degree of their proximity differs among different revolutionary democratic groups and parties; basically the gradation already elucidated with respect to questions of philosophical materialism carries over into this area. The most consistent analysis of social phenomena and the social process from the viewpoint of historical materialism are the documents of revolutionary democracy in the People's Republic of the Congo and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Revolutionary democrats in Mali stand immediately alongside them.

The leaders of the Democratic Party of Guinea, too, in their theoretical views on social development proceed to a great extent from the propositions of historical materialism, despite the fact that they not infrequently interpret these propositions in their own manner and supplement them with ideas from the French and English enlightenment and from ethical philosophy.

The ideas of other revolutionary democratic parties and groups typically depart further from materialist principles of the understanding of social development, for which they substitute moral and ethical factors, often of an outright idealist stripe. From Nyerere's point of view (and he takes an extreme position in this matter), history is moved and human conduct guided by ideological motivation that is in turn dictated by men's inner motivation to no less an extent than by objective reality around.

However, this sort of deviation often occurs against the background of a general recognition of the materialist principles of the social process and in the form of a reinterpretation of these principles as they are applied in practice.

It is in their attitude toward imperialism and colonialism where *all* revolutionary democrats come closest to a materialist analysis of social development—here they increasingly employ the tenets of Marxism.

Naturally, of greatest interest and significance is the position revolutionary democrats take on the matter of the class struggle and, stemming from this, their position vis-à-vis socialism as a social structure, the ways to achieve it, and the basic class forces for the creation of the new society.

We should note first that revolutionary democratic doctrines view the people, the laboring strata, not only as a suffering mass evoking sympathy, but also as the creators of history. Typical in this respect is the view expressed in a joint communique by the Algerian FLN and the Egyptian ASU, which emphasized "the interests of the popular masses, who are the true authors of the revolution".¹ BSPP documents also include the proposition that the people plays the decisive role in social development. These documents proclaim that "man is the most important thing", allot the decisive role to working people (by which is meant peasants, industrial workers and intelligentsia) and indicate that they are "the principal moving creative force" in the history of society.²

Further, revolutionary democratic concepts as a rule now presume the existence of class struggle both on the level of human history and in the formerly enslaved countries themselves. The documents of the revolutionary democratic parties and the speeches of most leaders of these parties recognize the class character of society in their countries and the existence of classes or, at least, different social groups. The class struggle is considered an objective reality in the development of these countries, at least in the period of colonial domination and at present, though the class struggle is also held to be a result of the "destructive" influence of colonialism, which "corrupted" the indigenous way of life.

At the same time, revolutionary democrats approach this question in varying ways. The most consistent recognition of the class struggle is to be found in the documents of the

¹ *El Moudjahid*, July 30, 1966.

² Ne Win, *op. cit.*, pp. 204, 215.

National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Congolese Workers' Party (and earlier in the National Revolutionary Movement). It can be said of a number of other revolutionary democratic parties that they have made definite strides toward the ideas of historical materialism.

The February-March (1966) plenum of the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Movement gave a class characterization of Congolese society. All the programmatic documents of the Congolese Workers' Party are imbued with the spirit of the theory of class struggle. The Party Program adopted at the CWP's Second Extraordinary Congress (December 1972) stresses that the Congolese Workers' Party must be a class party and the vanguard of the Congolese working class. "Our analysis," Marien Ngouabi, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Congolese Workers' Party, has said "is always premized on historical materialism, the basis of which is the law of class struggle the motive force of history.... We recognize the existence of classes and conduct our struggle from working-class positions. Though too general and incomplete, our analysis of classes in Congolese society has disclosed the existence, both in the past and now, of antagonistic social classes."¹

A statement on the class struggle figures in the Policy Declaration of the Burma Socialist Program Party, "The Burmese Way to Socialism," and in its philosophical platform. "...Antagonism between the exploiting and exploited classes," notes the philosophical platform, "has been observed throughout human history. Consequently, the history of mankind is not simply a history of states, nations, wars and individuals, but also a history of class struggle."²

Egypt's National Charter declares that the "inevitable and natural class struggles cannot be ignored or denied" and even allows that this struggle can have a bitter and sanguinary character.³ "We still have classes and a class struggle. We can not say that inequality no longer exists," declared Nasser in a speech delivered to Egyptian students studying abroad.⁴ He

¹ *World Marxist Review* No. 5, 1975, pp. 41-42.

² Ne Win, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

³ *The Charter*, p. 44.

⁴ *L' Economiste Egyptien*, Alexandria, August 10, 1966.

also said at a mass meeting at the Helwan combine in March 1968 that "we must understand that where there is revolution there is counterrevolution".¹

The documents of the Democratic Party of Guinea (DPG) take note of the intense differentiation of Guinean society and of the class struggle. The general resolution of the DPG's Eighth Congress speaks in particular of the existence in Guinea "of a class with a bourgeois tendency; if this tendency is not eliminated now it will give rise to antagonistic classes".² The Statute of the DPG adopted in January 1969 remarks that the party has as its goal the struggle against the exploitation of man and that the party "recognizes class struggle as an essential and historically just means of conquering and exercising political, economic, social and cultural power for the entire people".³

It is more difficult to pin down the attitude of the leaders of the now disbanded Sudanese Union of Mali toward classes and the class struggle. Here, as in some other parties, ideological problems were handled by party figures whose views not infrequently diverged. Typically, however, the Party organ — *L'Essor* — stressed that the class struggle is the moving force of history.

The Arusha Declaration, the principal ideological statement by TANU, recognizes the class struggle. In Tanzania, reads the Declaration, there are still "elements of capitalism and feudalism and their temptations. These elements could expand and entrench themselves".⁴

The thesis of class struggle figures in the Stage Program of the Syrian Baathists, in the resolutions of the Sixth Pan-Arab Congress of Baath, and even more precisely in its subsequent documents.

Naturally, one must keep in mind that revolutionary democrats most often read a different meaning into class struggle than do Marxists. For most of them, recognition of the

¹ *Al-Shabab al-Arabi*, Cairo, March 4, 1968.

² "8^{me} Congrès, National du Parti Démocratique de Guinée. Résolution Générale", *Horoya*, Conakry, October 3, 1967.

³ *Ibid.*, January 17, 1969.

⁴ *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance*, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 3.

class struggle is neither an organic part nor still less the pivot of their ideological platform and action programs. In many instances, this recognition is more a response to a political situation, to the lessons of social development and the struggle for progressive reforms in the years of independence, a response to the distribution of political forces that has taken shape, a reflection of this distribution. Moreover, the thesis of class struggle is often advanced *post factum* as the justification for measures taken by revolutionary democrats or as an explanation of difficulties that have arisen in the countries they lead.

As a rule, recognition of the class struggle is not based on a scientific socio-economic analysis, on understanding of the economic roots of the emergence of classes and of class relations. It should especially be stressed that the national democratic parties of Tropical Africa ordinarily do not always take consistent approach to the specific forms of exploitation and social contradictions in African society.

The great majority of revolutionary democrats in effect draw their ideas on the class division of society and on classes from non-Marxist sources or at the least develop ideas suggested therein. Not place in the realm of production, but position in the system of distribution and income level constitute, from their point of view, the principal cause and basis of the class division of society, or at the least the division into working people, exploited and exploiting forces, into proletariat and bourgeoisie.

In practice, it is this concept that provides the gnoseological and methodological basis for the revolutionary democrats' views on the class struggle and the class aspects of building socialism. This shows clearly, for example, in the thesis on "non-exploiting capital", brought forward by the leaders of the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt as one of the specific features of the ASU's ideology.¹ This category is said to include those members of the native bourgeoisie who have a profit of

¹ It must of course be kept in mind that emphasis on this thesis is also a manifestation of the objective coincidence at this stage of development of some of the interests of the working masses and intelligentsia with some of the aspirations of certain circles of the national bourgeoisie.

no more than 10 thousand Egyptian pounds per year and pay their workers a "just wage".

The Arab Socialist Union leaders who had brought forward the thesis on "non-exploiting capital" proceeded from the fact that exploitation is linked not with private property as such but with specific conditions that lend it an exploitative character. Private property acquires an exploitative character, in their view, when it is large and "outside control", and the distribution of goods is, as a consequence, "unjust". In this view, the exploitative character of capital is overcome by limiting its size, by giving workers a "just" wage and the right to share in profits and management, and by preventing bourgeois control over production (and, naturally, over political life).

Those who drew up the National Charter and subsequent official Egyptian documents took the same approach to the definition of "worker" and "peasant". Workers, as defined by Nasser in a speech delivered in July 1961, are "all, from the President of the Republic, who lives on his salary, down to the last worker, who also lives on the wages he receives".¹ This definition was later modified. Workers meet two further conditions—they have a right to join a trade union and they do not employ hired labour. Peasants, according to the Charter, are those engaged in agriculture who live in the countryside and possess no more than 25 feddans of land, on the condition that the agrarian reform law does not extend to this land. This was subsequently reviewed; the permissible land holding was reduced to 10 feddans, but the general principles were not changed.

The same sort of view can, in fact, be found in statements of Julius Nyerere, who has said that workers, if they demand an "unjust" share of the wealth, are "potential capitalists".² Symptomatic, too, is the following proposition from the Arusha Declaration: "Although when we talk of exploitation we usually think of capitalists, we should not forget that there are many fish in the sea. They eat each other. The large ones

¹ *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, July 21, 1961.

² Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. The Basis of African Socialism*, Dar es Salaam, 1962, p. 7.

eat the small ones, and the small ones eat those who are even smaller. There are two possible ways of dividing the people in our country. We can put the capitalists and feudalists on one side, and the peasants and workers on the other. But we can also divide the people into urban dwellers on one side, and those who live in the rural areas on the other. If we are not careful we might get to the position where the real exploitation in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers exploiting the peasants."¹

Burmese revolutionary democrats, as indicated by their documents, consider the following to be workers: in villages, agricultural workers; in cities, hired laborers employed in workshops, factories, transportation and communication enterprises, government bodies and private offices, and in academic, scientific and cultural institutions.²

The same treatment of classes—not only their specifically political position but perhaps also to some extent their tactical position—is reflected in the revolutionary democrats' analysis of the basic distribution of social forces in their countries. In most cases, this analysis lacks specificity and frequently boils down to exclusively political evaluations, without taking into account the social background. Leaders of the Democratic Party of Guinea, for example, differentiate between a "counterrevolutionary class" and a "revolutionary class", the latter including workers, peasants, intelligentsia, women and soldiers in the Guinean People's Army. This approach is quite understandable given their treatment of the social contradictions in Guinea. According to Sékou Touré, "*differences connected with social position are not contradictions....* If there are differences of an antagonistic nature, they consist in the attitude of different people to the revolution and, through this, to the course of action that is determined by the people, for the people. Falsehood and truth, courage and opportunism, egoism and generosity, theft and honesty, those are contradictory concepts" (emphasis added — *Auth.*).³

¹ *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance*, p. 13.

² See, Ne Win, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

³ Sékou Touré, *L'Afrique et la révolution*, T. 13, S. 1., S. d., p. 105.

The leadership of the Sudanese Union of Mali as a whole viewed the class struggle not as a clash of the economic and political interests of exploiters and exploited, but principally as suppression of the opposition of all elements obstructing—with or without design—the implementation of the party's policy. Seydou Badian wrote that, in African countries, "it would seem that similar elements coming from the same social strata participate on both sides of the struggle, which gives us grounds to assert that *the class enemy in societies of this type is not a reality. The differentiation is not economic or functional, but ideological and appears only through trial*" (emphasis added—Auth.).¹

In the last phase of its activity, as the situation in the country became more acute, the leadership of the Sudanese Union repeated the thesis of class struggle with increasing insistence and bluntness, but the methodological approach to this question remained, in effect, the same.

The tendency to substitute or confuse social analysis with purely political analysis of the conflicting forces in the class struggle—and the consequent lack of clarity or even obscuring of social bases—is in one way or another characteristic of many revolutionary democratic ideologies. In this context the attitude of revolutionary democrats of Guinea is also of certain interest.

Such an approach to classes and class contradictions naturally has serious political and theoretical consequences (and provides the basis for a certain political line) in the conception of socialist society: its nature, the ways to achieve it and the moving forces in the transition thereto. Not infrequently, this approach makes for an inability—not just a lack of desire—to identify the role and importance of various classes in social life and in progressive development. Above all, in one way or another this approach is inextricably bound up with the fact that the revolutionary democrats' attitude to the class struggle is negative in principle.

The majority of revolutionary democrats view class contradictions and clashes in the former colonies and dependencies (and, accordingly, their recognition of this struggle) as an

¹ Seydou Badian, *Les dirigeants d'Afrique Noire face à leur peuple*, Paris, 1964, p. 162.

imposed and *undesirable* social phenomenon, as an *unavoidable necessity*. Linked with this stance to one degree or another are their attempts to avoid exacerbating the class struggle, to look for the nodal point of social contradictions in the ideological and moral-political realm, their accent on the special role of "re-education" and "self-education" as a means for solving social contradictions "within the masses" and even between antagonistic class forces.

In this respect, the point of view of the leadership of the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt under Nasser as to the *forms* by which social contradictions can be overcome, their bias toward smoothing over these contradictions within "the union of the labor forces of the people", their emphasis on the Arab Socialist Union as the organization within which this process should take place, can be considered typical (taking into account, of course, the ASU's political place within the revolutionary democratic current as a whole). The problem is put as follows in the National Charter: "...The peaceful resolution of class struggle can not be achieved unless the power of reaction is first and foremost deprived of all its weapons. The removal of such clash will pave the way to peaceful solutions to class struggles. It does not remove the contradictions in the rest of the social classes, but it creates a change for the possibility of resolving them peacefully, namely, by means of democratic action.... The cooperation between the powers representing the working people is the legitimate substitute for the collaboration between feudalism and the exploiting capital."¹ The *Declaration of March 30th* emphasizes that the Arab Socialist Union is the "vanguard that can effect political cooperation by effacing class contradictions".²

Noting the emphatic Egyptian disinclination to speak of class struggle among the "forces of labor", e.g., between private industrialists and workers, between rich peasants and field hands, and citing the Secretary of the Arab Socialist Union on Ideological Problems to the effect that this is the result of the need "to defend national union, since imperialism can drive a wedge into any crack", the newspaper *L'Unita* has observed:

¹ *The Charter*, pp. 44-45.

² *Al-Ahram*, March 31, 1968.

"We are scarcely speaking here of crude tactics. We are speaking of a far-reaching strategic conception that represents the construction of socialism as something gradual and patient, as 'painless' as possible, a strategic conception that presumes that time will solve many problems and that, for instance ... considers the consequences of the division of inheritances to be the simplest means for the almost 'automatic' liquidation within a few years of the greatest landed estates."¹

The fact that revolutionary democrats not infrequently take social progress to be the result not of class struggle but of the unification of social strata through limitations and compromise is confirmed, too, by the position taken by *The Spark*, which represents the left wing of the Convention People's Party of Ghana. "Membership of our Party is open to every man and woman who accepts the principles, programmes and constitution of the Party. It follows from this that we cannot count on the force of class interest to bind our Party together.... If we took this line, the inevitable consequence would be a bitter class struggle that would create untold havoc among our people and slow down the progress of the nation. We have chosen to follow a path that plays down the class war. This is why membership of our Party is open to all classes, to all tribes, to all religious creeds."²

Leaders of the Algerian FLN have also stressed the need to smooth over and reconcile social contradictions, at times using the familiar theses "on contradictions within the masses". Ahmed Kaid, for example, in a public lecture in April 1970 on "Class Contradictions and Contradictions Within the Masses" attempted to apply this formula to Algeria in order to show the absence of class conflicts within Algerian society and the existence therein only of non-antagonistic contradictions.³

Whatever the case may be, there are ample grounds for maintaining that the endeavor to avoid class struggle is to one degree or another peculiar to most revolutionary democratic ideologies and parties, irrespective of their official statements. This is only to be expected. We should recall that, identifying

¹ *L'Unita*, February 21, 1967.

² *The Spark*, Accra, March 5, 1965.

³ *El Moudjahid*, April 14, 1970.

the most typical features of petty-bourgeois democrats, Lenin wrote that they "are distinguished by an aversion to class struggle, by their dreams of avoiding it, by their efforts to smooth over, to reconcile, to remove sharp corners".¹

One may also cite (only with reservations as applied to revolutionary democrats, of course, but having in view that it applies completely to *this particular tendency*) Marx's statement that the politician who represents "the petty bourgeoisie, that is, a *transition class*, in which the interests of two classes are simultaneously mutually blunted, imagines himself elevated above class antagonism generally".²

It must be kept in mind here, of course, that the idea of social cooperation advanced by revolutionary democracy has a *different* import than the same idea has in bourgeois and reformist theories in the capitalist world, where its function is to defend the capitalist order. In newly independent countries, the idea of social cooperation is suggested to no small degree—or even principally—by the lack of class differentiation, by the muted expression of social contradictions and by nationalist factors ("we are called on to show a new way, not to repeat the mistakes of the developed countries, their flaws—class conflicts, wars", and so on). This idea develops and spreads against the background of a national liberation, anti-imperialist struggle that is gaining ever greater social acuity and in any case remains the primary current within the social process.

One should also keep in mind the role that tactical considerations play in the advancement of this and other ideas. For instance, the thesis of "non-exploiting capital" is to a large extent the ideological expression of the endeavor to involve certain circles of the native bourgeoisie in urgent tasks, especially in the economic sphere. Not for nothing did Nasser at a workers' meeting in May 1968 defend the thesis that the national, i.e., non-exploiting, bourgeoisie is an element—and at that not a secondary one—in the union of forces of the laboring masses, and stress as well that the native bourgeoisie is

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 108.

² K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, pp. 426-27.

"the principal financial force in the country's economy, and it should be encouraged".¹

Moreover, the emphasis on cooperation is to one degree or another suggested by the desire to mobilize for the cause of national revival and progressive development the broadest range of social forces, by the need to maintain a broad anti-imperialist front—even if this should be accomplished by dubious means.

Finally, we cannot avoid mentioning the fact that, given a tense—and especially an increasingly acute—domestic situation, revolutionary democrats are not ensured against left adventurist influences or extremes of the opposite sort. We have in mind what may be called an excessive, artificial stoking—to some extent purely verbal—of political contradictions, an obviously biased evaluation of the political situation within the given society. This happened, for instance, with part of the leadership of the Sudanese Union of Mali in 1967-1968.

At the present stage of the development of the theory and practice of socialism, it is imperative, especially for groups with revolutionary inclinations, that there be no distraction from economic factors and economic relations, from the problem of the exploitation of man by man—especially when the construction of a socialist society is at issue. Elimination of exploitation and development of the productive forces, socialization of the means of production, development of the state sector, development of agricultural cooperatives, economic planning—in all revolutionary democratic conceptions of socialism, these are recognized as the principles of building socialism. And here the line of demarcation setting revolutionary democratic ideologies apart from bourgeois and in general all reformist conceptions of "national socialism" is quite clear: revolutionary democrats place the question of socialism as a society and the ways to attain it on a different social foundation. In dealing with this question, revolutionary democrats juxtapose all laboring people, all non-exploiting classes, including at times so-called "non-exploiting capital", to the exploiting classes. The Philosophy of the Burma Socialist

¹ *Al-Ahram*, May 2, 1968.

Program Party states that socialism is "a society in which there is no exploitation and oppression of man by man", in which "the pursuit of profit" and "class antagonism" are absent. It is an economic system "based on the conformity of the social character of production and social property in the means of production".¹

In an interview with *Paris Match*, Houari Boumediène defined the socialism "for which the Algerian people has opted" as "economic development with social justice and equality", with the principal means of production given to the working people.² On this subject, the Arusha Declaration states: "The way to build and maintain socialism is to ensure that the major means of production are under the control and ownership of the peasants and the workers themselves through their government and their cooperatives. It is also necessary to ensure that the ruling party is a Party of Peasants and Workers."³

Yet in preparing and working for socialism, major and at times key importance is in many instances assigned to alteration of the mode of distribution of material goods, to ensuring "just" distribution—which in practice means in no small measure to defend the petty producer from the major proprietor—and to moral improvement and re-education. Proceeding from a specific understanding of the role of "unjust" distribution which in their view is called into being by exploitation, these revolutionary democrats are convinced that increasing consciousness can be of major significance for overcoming such distribution.

It is from such generalized sociological ideas, for example, that Nyerere takes his approach to the construction of socialism, which he pictures as to a large extent a process of introducing or "reviving" socialist consciousness in society. "...The basic difference between a socialist society and a capitalist society does not lie in their methods of producing wealth, but in the way that wealth is distributed," Nyerere has

¹ See, Ne Win, *op. cit.*, pp. 211, 212.

² *Paris Match*, May 14, 1966, pp. 66, 67.

³ *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance*, p. 3.

written. "Since the appearance of millionaires in a society does not depend on its affluence, sociologists may find it interesting to try and find out why our societies in Africa did not, in fact, produce any millionaires — for we certainly had enough wealth to create a few. I think they would discover that it was because the organization of traditional African society — its distribution of the wealth it produced — was such that there was hardly any room for parasitism.... Socialism is essentially distributive...."¹

The Egyptian revolutionary democrats also accentuate the elimination of this "injustice". The National Charter, for example, stresses that "social freedom cannot be realized except through an equal opportunity for every citizen to obtain a fair share of the national wealth".² Although much has changed since the adoption of the Charter, this principle, everything considered, still retained its force in subsequent years.

Most — or even all — revolutionary democratic conceptions contain elements of a moral and ethical approach, but the idea of moral improvement is especially strong in the pronouncements of the Tanzanian leaders, above all Nyerere. In his *The Basis of African Socialism*, Nyerere has said point blank that "socialism is an attitude of mind".³ Speaking at Cairo University in April 1967 he repeated this formula, maintaining that "I still believe this to be true". At the same time, he felt it necessary to add that this "does not mean that institutions and organizations are irrelevant. It means that without the correct attitudes institutions can be subverted from their true purpose".⁴ Elaborating on this, Nyerere directly linked the import of his formula with a simultaneous understanding of the need to eliminate private property in the basic means of production and the participation of working people in control over the means of production, the involvement of the people "in the government of their political and economic affairs", and so on.⁵

¹ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. The Basis of African Socialism*, pp. 1, 3.
² *The Charter*, p. 40.

³ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. The Basis of African Socialism*, p. 6.
⁴ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. Essays on Socialism*, p. 89.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Revolutionary democrats proceed from the fact that in the emerging nation states the class basis of the struggle for socialism is different than it is in developed countries. Saying that the social differentiation in the former colonies and dependencies is very weak, they frequently deny that any class in these countries has the leading role in the construction of socialism, or else they proclaim that the peasantry, the petty producer, has a special place in progressive processes. The leaders and ideologues of the Egyptian revolution maintain that the class basis for the construction of socialism in Egypt is provided by the labor forces of the people which include the fellahin, workers, soldiers, intelligentsia and national bourgeoisie. This is set forth not only in the National Charter,¹ but has also been emphasized in many subsequent speeches by Nasser and other Egyptian leaders. A corresponding statement was included, too, in the Statute of the Arab Socialist Union, ratified in May of 1968. This stressed that the Arab Socialist Union is a political organization encompassing "all the people's forces — peasants, workers, soldiers, intelligentsia and representatives of national capital".²

Wagering above all on the peasantry as the principal support and moving force in the construction of the new society is a characteristic feature of Tanzanian revolutionary democracy. This is seen in Nyerere's major speeches, in the Arusha Declaration and in other Party and state documents.

Evaluating the second Tanzanian five-year plan, the journal *The African Communist* remarked with complete justification that the plan sets the village above the city. Citing Nyerere to the effect that the heart of the plan consists in the socialist development of the village, the journal concluded that this, like Nyerere's 1967 declaration of the policy of "socialist villages" (*Ujamaa Vijijini*), reflects the orientation toward "building a socialist society based in the countryside" and the "proposition that socialism can emerge as a system by means of peasant mobilization in traditional structures".³

"Agriculture is Burma's main economic strength and the

¹ See, *The Charter*, p. 68.

² *Al-Gomhouria*, Cairo, May 10, 1968.

³ *The African Communist* No. 39, 1969, pp. 28, 29.

majority of the country's population are the peasant cultivators. The socialist revolution conducted by the Revolutionary Council is intended to promote the interests of the peasant-cultivator majority, the workers and all other working people," notes the Political Report of the Central Organizing Committee of BSPP to the First Party Congress. The Report also makes the point that peasants and workers are the most important classes in carrying out the socialist revolution in the Union of Burma. They are likewise the two basic forces behind the Burma Socialist Program Party.¹

As on other questions, representatives of the Democratic Party of Guinea and the Congolese Workers' Party stand closer to the method of scientific socialism, but even they approach this question in their own specific way. "We believe," said Sékou Touré in an interview with the journal *World Marxist Review*, "that the difference between the peasant and the worker lies in the degree of their consciousness. Because of the very nature of his activity the worker is more class conscious than the peasant. It is therefore our political duty to ensure that the one and the other have the same ideological training, that all sections of the working people are spurred on by the same will to fight for a society free from all forms of exploitation and oppression."²

It must be said that, over the course of time, many revolutionary democrats have increasingly recognized the role of the working class and have even begun to stress this aspect of the matter. The political and ideological positions of the Sudanese Union of Mali and the Convention People's Party of Ghana evolved in this direction, as their leaders' speeches and their press showed.³

This process has affected the Arab and Burmese revolutionary democrats, too. Nasser in his speech to a mass rally at Helwan in March of 1968 affirmed that "workers are, along with peasants, the principal force of the revolution", that workers and peasants are the two basic forces in an alliance that also includes the intelligentsia, the military and national

¹ *The Working People's Daily*, Rangoon, March 29 and September 5, 1971.

² *World Marxist Review* No. 4, 1967, p. 27.

³ See, *L'Essor*, March 27, 1968; *The Ghanaian Times*, July 8, 1964.

capital.¹ At the 17th Congress of the General Federation of Labor Unions of Syria, President Hafez Assad emphasized that "the working class is the solid armor that defends the advances made by Syria, it is the vanguard in the struggle for Arab unity".

In his turn, Houari Boumediène, President of Algeria, in his speech at the opening of the Second National Conference on the Socialist Organization of Enterprises described the working class as the "vanguard for building socialism", a vanguard implementing its social and economic liberation in a combat alliance with the laboring peasantry, youth, the revolutionary intelligentsia and the soldiers and officers of the army. Burmese leaders, though continuing in the opinion that the peasantry is the principal force for progressive development in their country, have at the same time noted the special, vanguard role of the working class. No doubt as a result of their experience, they publicly advance the thesis that the working class must play the primary role in strengthening the Burma Socialist Program Party, that it is more difficult for the peasantry to organize, since peasants have a much lower level of education, have a much narrower political and general outlook and are for this reason ideologically backward.

A radio speech by Nyerere in February 1970 is typical in this respect. "I must admit," he said, "that it is not easy to change the peasants' mentality. It is factories that bring progress; they are the place where many people work together either for their own good or for the good of the capitalist, or for the good of the nation as a whole.... Unfortunately, it is true that many peasants still suppose that the way to progress is when each has his own small farm."

Noteworthy, too, are remarks by the weekly *Horseid*, which reflects the views of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somali. *Horseid* has noted the role played by the working class in the course of the revolution in Somali and the Sudan as well as during the events in Egypt when attempts were made to overthrow President Nasser, and in the struggle of the people of Guinea against Portuguese aggression.

The predecessor of the Congolese Workers' Party, the

¹ See, *Al-Shabab al-Arabi*, March 3, 1968.

National Revolutionary Movement, recognized the vanguard role of the working class. But this has received even greater emphasis in the policy documents of the CWP. The very formation of the Congolese Workers' Party and its self-definition in its Statute as a "proletarian party" is itself a mark of the Congolese revolutionary democrats' more sophisticated attitude toward the proletariat, at least with respect to the principle of the proletariat's vanguard role. The Party Program describes the "revolutionary forces" at the present stage of the country's development as follows: "The working class, which though numerically and ideologically weak is the foundation of the revolution;

—its ally, the peasantry, which though extremely numerous is still unorganized;

—intermediate strata (petty bourgeoisie, the youth and students movements, etc.) are still vacillating."¹

The Party uses these guidelines in its ideological work. The leading role of the working class in social development and revolutionary reforms is emphasized in the documents—above all the Program—of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The obvious shift in revolutionary democrats' evaluation of the role of the working class in the social development of their countries is of great significance and is an important prerequisite for subsequent positive changes in the ideology of revolutionary democracy. Of course, a more precise grasp of the root of the question requires that we keep in mind, too, the unique meaning that some revolutionary democrats read into the term "worker" and the fact that this evaluation of the role of the proletariat remains in some cases largely verbal.

We must also take into account the fact that the special attitude toward the peasantry, though changing under the impact of experience (which demonstrates the social weakness of that attitude), remains to one degree or another inherent in almost all revolutionary democratic constructs. This attitude, ideologically and conceptually honed and, in its own way,

¹ Programme du Parti Congolais du Travail adopté au 2^{ème} Congrès Extraordinaire tenu du 27 au 31 Décembre 1972, p. 6.

buttressed, became especially widespread after the appearance of Franz Fanon's works, and is remarkably persistent.¹

There are a number of reasons for this persistence:

—the social roots and connections of revolutionary democracy, the distrust and even hostility of certain revolutionary democratic groups to proletarian, internationalist political and ideological lines;

—the overwhelming predominance of the peasantry in the former colonial and dependent countries. The unquestionably enormous importance of the peasantry's position for the stability of any political regime, for the fate of the revolutionary movement in these countries, is transmuted ideologically into the concept of the peasantry's *leading* or *principal* role in the progressive development in the national liberation zone;

—the role played by the peasantry in the struggle for independence in a number of countries. Characterizing the place of various social groups in the progressive development of Guinea and arguing for the importance of the working class, Sékou Touré, for instance, has said: "In this connection it should be noted that the peasants in our country were an important force that made possible the success of our Democratic Party."²

—original conceptions as to the sources of social activism and revolutionary potential of particular social forces, as well as of their interrelations; these conceptions are rooted in the views on class divisions examined above. These views not infrequently lead revolutionary democrats to conclude that, in effect, poverty is the principal source and criterion of

¹ See, Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, pp. 11, 59, 61, and *Towards the African Revolution*, pp. 40, 45. "In the colonial countries the peasants alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain," writes Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*, N. Y., 1968, p. 61. The utterances of the "African Marxist" (as he styles himself), Demba Diallo, are typical of a group of revolutionary democrats to the left of Fanon and who are attempting to draw on modern history and the events of the 1960s to buttress their arguments; they approach the question extremely broadly. Diallo writes that the revolutions in Asia and Cuba have clearly shown that the peasant masses, "well supplied with cadres and properly led, are capable of becoming an invincible force for putting an end to old feudal and reactionary structures" (D. Diallo, *L'Afrique en question*, Paris, 1968, p. 212).

² *World Marxist Review* No. 4, 1967, p. 28.

revolutionary commitment. As Luigi Pestalozza, correspondent of the journal *Rinascita*, the theoretical organ of the Italian Communist Party, reported from Dar es Salaam, the Tanzanian revolutionary democrats' conviction that the peasantry has the crucial, leading position in the country's socialist orientation and progressive development derives from the view that "it is the poverty of the peasant that is the genuine reserve of revolutionary energy". Not infrequently, this position is combined with the assertion (which, in a methodological respect, is of the same origin) that the working class in former colonies and dependencies is a "privileged" stratum, even exploitative and bourgeois with respect to the peasantry; or, as Fanon writes, it is a "'bourgeois' fraction of the colonized people"²;

—the organizational, political and ideological weakness of the proletariat in many former colonial countries, the subjugation of some elements of the proletariat to reformist leaders, who have seized leadership positions in a number of trade unions;

—not infrequently, a guarded attitude to the city, which was the stronghold of the enslaver during colonialism and the conduit for "alien" influences, as opposed to the village—the vehicle of national distinctiveness and local traditions.³

Without question, the thesis on the special significance of the peasantry in the social development of colonial and emerging countries, at any rate given current conditions, and on the necessity for a special attitude toward the peasantry, is not without foundation and can scarcely be objected to in itself. The question is *how* this significance is interpreted. The position becomes false when the specific character of the present stage is raised to the level of an absolute, when special

¹ *Rinascita*, August 29, 1969, p. 25.

² Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, p. 109.

³ "The city does not reflect the essence of the Egyptian people," remarked President Sadat at a session of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union dedicated to the second anniversary of Nasser's death, "while the village will always be the true expression of the Egyptian people" (*Al-Ahram*, September 29, 1972).

attention to the peasantry is accompanied by an underestimation of the role of other classes and social strata.

The sense of revolutionary democrats' ideas on the *state and political activities* is the denial of all forms of the bourgeois state and, especially, bourgeois parliamentarianism, and the proclamation of a policy of creating a people's state based on the masses and meant to be a tool for carrying out revolutionary social and economic reforms. The Policy Declaration of the Burma Socialist Program Party states: "A Socialist Democratic State will be constituted to build up a successful Socialist economy. A Socialist Democratic State is based on and safeguards its own Socialist economy. The vanguard and custodian of a Socialist Democratic State are primarily peasants and workers."¹

At the same time, revolutionary democratic ideologies do not, as a rule, accept the thesis of the proletarian dictatorship. Some revolutionary democrats—those in Guinea, for instance—admit that this proposition is correct in principle, but claim that it is not applicable to their own countries, citing either local conditions or the character of the present stage of social development. To a certain extent, Sékou Touré has summed up the attitude of these revolutionary democrats: "World history shows that the working class is the truly progressive class in society, the truly revolutionary class, the class capable of making sacrifices and effecting dynamic social changes. And when most of the revolutionary regimes speak of the leading role of the working class, of the dictatorship of the working class, we think that they are right. As far as we are concerned, we take into account in the first place our objective conditions. Dictatorship of the working class cannot be exercised in the objective conditions of Guinean society where wage workers still account for only 5 per cent of the population as against the 85 per cent of the peasantry."²

Other revolutionary democrats are opposed even to the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, rejecting it both as *dictatorship* and as dictatorship of the *proletariat*. In evaluating this position, one must of course keep in mind, in

¹ "The Burmese Way to Socialism", *New Times* No. 20, 1962, p. 17.

² *World Marxist Review* No. 4, 1967, pp. 26, 27.

addition to everything else, that most revolutionary democrats either do not understand or have an inaccurate picture of the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They have drawn their ideas on it largely from bourgeois propaganda and reduce dictatorship entirely to its forcible side, which they additionally picture as, without fail, a bitter, sanguinary struggle, accompanied by the physical liquidation of entire social strata.

Revolutionary democrats typically strive to present their regimes *not as a class dictatorship but as a people's (supra-class) state*, representing the interests of society as a whole, i.e., of the working strata or "alliance of popular forces".

An important feature of revolutionary democratic ideas—and one in which, again, the line separating these ideas from bourgeois and reformist theories can be clearly traced—is the distinct emphasis on the decisive role of the popular masses in the creation and functioning of the socialist state and social order. And this is characteristic of the most moderate ideas. Nasser, for one, presented the problem as follows: "The transition from exploiting capitalism and feudalism to socialism can occur only through the political activity of the laboring people, through the struggle of the working class and peasants to wrest power from the hands of reaction and then to use power to change reactionary social relations completely."¹ Nyerere, in the above-mentioned speech at Cairo University, made the achievement of socialism a function of the role of the popular masses in control over social property and political institutions: "Ultimately, socialism is only possible if the people as a whole are involved in the government of their political and economic affairs.... The involvement of the people is vital, for socialism is nothing if it is not of the people."² Speaking at a session of the National Council of the General Union of Algerian Laborers in October 1970, Houari Boumediène emphasized the role of working people as "a guarantee of the socialist orientation of the country."³

¹ *Al-Ahram*, November 13, 1964.

² Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. Essays on Socialism*, p. 89.

³ *El Moudjahid*, October 27, 1970.

There is no need to show how important propositions of this sort are. Naturally, their significance depends on whether they are of an abstract and conceptual nature or are adequately supported by the appropriate political measures.

With respect to revolutionary democracy's *economic platform*, it must be stressed first of all that all of the various revolutionary democratic currents *have platforms that are identical in all their substantive features*. Differences, where they occur, arise over the interpretation or application of principles that are formulated in similar or identical language. Many propositions from Marxist political economy and experience from the economic policy of the socialist states are used to one degree or another—both in the general formulation of basic questions and in the determination of priority tasks.

All revolutionary democrats favor the principle of a mixed economy—whether the term is used or not—at least during the transitional period: combination of a public sector (i.e., state and cooperative) with a private sector. Sikhe Camara of Guinea has said that "the economy in the countries of non-capitalist democracy consists of two basic sectors: the social sector, where state and cooperative property prevail, and the private sector, the size and content of which depend on local conditions".¹

The aim of developing a mixed economy at the national-democratic stage of the revolution is set forth in the Program of the Congolese Workers' Party, which states that the private national sector "should be encouraged at the present stage in order to further the activity of the Party toward the achievement of the economic independence of our country. However, the development of this sector must be watched by the Party and be under the control of the state sector".²

This approach is followed in other revolutionary democratic ideologies, too. The policy of developing a mixed economy follows from conditions specific to the former colonies and dependencies, from the poverty of their financial resources and technical and organizational experience, from the need to use all available means for fundamental economic change.

¹ *World Marxist Review* No. 11, 1966, p. 25.

² *Programme du Parti Congolais du Travail adopté au 2^{ème} Congrès Extraordinaire tenu du 27 au 31 Décembre 1972*, p. 10.

"A mixed economy is a feature of the transitional stage from dependence to socialism," stresses Batsa Kofi, editor of *The Spark*, organ of the Convention People's Party (emphasis added — *Auth.*).¹ Seydou Badian explains the position taken by the revolutionary democrats of Mali in much the same way: in view of the acute shortage of financial resources and technical personnel in developing countries, he has observed, it is necessary to establish three types of enterprises — state, mixed and private, including those that involve foreign capital on mutually advantageous terms.²

The policy of developing a mixed economy, so far as it affects the native proprietor, is also determined — at least for some revolutionary democrats (the Egyptians, for example) — by the ideological bias toward cooperation with "non-exploiting capital", by revolutionary democrats' position on the question as to the ways in which class contradictions can be resolved, their general attitude to the petty proprietor, especially in the village, and so on.

Advancing the principle of a mixed economy, revolutionary democrats at the same time insist that the public sector — principally in the person of state as well as cooperative property — must play the leading, dominant role. As the revolutionary democrats see it, this leading role should be secured by concentrating the key industries in the state sector and by a faster rate of development in the state than in the private sector. The Charter of the National Revolutionary Movement (the Congo), for instance, proclaimed that the country's land and natural resources, means of transportation, power plants, airports and ports were the property of the people. In 1970, this was written into the Constitution by the Congolese Workers' Party and the Congolese Government. Furthermore, the country's leaders have repeatedly emphasized (Ngouabi's speech at the opening of the Special Congress of the Congolese Workers' Party, for example) that they consider rapid growth in the state sector extremely important.

¹ *The Labour Monthly*, November 1965, p. 515.

² See, Seydou Badian, *Les dirigeants d'Afrique Noire face à leur peuple*, pp. 146-47.

The Arusha Declaration lists in detail the means of production that should be controlled by peasants and workers through the government and through cooperative organizations — these means include land and all mineral resources, almost all modern industry, the financial system, transportation, communications, wholesale business, large plantations, and so on.¹

The Egyptian National Charter maintains that, in the interests of building socialism, "the people's control over all the tools of production and over directing the surplus" must be established "according to a definite plan".²

The public sector must have the dominant position because it carries out two functions — economic and social. Economically, the public sector is deemed an indispensable prerequisite for effective planning (which in revolutionary democratic thought is directly associated with the principle of extensive state participation in economic life) for maximum and centralized mobilization of resources, for ensuring rapid economic growth, the attainment of economic independence and social progress.

The social function involves ensuring that development be along socialist lines and preventing the rise of extensive exploiting groups and elements. "We are convinced," General Mohamed Siad Barre, President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somali, has said, "that if the means of production and the economic levers are in the hands of detached groups or organizations we will never be able either to free the popular masses from constant and systematic exploitation, or to obtain a just distribution of the national income."³ A plenary session of the National Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Party of Guinea, meeting in Kankan in November 1967, emphasized the importance of the cooperative movement and linked it with the task of "avoiding by all means the emergence in our villages of a class of agricultural exploiters whose actions could to a dangerous degree distort, for a more or less extended

¹ *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance*, p. 3.

² *The Charter*, p. 51.

³ *Stella d'Ottobre*, October 21, 1970.

period, our policy of non-capitalist development and inflict a death blow to the revolution".¹

Though all revolutionary democratic parties subscribe to the principle of a mixed economy, they do not have identical attitudes toward the private sector or, correspondingly, toward private property in the tools and means of production; they differ especially over private property in land. Obviously, this is first and foremost a function of objective conditions, as differences on this question between the revolutionary democrats of Tropical Africa and Arab states show.

In Tropical Africa, where social differentiation is slight, where the native bourgeoisie is extremely weak and the communal structure persists to an important degree, the question of private property in the tools and means of production, the question of the private sector as a whole, is for revolutionary democracy primarily a question of *foreign* capital. We must not underestimate the extent to which this circumstance has in these countries shaped revolutionary democracy's attitude to the private sector as an undesirable though at this stage unavoidable necessity. Typically, too, revolutionary democracy here rejects private property in land and — whether or not the term is employed — subscribes to (and in places has already implemented) the principle of the nationalization of land.

Moreover, the negative view on private property and the private proprietor held by some revolutionary democrats of this wing has influenced their posture with respect to foreign capital in a way that is, at first glance, somewhat unexpected — it prompts a policy of attracting and utilizing foreign capital. As these revolutionary democrats see it, such a policy ensures the solution of a number of the urgent problems of economic development and at the same time discourages the emergence and strengthening of a native bourgeoisie, which would inevitably occur if the same tasks were carried out with the help of a native bourgeoisie.

The situation is different in Arab countries. Here social differentiation has gone considerably farther. Private land tenure is an age-old tradition, and the interests of the

¹ *Horoya*, November 10, 1967.

proprietor (chiefly the petty proprietor) and the proprietor himself as a social force are well-represented in revolutionary democracy. As a result, for the most part one does not observe among revolutionary democrats here the same negative attitude *in principle* to private property in the tools and means of production. "The people's control over all the tools of production," reads the National Charter of the Arab Republic of Egypt, "does not necessitate the nationalization of all means of production or the abolition of private ownership or the mere touching of the legitimate right of inheritance following therefrom."¹ The Charter stresses that popular control can be achieved through the creation of a strong state sector with the existing private sector. This is reaffirmed in the Program of National Action.

An important criterion in determining the attitude of these revolutionary democrats toward private property (both when that attitude is expressed conceptually, as in Egypt, in the thesis on "non-exploiting capital", and when it is not conceptualized) is the *magnitude* of the private property at issue. Only if this property exceeds certain limits or encroaches on sectors of the economy vitally important for the entire country does it, in their opinion, assume an undesirable or dangerous character.

Those who subscribe to this position not only develop farther the position common to all revolutionary democrats that private capital, above all of the petty sort, and the petty proprietor are called on to play an important role in the transitional period of the birth of the new social order. They often speak of "encouraging" the private sector, in order among other things to provide competition for the state sector, in order to force the state sector "to exert ever greater efforts to withstand this competition".² At one extreme is the position outlined by Ahmed Kaïd at the Third Congress of the General Union of Algerian Laborers in May 1969. Kaïd argued that it would be unjust to put difficulties in the way of the native capitalist sector in Algeria. Quite the contrary, its development should be facilitated and workers should be taught not to

¹ *The Charter*, p. 51.

² *Al-Ahram*, September 18, 1968.

confuse native private enterprises with the foreign capitalist sector.¹

On the whole, this group of revolutionary democrats views the petty proprietor — above all the petty agriculturalist — as in effect an important and positive element in the emerging social order, as an inseparable, organic element in that order. For many, the petty proprietor is close to their model of the ideal citizen.

Of course, the objective factors that we have mentioned are hardly the only ones in the revolutionary democrats' formulation of their views on private property and private capital. This is clear, for example, in the position held for many years by Burmese revolutionary democrats with respect to the petty urban proprietor and petty private capital. It was considerably more "rigid" than the stand taken by the leaders of Arab states with a socialist orientation.

For all the differences and nuances in their attitude toward the private sector, revolutionary democrats are at one as to the need for effective state control over this sector so as to subordinate private activity to the overall tasks and the chosen direction of their countries' development.

In their majority, revolutionary democrats proceed in effect from the principle that working persons should have a material interest in the creation of a socialist society. This is, however, dictated primarily by pragmatic considerations, has as a rule received no theoretical or programmatic elaboration, and in practice is applied inconsistently. At the same time, no few revolutionary democrats, especially in Tropical Africa, in line with their overall social goals have in fact a negative attitude to this principle and tend toward equal distribution. Nyerere holds the most complex position on this matter. In his *The Basis of African Socialism*, he emphasizes that, in order to build a socialist society, the system of distribution must be reorganized so that all receive an equal portion, irrespective of the type of labor performed or the degree of skill.² At the same time in another essay Nyerere has written that income in the "socialist villages" must be shared according to the work done.³ And in

¹ *El Moudjahid*, May 11-12, 1969.

² Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. The Basis of African Socialism*, pp. 5, 7.

³ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. Essays on Socialism*, p. 135.

fact, in these villages, after deductions for the social fund, returns are distributed in accordance with work performed.

On the whole, Marxist ideas and the Soviet Union's and other socialist countries' experience in building a new society have had a perceptible influence on revolutionary democrats' economic platform.

2. The Problem of "Uniqueness" and the Attitude Toward Marxism

Most revolutionary democrats advance the thesis that their peoples have a "special" uniqueness that supposedly facilitates the victory of socialism, which to their minds is to a greater or lesser degree the embodiment or restoration of the social and moral values and principles traditional in the life of their peoples before the advent of colonialists or in the distant past. The connection between conceptions of this sort and the special place that revolutionary democracy assigns to moral and ethical factors is obvious.

These ideas are expressed most clearly by the revolutionary democrats of Tropical Africa, though they are shared in North African and Asian countries. Of course, the various revolutionary democratic currents and parties scarcely treat this problem in an identical manner. Nevertheless, though there is a wide range of nuances, we are in effect dealing in all cases with an idealization of the historical past of the people in question, an idealization of patriarchal relations and patriarchal or even religious ideology, an idealization that is not only petty bourgeois but also at times nationalistic.

At the same time, many revolutionary democrats combine this idealization with an understanding and recognition (even if blurred and incomplete) of the fact that this "uniqueness" is rather the "originality of backwardness" and is not peculiar to their peoples alone but was typical of other nations at a specific stage in their historical development. These revolutionary democratic ideologies, in advancing the notion of the national uniqueness of the formerly enslaved countries, have in view the need to utilize the most valuable communal traditions and forms in the process of building socialism.

Only in a few revolutionary democratic ideologies is this

idealization made absolute and traditional native society viewed as a ready-made cell or even articulated structure of a socialist order. Given this treatment, the task of building socialism is conceived primarily as returning (though on a new technical basis, on the basis of different productive forces) to traditional usages, at least with respect to moral norms and prescriptions for distribution.

It must be said, moreover, that this diversity of approach is increased by the inconsistency of the statements by revolutionary democratic leaders and ideologues on this as on other questions. The contradictions arise not only from the instability of the stands taken on this issue but also from the undoubted evolution that the views of revolutionary democrats are undergoing as they move toward a more realistic estimation of the import of vestigial forms and traditions—including communal—for social progress.

Belief in the "special character" of African society, the extolling of its patriarchal structure, recognition of the commune as under certain conditions a nontransient form of socio-economic development—these are among the most specific features of Julius Nyerere's views. Nyerere holds that traditional African society was, in terms of the relations that held sway in it, socialist, that it has merely been subjected to the corroding influence of foreign capitalists, who have fostered in Africa and infected some "wavering" Africans with the thirst for enrichment. Given Nyerere's views on history—which we have already dealt with—it is natural that he holds this society to have been engendered by a special means of distribution characteristic of it.¹

In his speech at the 13th Conference of TANU, Nyerere restated his plan for creating, in place of the dispersed communal settlements practising slash-burn farming, large villages where it will be possible to cultivate the land collectively and to distribute the product among the producers. Declared Nyerere: "...We shall have an up-to-date, and larger, version of the traditional African family, where the land was 'ours', crops were 'ours', and so on."²

¹ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. The Basis of African Socialism*, pp. 1, 3, 4, 5.

² Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. Essays on Socialism*, p. 172.

Summing up his approach as a whole, Nyerere in the same speech remarked: "In traditional African life the people were equal, they cooperated together, and they participated in all the decisions which affected their lives.... Our task, therefore, is to modernize the traditional structure so as to make it meet our new aspirations for a higher standard of living. This can be done provided we hold fast to the basic principles of traditional living, while we adapt its techniques to those of the twentieth century."¹ The journal *Rinascita* aptly observed of Nyerere's views: "The communal way of life is viewed in *Ujamaa* as something like primitive socialism, from which one can rapidly pass over to socialist collectivism."²

Bourgeois authors—in their own manner, of course—also single out this aspect of Nyerere's ideology. The well-known French economist, René Dumont, for example, maintaining that Nyerere advocates "African socialism", remarks that "he seeks the bases of this socialism in the African traditions of the clan and the tribe. Embellishing them, he exalts the virtues of mutual aid and cooperation."³

At the same time, Nyerere has recognised in a number of speeches that it is impossible simply to return to traditional African structure and customs, not only because of the need to introduce modern technology on a large scale but also because the traditional structure "has now suffered considerably from the effects of a money economy."⁴

The utterances of other revolutionary democratic leaders and ideologues and the documents of their parties reflect a much more restrained position on this intricate question. Depending on their *political* views, they focus to a greater or lesser degree on the need (of which they are sincerely convinced) to *utilize* rationally the *positive* communal traditions that have been preserved.

Of course, an objective evaluation of the statements on this question—especially with respect to the left wing of revolutionary democracy—must also take into account the attempt to

¹ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. Essays on Socialism*, p. 171.

² *Rinascita*, August 29, 1969.

³ *Esprit*, May 1968, pp. 813-14.

⁴ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa. Essays on Socialism*, p. 81.

put the ideas of socialism into a language comprehensible to the people and adapted to the level of their social consciousness.

Many revolutionary democratic parties use the national uniqueness of their countries, the specific character of the conditions that have taken shape in them, in their attempt to stress the "local" origin of their concepts; these revolutionary democrats manifest an unwillingness to "copy" socialist views predominant in other—especially developed—countries. The Egyptian National Charter, for instance, states explicitly that the "Arab revolutionary experiment ... cannot afford to copy what others have achieved.... Socialism does not mean observing rigid theories which have not arisen out of the nature of national experience".¹

Speaking at a conference of the General Union of Algerian Laborers in October 1968, Boumediène remarked: "The philosophy of our revolution must find inspiration in our past, in our civilization, in our values, in our faith. It must be a specifically Algerian philosophy."²

Emphasis on the "special" path of development of the Arab revolutions and on the need to provide it with independent theoretical underpinnings was evident in many of the speeches at the "Arab Ideological Conference" in Khartoum in March 1970.

The same distinguishing feature can be noted in this question, too: persistent unwillingness to "import" ideology is a direct function of the overall political orientation that a given leader advocates. Typically, the thesis that "Egyptian society has its own national credo" was widely publicized by Hassanein Heikal, who used it as proof that Marxism is inapplicable to conditions in Egypt or in the Arab world as a whole.

Yet most revolutionary democratic leaders state that there are no special "national socialisms". Some—e.g., the leaders of the Democratic Party of Guinea, the Convention People's Party of Ghana, the National Revolutionary Movement of the Congo and some others—took this position almost from the start, or soon after their advent to power; they combine a denial of

¹ *The Charter*, pp. 15, 38.

² *El Moudjahid*, October 27-28, 1968.

"national socialisms" with criticism of so-called African socialism. Others, who not so long ago emphasized the intrinsically "national" character of their doctrines, have come or are coming around to this point of view by a more tortuous route, through a certain political and ideological evolution.

Sékou Touré, in an interview with *World Marxist Review*, remarked: "There is nothing national about socialism, it is not confined to any one nation, race or continent. It is as impersonal and inalienable as science."¹ Marien Ngouabi is no less forthright. He declared at a meeting in August 1969 that "the best social order, bringing happiness to working people ... is only scientific socialism, not 'Bantu socialism' or 'African socialism'."² A number of other revolutionary democratic leaders and ideologues have made similar statements (even down to phrasing) on this question.

Nasser's dictum is well known: "'Arab socialism' is an invention of the Egyptian newspapers. In my speeches and in the Charter I have never used the term. There are no socialisms, there is only universal, scientific socialism."³ "We know," the organ of the Algerian FLN, *Révolution africaine*, has emphasized, "that socialism is one, even if its application differs according to the peculiarities of any given country."⁴

The Somalian revolutionary democrats have stated their position on this question unequivocally, too. They have repeatedly emphasized that they have chosen neither African nor Moslem socialism, but scientific socialism.

Without question, the recognition in revolutionary democratic ideologies of the unity and universal character of scientific socialism, and the declaration of their adherence to the latter, is an advance of principled significance in the development of social thought in the formerly enslaved countries, a fundamental, positive feature in these ideologies. And this—having in view the resulting renunciation of the narrowly "national" ("African", "Arab", etc.) character of their doctrines, a stand formerly taken by the majority of revolutionary democratic

¹ *World Marxist Review* No. 4, 1967, p. 29.

² *Pravda*, August 13, 1969.

³ *Meeting Africa*, Moscow, 1964, pp. 137-38 (in Russian).

⁴ *Révolution africaine*, March 27 and April 2, 1967, p. 12.

parties—is a major political and ideological shift away from the nationalist disassociation from Marxism openly avowed by the adherents of the various “national socialisms”. Not coincidentally, the revolutionary democrats’ point of view on this question has become one of the primary reference points distinguishing their ideology from bourgeois-democratic and from wholly reactionary theories of “socialism”.

Marxists neither ignore nor underrate the importance of this shift. At the same time, we must here, too, avoid one-sided judgements that see this as *solely* a shift toward Marxism; renunciation of particular unscientific constructs and views does not necessarily mean a step directly toward Marxism. In other words, it is important to reckon with the fact that this shift, at least so far as some revolutionary democrats are concerned, is dictated not only by an increasing understanding of the unscientific and illusorous character of pretensions to an absolutely “special”, purely “national” socialism, not only by increased study of Marxism, but also by the aspiration to declare *their* conception, *their* “socialism” scientific. This conclusion, suggested by analysis of the political and ideological frameworks of the revolutionary democratic groups and leaders in question, is likewise supported by their public statements, even though they be few.

Youssef Zouayen, at that time one of the leaders of the Syrian Baath Party and Prime Minister of Syria, to a question posed by Ania Francos, correspondent of the Tunisian journal *Jeune Afrique*, as to whether he and his Party colleagues subscribed to Marxist views, answered, as Francos noted, “not without hesitation”: “No, we are not Marxists. We adhere to the principles of scientific socialism. We proceed from the concrete situation of the Arab world.”¹ Mohammed Wahby, Assistant Chief Representative of the League of Arab States in India and author of *Arab Socialism*, maintained that, in speaking of “scientific socialism”, Arabs have in mind their own science of socialism.²

There is no need to demonstrate that we are dealing here

¹ *Jeune Afrique*, November 6, 1966, p. 39.

² Mohammed Wahby, *Arab Socialism. Ferment and Commitment*, New Delhi, 1966, pp. 139-40.

not simply with verbal contrivances, with a wholly tactical forray, but with a platform that has specific ideological and political substance. To explicate this substance, to set out the limits of this platform, it is extraordinarily important *how* we interpret—and this is in effect part of the problem of the objective relation to scientific socialism—the role of the “nationally unique” soil and, correspondingly, the application of universal principles of socialism to the “specific” conditions of developing countries.

We have already noted that, in revolutionary democratic theories, the thesis of the “national uniqueness” of the countries of Asia and Africa is advanced chiefly as a formula emphasizing the need to “adjust” the universal principles of socialism to the specific conditions of Third World countries, the obligation to take these conditions into account in the practical activity of building a new society. However, on a number of important issues the stipulation that local conditions must be taken into account (reference is primarily to the problem of class structure and class struggle and, in the final analysis, the dictatorship of the proletariat) often develops into the proclamation of a “uniqueness” that determines not only the *form* in which general socialist theory is applied but also, to one degree or another, the theory’s *substantive features*, often even the heart of the entire conception.

Excluding the Congolese Workers’ Party and the united political organization of the National Front of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, what we have just said is to some extent true even of those parties that have officially adopted Marxism-Leninism or make extensive use of its ideas.

True, declarations setting out positions of principle on this score most often have a positive character. Sékou Touré has said, for instance: “There may be methods that we can use in common with the socialist countries and methods that are dictated by the specific conditions prevailing in our country.”¹ The editor of the weekly *The Spark* (which was, by the way, founded by Nkrumah to popularize the idea of the liberation of Africa and took its name from Lenin’s *Iskra*—The Spark), K. Batsa, has stressed that, in Ghana, the “Party and

¹ *World Marxist Review* No. 4, 1967, p. 30.

Government are based ideologically on Nkrumaism, the application of Marxism-Leninism to African conditions". In the same article, he debunked attempts by the advocates of "African socialism" to declare Marxism "outdated" and "inapplicable" to African conditions because of their "special" character.¹

Nevertheless, other statements of a general character tend to a more expansive interpretation of the extent to which the universal principles of scientific socialism can be "adjusted".² This is more explicit in the stand taken on a number of concrete questions, as was indicated above. We wish to note here only that, along with tactical factors that affect only the form in which general laws are applied, this group of revolutionary democrats is often inclined to treat some transitional features of a particular stage of their countries' development—features associated with backwardness—as features of virtually permanent significance.

Having said this, we should emphasize at the same time that this position (if we ignore considerations touching on the problem of the monopoly of power) is in no way buttressed by a critical attitude toward Marxism. It stems from the sincere conviction, deriving gnoseologically and politically from an absolutization of the given stage of the social process, that it is "impossible" to apply all the principal tenets of Marxism to the circumstances of these countries, that appropriate "adjustments" are necessary.

The "prescription for adaptation" is interpreted much more broadly by some other revolutionary democratic parties, especially by their "moderate" and—it goes without saying—right wings. They are concerned not only to take adequate account of the specific conditions in their countries. Additionally, they often take the specific properties of social relations in their countries, or even in developing countries as a whole, to be the determinant of the substance of these relations and of the corresponding theory and practice of building the new order.

¹ *The Labour Monthly*, November 1965, pp. 514-15.

² With respect to revolutionary democrats in Ghana, the very attempt to put forth an ideology of "Nkrumaism" is indicative.

From here it is only a short step—and one not infrequently taken—to the quest for a "third", "middle" course. Let us consider some statements in which this or a similar train of thought is evident, whether that specific conclusion is enunciated or not. The journal *Révolution africaine* wrote, on the eve of an ideological seminar in Algeria: "...We are witnessing the development of a rich gamut of varieties of socialism. But we know that there is only one socialism, though it is applied differently, depending on the particularities of the country." At the same time, however, the journal emphasized that the forthcoming conference "is the first step in the search for an ideological platform that will in turn outline a scientific theory based on the specific realities of the Arab countries" (emphasis added—*Auth.*).¹

Hassanein Heikal has been even more "radical" and insistent on this issue. In the summer of 1964, he asserted that neither "Eastern" nor "Western" forms of democracy are appropriate for Third World countries, that they need a "new type of democracy".² In an article written in June 1966, he set forth the idea that "national revolutionary movements" have the role of a "third force" in the presently polarized world.³ He also attempted to depict Nasser's position in the same light. In an article entitled "Abdel Nasser: Man and Symbol", dedicated to the second anniversary of Nasser's death, he declared that "Nasser chose not a middle but a third path—the path of political and social development...."⁴

A question of principle for the analysis and evaluation of revolutionary democratic concepts of socialism is their connection, their objective relation to Marxism, the degree to which they are influenced by Marxism. No less important is the subjective side of the matter: the professed position of revolutionary democrats and their concepts with respect to Marxism. This is one of the major areas in which revolutionary democratic ideology shows its progressive import as compared to other theories of "national socialism" in developing countries.

¹ *Révolution africaine*, March 27 and April 2, 1967.

² *Al-Ahram*, July 3, 1964.

³ *Al-Ahram*, June 3, 1966.

⁴ *Al-Ahram*, September 28, 1972.

Without question, Marxist ideas and the achievements and experience of socialist states have an enormous influence on *all* revolutionary democratic parties and groups *without exception*, irrespective of their attitude toward these ideas; it is worth noting that they recognize this influence.

We know that many revolutionary democratic leaders are familiar with some of the classic writings of scientific socialism—Lenin's writings first and foremost—and continue to work in this direction. References to Lenin and quotations from his works are not infrequent at revolutionary democrats' party forums and at the mass meetings they organize.¹

Marxism's increasing influence and authority among revolutionary democrats is evident in their growing interest in Marxist-Leninist literature, in their attitude to ideological measures connected in one way or another with publicizing scientific socialism. Where Marxism-Leninism has been declared the official ideology of the ruling party, of the forces in power, Marxist literature is distributed without hindrance. But in almost all other countries, too, opportunity to distribute Marxist literature—including, sometimes especially, the classic works of scientific communism—has grown considerably, despite continuing opposition, at times active, both at the leadership level and in the state bureaucracy.

After the Constituent Congress of the Congolese Workers' Party, an ideological seminar was organized for members and candidate members of the Central Committee, and subsequently for larger circles of the Party's most active members. The seminar's lectures given on the basis of Marxist works cover such topics as "Class Struggle in the Congo", "Methods of Work in a Progressive Party", "Stages of the Congolese Revolution", "Ideological Work in the Village". In his

¹ For example, Marien Ngouabi, in his report to the Constituent Congress of the Congolese Workers' Party, repeatedly cited or referred to Lenin. Lenin's pronouncements were quoted a number of times at the Fifth Congress of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somali, Siad Barre, cited Lenin, too, in a speech at a meeting in Mogadiscio in November 1971. President Sékou Touré of Guinea cited Lenin in a speech to the Sixth Congress of the National Confederation of Workers of Guinea in March 1972. Many other examples could be cited.

concluding speech at the Extraordinary Congress of the Congolese Workers' Party, Marien Ngouabi declared that "every activist must systematically study the principles of Marxism-Leninism...."¹

The information organs of the People's Republic of the Congo systematically publicise scientific socialist literature. In the spring of 1973, special series of radio programs on Marxist-Leninist philosophy and political economy were begun.

In Somali in January 1972, a special national "campaign" for propagandizing scientific socialism was proclaimed. In May 1973, the public relations bureau under the Supreme Revolutionary Council began publication of a monthly journal, *Labour and Socialism*, which is intended, as its editor-in-chief has said, "to explain to the Somali people in simple and comprehensible language the principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine". The first issue of the journal included articles on the history of the international workers' movement, a biographical sketch of Lenin in connection with the 103rd anniversary of his birth, materials on the Paris Commune, and so on.

The influence of Marxism was felt profoundly in the ideological seminars in Cairo, Algiers, Khartoum and Baghdad, seminars that were organized by the revolutionary democrats themselves, either in conjunction with Communists or independently. For instance, Marxism was well represented at the seminar in Cairo. References were made to Marx and Lenin not only in speeches by Communists, but also by revolutionary democrats, and Marxist methodology was employed.

In countries led by revolutionary democrats, the centenary of Lenin's birth was, as a rule, marked on a larger scale than in other emerging states. The former co-sponsored a resolution calling for UNESCO participation in the celebration of this anniversary.

In connection with our analysis of Marxism-Leninism's influence on the formation of the outlook of revolutionary democrats, and as a point of departure for such an analysis, the

¹ *Pouvoir Rouge en Afrique. Les leçons du 23 Mars*, Editions du Comité Central du PCT, Brazzaville, 1971, p. 34.

following statement by Madeira Keita is of interest: "When we learned that areas with a population that had been almost entirely illiterate were keeping pace with the rest of the country, that they produced scientists and engineers, and officers for the victorious Soviet Army, we fixed our attention on the socialist system, which had emancipated the former tsarist colonies in Asia.... The Marxist teaching, socialist ideas, gave us the perspective we needed in our fight against colonial domination, imperialism and capitalism."¹

Such statements are most typical of the left wing of revolutionary democracy, but to an extent they reflect the opinion of revolutionary democracy as a whole. In any case, it is clear that familiarity with Marxism and the achievements of socialism is as a rule the point of departure for revolutionary democrats in their *conscious*, theoretical critique of capitalism, imperialism and colonialism.

It has already been observed that revolutionary democrats have taken over many Marxist tenets. "From the Marxist analysis," observe the editors of *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, "the modernizing nationalists have accepted certain elements and rejected others", and they refer to a "pattern of partial incorporation and partial rejection".² In fact, summing up revolutionary democrats' ideological links and interaction with Marxism-Leninism, one might say that revolutionary democrats have adopted some of its propositions, have taken over others in a "transformed" guise and, finally, have either not mastered or rejected other propositions, often including some of the most important.

The propositions of scientific socialism are used especially widely in the critique of imperialism and its colonial policy, as well as in the critique of capitalism as a whole; this is the area in which revolutionary democracy comes closest to a Marxist analysis. The editors cited above note that "the Leninist theory of imperialism is widely accepted".³ Further, it is acquaintance with the Marxist critique of capitalism and, especially, colonial-

¹ *World Marxist Review* No. 11, 1967, p. 48.

² *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*. Ed. by P. E. Sigmund, Jr., New York, 1963, pp. 37, 38.

³ *Ibid.*

ism, and use of this critique by many revolutionary democrats that stimulates a greater interest in scientific socialism. In this respect, one can consider the path travelled by Kwame Nkrumah typical of most of the left wing of revolutionary democracy. As Nkrumah recalled, study in his student years of the works of the founders of Marxism opened his eyes to the need to look for the social contention in any philosophy.¹ The brochure that he published in 1947, *To Freedom of the Colonies*,² was, in the words of K. Baako, one of the leaders of the Convention People's Party of Ghana, "the result of attentive study of the works of Karl Marx, especially of the laws Marx discovered on the accumulation of capital and the declining rate of profit". The work contains specific references to observations by Lenin and to Lenin's analysis of imperialism.

It should be recalled that in revolutionary democratic theory, capitalism with its economic system, political institutions and ideology is criticised not simply as an "unjust" social order but primarily as the "source" of imperialism. But even on other issues (above all in matters related to their economic platform) we have observed in the conceptions of revolutionary democrats a clear debt to Marxism, despite the fact that Marxist theses are often subject to "amendment", are supplemented by propositions equivalent to a deviation from Marxism, are artificially combined with elements of reformism, and so on.

Some revolutionary democratic parties have openly stated that their world view is linked inseparably with Marxism-Leninism. The revolutionary democrats of South Yemen, the Congo and Somali especially stand out in this regard. The united political organization of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen stresses in its program that the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism is the ideological basis of the Party. Some other revolutionary democratic organizations in Arab countries take the same position in their statements.

The National Revolutionary Movement of the Congo

¹ See, Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, p. 5.

² Reissued in 1962 as *Towards Colonial Freedom. Africa in the Struggle Against World Imperialism*, London, Melbourne, Toronto, 1962.

observed in its Charter that knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and of the principles of proletarian internationalism is the foundation of the ideological training for a society that wishes to build socialism. The same motif rang even more strongly and sharply with the establishment of the Congolese Workers' Party. Its Charter (article 3) stresses that "the theoretical foundation by which the leadership of the CWP is guided in its thought and in its activity is Marxism-Leninism" and that the Party "adheres firmly to proletarian internationalism".¹

Marien Ngouabi, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Congolese Workers' Party, wrote: "The Congolese Workers' Party is a working-class party standing at the head of our people's fight against imperialism and for a socialist society."

"The CWP is a vanguard party. It draws its strength from the masses, and is guided in all its activities by Marxism-Leninism...."

"We consider it necessary to unite all the progressive forces, the working people in the first place. Proletarian internationalism can accelerate the building of socialism in Africa and throughout the world."²

Naturally, we do not base our judgements on the platform of a party or political group on formal statements alone. And still the documents of the Congolese Workers' Party just as those of the united political organization of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and statements by their leaders are indicative since their phraseology, terms and methodology speak for themselves. They testify to the fact that Marxist-Leninist propositions have sunk into the consciousness of many revolutionary democrats in the Congo and South Yemen. The same also refers to many revolutionary democrats of Somali.

The documents of the former Sudanese Union of Mali and the Convention People's Party of Ghana also spoke of proximity or even adherence to Marxism with some degree of certainty. The Political Secretary of the Sudanese Union of Mali, Idrissa Diarra, in a speech at the seminar "Africa: National and Social Revolution", specifically emphasized the

¹ *Parti Congolais du Travail. Statuts adoptés par le 2^{ème} Congrès Extraordinaire tenu du 27 au 31 Décembre 1972*, pp. 2, 3.

² *World Marxist Review* No. 5, 1975, p. 74.

truth of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, as well as the fact that his Party took this doctrine as its ideology.¹

The policy statements of the Democratic Party of Guinea in practice proceed from Marxism. Sékou Touré has in some of his public utterances viewed the victory of communism as a predictable historical prospect. "Socialism", he remarked in an interview with the journal *World Marxist Review*, "is a definite stage of historical development which is followed by communism...."²

Nevertheless, even in ideological constructs that have taken over a great deal from Marxism and have accepted important Marxist ideas, there are no few deviations from Marxism. They are the result of attempts to "touch up" certain Marxist propositions, to "enrich" them, to introduce some elements of another, alien view of the world from various non-Marxist source. These deviations proceed chiefly or exclusively along the line of "adapting" Marxism-Leninism to "specific" local conditions. However, we should stress again: a characteristic feature of the posture of this wing of revolutionary democracy—taken as a whole—is that these deviations are in no way based on a critical attitude toward Marxism-Leninism or a conscious denigration of its importance as science and revolutionary practice, or on the attempt to juxtapose one's own—let alone anti-Marxist, anti-communist—concepts to Marxism.

The situation is otherwise for another group of revolutionary democratic parties, leaders and ideologues. Here we have an especially broad spectrum: from assimilation of some Marxist propositions (often simultaneously with the avowal that Marxism as a whole "does not apply" to the conditions of the emerging countries) to complete rejection of Marxism as unacceptable in principle. Common to all these parties and their leaders, however, is an attitude that is to one degree or another "critical" of Marxism-Leninism, a position that is, again, often taken under the guise of developing a theory that answers to the "national, unique" situation in these countries.

This section of national democracy, leaving aside its right

¹ *Africa: National and Social Revolution*, pp. 114-22.

² *World Marxist Review* No. 4, 1967, p. 26.

wing, as a rule recognizes within certain limits the value and historical role of Marxism; it agrees with and even adopts and utilizes some, and occasionally many, Marxist ideas. This refers in part, for example, to the analysis of the economic roots of imperialism and capitalism, colonial policy, and the economic bases of socialism. Naturally, even these propositions are adopted in a far from complete and often transformed guise.

Many revolutionary democratic groups and leaders within this current take an extensive interest in scientific socialism and study the works of its founders. Not infrequently they place no obstacles in the way of, and sometimes even encourage, the distribution of Marxist-Leninist literature.

At the same time, they express "disagreement in principle" with some of the fundamental aspects of the philosophical, political and social theory of Marxism-Leninism. The authors of the well-known statement of the Burma Socialist Program Party, "Specific Characteristics of BSP Party", sharply condemn social democratic parties for the fact that they "arbitrarily discard the texts and treatises on Marxism-Leninism and rely entirely on those by the bourgeois reformists", for their imprecise and eclectic ideology, for the lack of a clear class orientation, yet at the same time they accuse Communists of "dogmatism", of "devaluing the role of man and of his mind" and claim that "the majority of the Communists fails to abandon their dogmatism".¹

In effect, some representatives of this section of revolutionary democracy, primarily in ideological conflict with the local communist movement, advance their own "scientific socialism" as an alternative—though not a hostile one—to Marxism-Leninism. They are to varying degrees inclined to treat the social order in socialist countries as one—along with their own—of the possible "variants" of socialism that have shown their historical importance, but one that in its basic features does not answer to the "special conditions" of their countries or the Third World as a whole.

Julius Nyerere, in answer to a question as to "the place that Tanzanian socialism assigns to Marxism", said in an interview with the journal *Jeune Afrique*: "We can learn much from

¹ *Forward* No. 3, Rangoon, September 15, 1964, pp. 4, 61.

Marxism. However, we must be inspired by Marxism discerningly. This means that we must not, from laziness or lack of imagination, attempt to resolve our problems with the aid of any handy recipes.... Though in essentials *Capital* has universal significance, it is all the same a reflection of a certain epoch and a certain social and political system. When I speak of the economic development of Tanzania, I am speaking of a problem that Marx obviously could not know. In this specific case, reading *Capital* will not help me very much. Marx viewed the problem from the perspective of the transition of capitalism to socialism. We in Tanzania wish to move directly from the state of tribal society—precisely tribal, not feudal—to the stage of socialist society."¹ Nyerere elaborated on this argument in another statement a year later.²

However, as a whole, this wing of revolutionary democracy today sooner advances *non-Marxist* than *anti-Marxist* views. And its ideological constructs play, correspondingly, the same role.

True, the right wing of this current of revolutionary democracy not infrequently slips into a posture of overt and conscious, and at times active, anti-Marxism (and simultaneously, almost always anti-communism), into a posture that is *negative* and hostile to Marxism. In this, right-wing elements are using new tactical devices. Forced to reckon with the atmosphere that has now taken shape in countries with progressive regimes, with the position of at least some of the leaders of these countries, rightists vouch their agreement with the "economic platform" of Marxism, but with the obvious purpose of thereby reducing this concept to economic "techniques", to certain economic "devices" and methods.

The revolutionary democrats' ideological constructs take note of the victory of socialism in many countries, a victory achieved under communist leadership and based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Representatives of peasant and petty-bourgeois socialism understand the enormous importance of this victory for the success of socialism and revolutionary forces on an international scale, including in the former colonies and dependencies.

¹ *Jeune Afrique*, March 16, 1971, p. 18.

² See, *Jeune Afrique*, January 15, 1972, pp. 14-15.

Statements on this score by the revolutionary democratic parties' leaders and press are absolutely unambiguous. Touching on the significance of the October Revolution and the triumph of socialism in the USSR. President of FRELIMO, President of the People's Republic of Mozambique Samora Moises Machel wrote: "The Great October Socialist Revolution was the first in history to establish a zone of freedom for mankind; it changed fundamentally the balance of forces between the peoples and imperialism and between the working masses and the exploiters' society, and it initiated a new epoch in the history of mankind, in its struggle for social liberation.

The consolidation of the Soviet state under the leadership of Lenin's Party made it possible, along with the struggle of the anti-imperialist and democratic forces of peoples, to rout fascism and establish a powerful socialist community, and to give the national liberation struggle of colonial peoples new scope."¹

In their greeting to the Soviet Government on the 58th anniversary of the October Revolution, the leaders of the united political organization of the National Front and of the Government of the Democratic Yemen announced: "The Great October Socialist Revolution marked the birth of the world socialist system, the awakening and victory of the working people of the whole world and their liberation from the bondage of capitalist slavery. It paved the way for peoples struggling for their freedom and for an independent political course in the name of peaceful construction and progress....

"The Great October Socialist Revolution is the greatest milestone in the history of the struggle of the peoples against imperialism.... The united political organization of the National Front also expresses satisfaction with the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of rendering support to the Arab peoples, and to all peoples of the world in their liberation struggle against imperialism and its reactionary allies, and of assisting them in their economic, political, social and cultural advance, of strengthening the world peace and ridding mankind of the threat of war."²

¹ *Pravda*, November 14, 1975.

² *Pravda*, November 9, 1975.

Characteristic of revolutionary democrats and their ideologies, too, is the propensity (to varying degrees, of course) to utilize the socialist states' experience accumulated in the political and economic struggle against capitalism, to become acquainted with the various aspects of their party, state and economic construction. Revolutionary democrats not infrequently turn to and cite this experience in working out solutions to their own problems. "The Soviet experience of socialist planning and progressive reforms is extraordinarily useful for developing countries," the newspaper *Al-Gomhouria* has emphasized.¹ In connection with a visit of a Syrian Party delegation to the Soviet Union, the Party's organ, *Al-Baath*, in an editorial entitled "New Prospects", declared that the visit would inaugurate a new stage in the cooperation between the two countries in the most diverse areas. "This cooperation," wrote *Al-Baath*, "meets the desire of the laboring masses to become acquainted with socialist experiments throughout the world and to utilize their experience and achievements. Among these experiments, the October Revolution holds, without question, the most central place. It has the richest experience in ideological and practical spheres."² The President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somali, Siad Barre, has called for study of the experience of socialist countries.

None of this means, of course, that there are no elements or groups in the political structure of revolutionary democracy that are alienated from or unfriendly to the Soviet Union, to the socialist countries and their policy. A negative posture of this sort is nourished by narrowly nationalist and, not infrequently, class motives reflecting the sentiments of degenerating factions within revolutionary democracy. But inarguably, such an approach is not typical of forces keeping to the platform of revolutionary democracy—it is alien to these forces.

It has been asked what causes the distance—in many cases quite considerable—that now separates revolutionary democrats from Marxism-Leninism. Without giving a detailed and

¹ *Al-Gomhouria*, November 6, 1971.

² *Al-Baath*, January 20, 1970.

exhaustive answer to this question, we can touch on some of the basic causes.

First of all, factors of both a philosophical and a socio-political order are at work here. The former include the adherence of the majority of revolutionary democrats to an idealist view of the world, or at least the presence of idealist elements connected with religious views and with the influence of non-Marxist, bourgeois philosophical currents; the conjunction or even identification by some revolutionary democrats (chiefly from lack of knowledge, though also under the impact of anti-Marxist propaganda) of historical materialism with vulgarized, mechanistic materialism, and of dialectics with relativism; failure to employ the dialectical method and, largely because of this, the tendency to make a given stage, aspect or factor in the social process absolute, and so on.

With respect to socio-political factors, the primary role here is played by pre-capitalist social relations in the former colonies and dependencies, relations that *in and of themselves* can engender and support only forms of ideology adequate to these relations themselves and facilitate the penetration of elements of such ideology into the world outlook of people, groups and currents that assimilate conceptions stemming from other, more advanced socio-economic conditions.

Derived from this are the social roots and social caste of revolutionary democracy, its connection primarily with non-proletarian and petty-bourgeois strata, which can not but make itself felt in the formation of its ideological credo. From this are also derived the religious views that permeate the world outlook of many revolutionary democrats and that place not only gnoseological but also political obstacles on the path to Marxism.

Inseparable from this, too, are the nationalist views of revolutionary democrats, views that cause them to reject proletarian internationalism. And in so far as the latter is an inalienable feature of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, this has a substantial influence on revolutionary democracy's overall attitude to this doctrine.

Experience has shown that the revolutionary democrats' position with respect to Marxism and their position with respect to Communists, especially in their own countries, are

far from always identical. And it is clear that factors connected with "inter-party relations" have an impact on the ideology of revolutionary democracy.

Naturally, we can not disregard the role of imperialist propaganda, or bourgeois propaganda as a whole. Despite revolutionary democrats' generally negative and mistrustful attitude to this propaganda, it has been able, especially if we keep in mind past experience (and occasionally even the present), to exert a certain influence, presenting in a distorted light the domestic and foreign policy of the socialist states, speculating on mistakes and shortcomings that have occurred in the course of socialist construction.

Finally, the schismatic action of revisionists has not been without results, either. In a number of cases they have had a negative impact on the authority of Communists in the eyes of revolutionary democracy and are actively exploited by right-wing revolutionary democrats in the struggle against the further spread of Marxism-Leninism among revolutionary democrats.

The question may arise as to whether the proposition that the level of development of social relations in the former colonies and dependencies is the primary factor in determining the ideological caste of revolutionary democracy and its relation to Marxism is not contradicted by the indisputable fact that many revolutionary democratic leaders in Tropical Africa—the least developed area of the Third World—have come closer to the doctrine of scientific socialism than others. However, this seems a contradiction only at first glance. It should be stressed first that, in speaking of the factors conditioning the attitude toward Marxism, we did not have in mind specific individuals but revolutionary democracy as a whole, as a socio-political current. Above all, the revolutionary democratic leaders of whom we are speaking are working under specific conditions.

It must not be forgotten that the leading figures of the New Africa Sékou Touré, Kwame Nkrumah and some Mali and Congolese revolutionary democrats were, as already noted, shaped and tempered politically and ideologically in circles close to the progressive forces of the metropolises. And this left an enormous imprint on their world view. There is much

testimony to this from revolutionary democrats themselves. "It was through the French progressive democratic movement," Madeira Keita, a member of the Politburo of the Sudanese Union of Mali, has emphasized, "that we in West Africa learned indirectly about the ideas of the October Revolution.... We learned much from the French General Confederation of Labor, the Secours populaire français and the French Communist Party, which helped us to form Marxist circles. These taught Marxism to our trade unionists and leaders of mass organizations and political parties...."¹

The same question was touched on by representatives of revolutionary democratic parties in their speeches to the 18th Congress of the French Communist Party. Mamouna Toure, a member of the National Politburo of the Democratic Party of Guinea, declared that the contribution of the French Communist Party to the political organization and ideological education of the Party activists was positive in many senses. In effect, the first steps of the trade unions, and later of the Democratic Party of Guinea, to a large degree enjoyed the advantage of active participation by communist elements who were a part of the General Confederation of Labor of France and of the French Communist Party and worked in Guinea as white- and blue-collar labor or in trade. Since then, the cooperative relations established between the Guinean organizations of struggle and the French Communist Party have never ceased to develop. The representative of the National Revolutionary Movement, G. Boukambou, likewise emphasized the "cooperation that has always existed between the French Communist Party and progressive movements in their struggle in the epoch of colonialism".²

The impact of the "educational milieu"—the progressive forces of the metropolises, as well as world socialism as a whole—was the more effective (and this played its role subsequently) because the especially low level of development in the countries struggling for national liberation, the lack of social differentiation, meant that class conditioning was of much reduced significance. As a result, local revolutionary

¹ *World Marxist Review* No. 11, 1967, pp. 47, 48.

² *L'Humanité*, January 9, 1967.

democrats were socially less *engagé* than, say, revolutionary democrats in more developed countries, who were more closely connected with the petty-bourgeois, peasant social milieu, not to mention bourgeois influences. Moreover, their political formation and political activism were not burdened with a contradictory attitude to the Communist Party, an attitude that left its imprint on many revolutionary democrats. At the same time, other revolutionary democrats were often brought up in an atmosphere that was to a great extent steeped in the spirit of anti-communism.

Without question, revolutionary democrats' interest in Marxism is growing. But one thing is clear: even in favorable circumstances, the rapprochement of revolutionary democracy with Marxism is a process both complex and protracted.

3. The Role of Nationalist Ideas

One of the principal features of revolutionary democratic ideologies is their distinct nationalist coloration. We do not mean by this something superficial and easily separable, but something that has in many respects grown from the very heart of these ideologies and has a very substantial effect on their entire content. Many important features of these theories can be more or less precisely explained only if they are linked with *this particular* influence, and not simply with petty-bourgeois influence in general.

Nationalism is, along with the "socialist credo", the cornerstone of the world view of the great majority of revolutionary democrats. As we know, the principle of nationalism (often taken to mean patriotism from a want of terminological clarity) is included in the policy statements of many revolutionary democratic parties and is even reflected in the constitutions of emerging states. Both revolutionary democrats themselves and bourgeois authors speak a great deal of the role of nationalism in the world view of revolutionary democracy as a whole and in its socialist conceptions. General U Ne Win, for instance, the Chairman of the Central Organizing Committee of the Burma Socialist Program Party, in a speech at a seminar in November 1966, emphasized that "the most important phenomenon is

nationalism". As the newspaper *Botataung* wrote, Ne Win did not mean by this a narrow nationalism of the Burmese alone, he was singling out the fact that national interests must be the basic criterion.¹

A joint communique issued in 1965 by the Arab Socialist Union of the UAR and the FLN of Algeria, a communique that speaks of the both organizations' faithfulness to the cause of building socialism in their countries and to socialist ideals, and of the methods of building socialism, also noted: "Both parties emphasized their determination to promote ideological bonds between the revolutionary vanguards of Algeria and the United Arab Republic so that they will be able to fulfill their obligations in the service of *Arabism*, socialism and human civilization.... Moreover, they stressed that *Arab nationalism* is an effective weapon of the Arab masses for strengthening national independence and achieving social progress" (emphasis added — *Auth.*).²

The following consideration requires our attention. When a situation develops so as to aggravate domestic contradictions, nationalist motifs and slogans are increasingly stressed and brought to the fore. Commenting on the special session of the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt in July 1972, *Al-Gomhouria* wrote that Egyptian patriotism and Arab nationalism are "the principal demands of the day, with the aid of which we should fortify the nation's might in the face of provocations. Egyptian patriotism and Arab nationalism are the basic moving forces of the glorious victories of the revolution over the last 20 years".³

Some bourgeois scholars, Americans especially, have called the socialist ideas of the leaders of the Arab Socialist Union "radical-reform nationalist theory".⁴ The English scholar Colin Legum, evaluating Nkrumah's ideology, has expressed himself more circumspectly. He maintained that Nkrumah was at one and the same time a convinced nationalist and

¹ *Botataung*, December 3, 1966.

² *Al-Gomhouria*, April 12, 1965.

³ *Al-Gomhouria*, July 25, 1972.

⁴ Leonard Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*, N. Y. 1964, p. 156.

pan-Africanist and a dedicated socialist of an almost Marxist slant.¹

The Swiss newspaper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* has also touched upon this question, within the framework of bourgeois methodology, of course, and not without tendentious exaggeration. Nevertheless, it took note of some real phenomena. In an article entitled "Marxist Tendencies in the Middle East", analyzing, as the paper expressed it, "the substantial differences between a Communist who has grown up and been schooled in Europe and an Arab 'scientific socialist'", the newspaper wrote: "The Arab 'scientific socialist' does not proceed in his political convictions from the social question, but rather from nationalism. For him it is fundamental that 'Arabs' and not 'workers' must cast off their chains. This is the nationalist impulse that to this day lends his doctrine fighting force." And the paper added: "But in recent years the Marxist idea has been tied with subtle threads to the nationalist world view."² Pronouncements to this effect are at times voiced by revolutionary democrats themselves.

In weighing the impact of the revolutionary democrats' nationalist views on their socialist concepts, it is important to keep in mind that we frequently have to do with a nationalism that is no longer quite the nationalism that operated at the preceding stage. Nationalism has not been unaffected by the reality of political life and the struggle for social progress, it has been influenced by the role that revolutionary democrats play in this struggle and by the experience that they have gained.

While the nationalism of revolutionary democrats has a considerable impact on and often deeply penetrates their socialist ideas, it in turn experiences a reciprocal influence from the ideas of social progress. If national unity is now placed "above" class struggle, the "nation" and "national unity" at issue is as a rule understood in a new way—as excluding the "forces of reaction" (i.e., usually feudal landlords and the big bourgeoisie, "exploitative capital", and in

¹ See, *African Socialism*. Ed. by W. H. Friedland and C. G. Rosberg, Jr., Stanford, California, 1964, pp. 131-59.

² *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 5, 1967.

Tropical Africa bourgeois elements in general). If the current nationalism puts national interest above all else, the social factor is as a rule already represented in this interest (in a specific, nationalist way, of course). The national interest is taken to include the social interest as well, indeed merges with the latter when treated as the interest of the "revolutionary forces", "popular forces", the "union of popular forces", and so on. Typically, the commentator in *Botataung*, outlining Ne Win's speech and emphasizing, in accordance with Ne Win's statements, the importance of nationalism, wrote in the same article: "We must understand that nationalism, as taught by General Ne Win, is very different from bourgeois nationalism. We must understand that the words 'the union of the nation' refer only to laboring people."¹

The nationalist factor plays a role of first magnitude in the very emergence and development of a socialist orientation among revolutionary democratic forces. Events in a number of countries have shown quite clearly that revolutionary democrats arrive at socialist ideas not only through the aspiration to forestall the ruin of petty proprietors living in fear of the capitalist Moloch, not only through sympathy for the plight of the masses, but above all out of hatred for imperialism, out of revolutionary nationalist impulse.

In effect, revolutionary democrats arrive at the proclamation of socialist goals, at an orientation toward socialism, not through class negation of capitalism, but through *anti-imperialist nationalism*. In this respect, they recapitulate to a certain extent the natural logic of the revolutionary process in these countries, a process that retains an anti-imperialist character even at the stage when deep-seated socio-economic reforms with an anti-capitalist bias come to the fore. "So the very nationalism of these elements makes them gravitate toward accepting socialism," notes Khaled Bagdash. "No matter how paradoxical this fact may seem, for it contradicts all our previous criteria, it is a fact wrought by the dialectical development of our time, the time of transition from capitalism to socialism."²

¹ *Botataung*, December 3, 1966.

² *World Marxist Review* No. 8, 1964, p. 54.

The role of anti-imperialist nationalism in the revolutionary democrats' movement toward a socialist orientation has been particularly evident in the fact that their radicalization, their shift toward progressive goals in a number of countries—Egypt, for instance—became obvious first and foremost in the realm of foreign policy. Revolutionary democrats in power in these countries have come out against imperialism, against the neo-colonialist policy of the United States and other Western powers, against foreign monopolies, with increasing determination and sharpness, while at the same time the policy of these regimes in domestic matters, their attitude toward workers and peasants, has given Communists grounds for criticism. It is in this sphere—international relations—that the implementation of their revolutionary program began and it was this sphere that, to a great extent and for a long time (and in some ways even to this day), provided the stimuli toward progressive steps in domestic matters.

Significant, too, is the fact that socialism is for revolutionary democrats above all a tool for solving the tasks of national liberation and rebirth, of complete deliverance from imperialist oppression. Not only the practical steps they have taken, but also their own numerous statements (by revolutionary democrats in all countries and of all political shadings) leave no room for doubt on this score.

Many, if not all, bourgeois authors also single out this side of the matter. David Jones, a professor at the London School of Economics, for instance, has written that a genuine attempt to grapple with the economic problems of Egypt led both Nasser and his Party "in the direction of socialism".¹ Kamel S. Abu Jaber, a professor at the University of Tennessee, has emphasized that "in the Arab world socialism as an ideology remained a wing of the nationalist movement", that "socialism evolved as part of the nationalist revolution".²

The anti-imperialist struggle demonstrates to revolutionary democrats that in the second half of the twentieth century, in a country throwing off the chains of colonial dependency, it is

¹ David R. W. Jones, *Guide to the Arab Revolution*, London, 1965, p. 30.

² Kamel S. Abu Jaber, *The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party*, Syracuse University Press, 1966, p. 101.

impossible to be a revolutionary patriot, it is impossible to move along a broad front to genuine liberation from imperialism, if they fear to encroach on capitalist relations, if they reject socialism.

It is the understanding of these factors, an understanding often arrived at through bitter personal experience, that has chiefly determined the socialist orientation of revolutionary democrats. The peculiarities of the path that revolutionary democrats follow toward the socialist choice explain, too, the fact that as a rule they make this choice while not yet armed with the theory of scientific socialism, and often not relying on any conception that has even the slightest theoretically consistent underpinning.¹

In this development of the revolutionary democrats' anti-imperialist nationalism, an enormous role is played (as they themselves often recognize) by the contemporary international situation, the influence of the socialist system, of the international working class and progressive thought in the metropolises.

Naturally, it would be wrong to imagine that nationalist orientations and tendencies in the development of such orientations are uniform or identical among different revolutionary democratic circles. The strengthening in a number of cases of the negative sides of nationalistic ideology in emerging countries in the period after the conquest of political independence is a process that also finds expression in the revolutionary democratic milieu, especially given the socio-political differentiation and regrouping that is presently occurring within it. The significance of this is heightened by the fact that excessive emphasis on nationalism and the drive to strengthen the nationalist component of revolutionary democracy's socialist theories is one of the prime tendencies in the

¹ The leaders and important figures in the Egyptian revolution have admitted on a number of occasions that the revolution's organizers possessed neither revolutionary theory nor even a clear program. "Of course, we did not have all the concepts to which we now subscribe," said Nasser in an interview with *France Observateur* (April 30, 1964). Nyerere, too, has recently remarked that when TANU was founded and the struggle for independence was being waged, he "had no idea what it meant to be a socialist" (*Jeune Afrique*, March 16, 1971).

ideological and political activity of the conservative wing, in the latter's struggle against the progressive content and positive evolution of these theories. It is scarcely coincidental that Hassanein Heikal "recalled" with a certain insistence in August of 1967 that "the great moving force in the Arab lands, and perhaps throughout the world, is nationalism", and emphasized that "Marxism in the Arab world must keep this in mind".¹

Symptomatic, too, is the position taken on this issue by the right wing of the Convention People's Party, and the fact that on matters of principle it echoes Heikal's point of view. Kwesi Armah, one of the Convention People's Party's leading spokesmen, has gone to great lengths in his *Africa's Golden Road* to prove that "Nkrumahism and African nationalism are synonymous".²

Just as with the development of nationalism in a progressive direction, the strengthening of reactionary tendencies within nationalism can have a far-ranging impact on the position of revolutionary democratic circles. This is one of the possible ideological preconditions for a negative evolution of revolutionary democrats' political orientation.

4. On an Overall Evaluation of the Conceptions of Revolutionary Democracy

The material presented above and the conclusions we have reached on specific aspect of revolutionary democracy's conceptions make it possible to draw up a balance, to pose the question as to our overall evaluation of these constructs. In this connection, our thought quite naturally turns to the *Communist Manifesto*, to the analysis of the problem of non-proletarian socialism made by Marx and Engels, to Lenin's observations on revolutionary democracy and Narodism (Populism) in Russia and the East. The guidelines and the methodology provided in these works permit us to find the proper approach to the definition of the social aspect of the revolutionary democrats' conceptions.

By way of generalization, we can isolate the following basic

¹ *Al-Ahram*, August 26, 1967.

² Kwesi Armah, *Africa's Golden Road*, London, 1965, p. 117.

features typical of the theories of socialism advanced by revolutionary democracy or, at the least, by the greater part of revolutionary democracy:

— *anti-imperialism*, expressed above all in the thesis that imperialism is the principal enemy of liberation and social progress in the former colonies and dependencies and that a determined struggle against imperialism is a necessary condition for such progress—this is one of the revolutionary democrats' central concepts;

— *revolutionary democratism*, expressed in the fact that revolutionary democrats pose the question of the position and role of the people in historical development and in the creation of socialist society; in their sincere sympathy for the laboring and exploited classes and in faith in the people's righteousness; in the conjunction of these views with the intention to solve, by revolutionary means, the urgent problems of political and economic liberation from imperialism and to achieve social progress;

— *the impress of scientific socialism* and, connected with this, the approach on a number of important questions to class positions, to a point of view reflecting the interests of workers, peasants, and the laboring masses as a whole;

— *a pronounced nationalist coloration*, especially evident in the refusal to "borrow" "foreign ideology", a greater or lesser absolutization of the national factor at the expense of the social, in the exaggeration of the role of "national uniqueness" (African, Arab and such like "individuality") in the construction of a new social order, in the specific way in which they approach class relations in their own country and at the international level, in their approach to the experience of socialist countries and other present-day revolutionary cohorts;

— *elements of petty-bourgeois ideology* in the narrow sense, quite clear in the defense of the interests of the petty proprietor and in the decisive opposition to big and, in part, middle capital; in the reserved, not infrequently hostile, attitude to class struggle; in the demand for "just" distribution, which is made one of the cornerstones of the economic program; in the underestimation of the revolutionary role of the proletariat;

— *Narodnik features* (or, employing Lenin's definition, their Narodnik coloration), noticeable in the slogan of radical land reforms for the purpose of satisfying the peasant's dream of having "his" land; in the belief in a "special" way of life and "unique" paths for the development of their peoples, these paths allowing them to avoid the "flaws" and "agonies" inherent, as revolutionary democrats see it, in the development of other countries;

— *in many cases, elements of a religious outlook*, used both as the foundation for the slogan of socialism itself and in the treatment of some important social problems;

— *traces of the philosophical and political-economic influence of reformist and bourgeois sociological doctrines.*

Naturally, this breakdown is inevitably arbitrary and schematic. The features noted—and they do not encompass fully the whole substance of the ideological constructs—are in practice closely connected and interlocking. It is clear, for example, that the nationalist tune can be heard not only in the approach to class relations and in the thesis of a "special", "unique" way of life, but also in the form and extent of the influence of scientific socialism and in the attitude toward this influence, in anti-imperialism and revolutionary democratism, in the criticism of capitalism, and so on. And the nationalist tune is itself an important, even the prime, manifestation of the petty-bourgeois tendencies peculiar to revolutionary democratic conceptions. It is also important to keep in mind that the generalized traits that have been singled out, though true for the majority of revolutionary democrats, do not pertain equally to all of them.

The judgements offered in the classic works of Marxism-Leninism help us to determine the historical lineage and—what is especially important—the *specificity* of the constructs of revolutionary democracy as compared to past doctrines of non-proletarian socialism, their place in the social and ideological life of the formerly enslaved countries and in the modern world as a whole, to look ahead to their future development. It is scarcely necessary to demonstrate that there are in the constructs of revolutionary democracy—as compared to past doctrines that had a similar philosophical, political and even social base—many substantively new

elements, primarily in the direction of anti-imperialism and the influence of the ideas of scientific socialism. And this creates conditions for a change of their role in the social process.

But what is most important are the radical shifts in the historical situation that has now taken shape in the world as a whole and in the emerging countries themselves. Obviously, revolutionary democratic theories must be evaluated, as it were, in the context of our era and of the struggle between the two world systems. And under the current conditions of this struggle, negation of capitalism, even from the position of the petty producer—and the more so from the position of a struggle against “dependent” development—necessarily acquires other than merely reactionary overtones and can be an element in a realistic anti-capitalist struggle, an impulse not to utopian but to genuine socialism.

In dealing with the revolutionary democrats’ conceptions, it is important to take adequate account of the role of the social forces that fight under their banner—they are a part of the world revolutionary movement—and this is of first-rate theoretical and political importance both from the point of view of the origin of these conceptions and their socio-political content and, finally, from the standpoint of their future prospects. It is likewise necessary to recognize that these theories are, in the final analysis, a part of the worldwide ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism.

Further, these theories must be viewed against their specific historical background, in their specific countries, i.e., not against the background (and theoretical expression) of a well-developed class struggle and a socialist revolution that has become the order of the day, but against the background of the existing pre-capitalist social relations and the national liberation process, which is of course acquiring ever more social content.

At a time when hundreds of millions of non-proletarian, laboring people in the former colonies and dependencies are being drawn into the world revolutionary process, the appearance of such views is inevitable. On the one hand, they are the ideological product of the immaturity of economic relations and the underdevelopment of the class struggle in these countries, on the other hand they are an echo of the

achievements of the revolutionary process as a whole and of the growing influence of world socialism. They reflect the specific situation of the non-proletarian masses in the formerly enslaved countries in the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle at a time when their revolutionary potential has not yet been fully disclosed (not least because of the enormous burden of ignorance, prejudice and petty-bourgeois views); they reflect the dynamic and peculiarities of the social coming-of-age of these masses, of their passage—hesitant and wavering, through a prolonged process of overcoming mistaken views—to a scientific socialist ideology.

The inadequate social experience on the part of the masses and revolutionary democrats themselves in the former colonies and dependencies is also an obstacle to the *direct, straightforward* apprehension of the ideas of scientific socialism. No matter how great the achievements and authority of world socialism, no matter how indisputable the importance of communist ideas in these achievements, every people must, in order ultimately to arrive at a definite political ideology, at definite social conclusions, recognize their correctness in the crucible of their own public activity.

An important criterion in the evaluation of these theories is, of course, their relation to Marxism-Leninism. A negative stance on this question is often not a calculated, socially considered, *class* denial of scientific communism but, as already noted, tribute rendered to prejudices and nationalist sentiments, a result of inadequate information and other such factors.

We must especially stress that correct approach to the theories of revolutionary democracy should proceed not so much from strictly philosophical as from political criteria. Of overriding significance is the political course, the political activity for which these conceptions serve as the ideological banner. The policy pursued by national democrats is, as a rule, more radical than their stated views.

Finally, with the aim of elaborating a methodologically correct position with respect to revolutionary democratic constructs, we should like to cite Lenin’s remarks on Narodnik and other types of petty-bourgeois socialism.

As we know, Lenin resolutely opposed a nihilistic, indiscrimi-

nately critical attitude to such theories, calling the inability to see through the veil of inconsistent or mistaken, unscientific theories to the real import of the revolutionary struggle the "doctrinairism at its worst".¹ "The mistake some Marxists," he wrote, "make is that, while criticizing the Narodnik theory, they overlook its historically real and historically legitimate content in the struggle against serfdom. They criticize, and rightly criticize, the 'labor principle' and 'equalization' as backward, reactionary petty-bourgeois socialism; but they forget that these theories express progressive, revolutionary petty-bourgeois democracy."² At the same time, Lenin rejected just as decisively the pretensions of non-proletarian figures and parties to substitute their conceptions for Marxism as the only scientific doctrine on the construction of socialism.

If we approach the constructs of revolutionary democrats from this perspective, with a view to all the factors noted above, we must recognize that these constructs play, at the present stage of the international class struggle and of the social development of the emerging countries, primarily a positive role.

These constructs are above all a reflection of a state of revolutionary feeling that is petty-bourgeois in nature; they are the ideological expression of the extension of the national liberation revolution and the masses' swing to the left by the masses participating in the revolution in "pre-capitalist societies". When the wave of revolution reaches the petty proprietor, the petty commodity producer and the "pre-proletarian", shaking and galvanizing them into action, they respond at the ideological level with petty-bourgeois and often utopian theories.

Especially important is the fact that the conceptions advanced by the revolutionary democratic forces can serve as the banner for the passage to a non-capitalist path and for development along this path. Furthermore, these conceptions can in turn facilitate the extension of the national liberation revolution, the mobilization of the masses for carrying out their socio-economic tasks.

In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels emphasized:

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 400.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 237.

"The significance of Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism bears an inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite shape, this fantastic standing apart from the contest, these fantastic attacks on it, lose all practical value and all theoretical justification."¹

Borrowing from this approach, it would be correct to begin with the fact that the conceptions that the revolutionary democrats put forth have at the present stage both a certain "practical meaning" and a certain "theoretical justification".

It would seem possible to say, despite the approximation of the comparison, that while nineteenth-century utopian socialism in Europe expressed the protest of laborers, of the "pre-proletariat" against the expanding system of capitalist exploitation and was a symptom of the emergence and impending appearance on the scene of the gravedigger of capitalism, revolutionary democratic theories reflect first and foremost the anti-imperialist sentiments of laboring people, of the petty-bourgeois masses, their pull toward new social relations, to justice and equality, and this is the historical precursor of an extensive and intensive proletarian struggle for socialism in the national liberation zone. This is the way in which the left-radical, nationalist intelligentsia, the petty-bourgeois and non-proletarian exploited strata, and even elements of the proletariat that have not yet achieved class consciousness, react to the backwardness and dependence of the former colonies and dependencies, to their exploitation by imperialism, to the spread of Marxism, to the achievements of the socialist states and world socialism as a whole.

Of course, both as stated by the revolutionary democrats themselves and in practice, these socialist conceptions are not "single-class" (what is more, in this sense they are not, strictly speaking, "class" conceptions at all). Nevertheless, we can with some justification speak of some of the revolutionary democrats' conceptions as to some extent approaching the point of view of working people as a whole.

We must not forget, either, that these theories are not

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 1, p. 135.

completed and finished. They are transitional, in line with the transitional nature of the present socio-economic relations in the emerging countries, in line with the current phase of development of the national liberation revolutions, with the political level of the masses and their leaders. These "transitional" views, as Lenin put it,¹ have much potential for evolution.

In general, in so far as we are concerned with these conceptions, and with the entire problem of revolutionary democracy, it is not "static" but dialectical analysis that is of principled significance, a consideration of the *direction* of movement: from a patriarchal view of the world, from militant nationalism combined with elements of bourgeois and social democratic ideas, from anti-communism, to anti-capitalist views, toward a class approach, toward scientific socialism — or the reverse.

It would of course be naive to imagine that the path of evolution is predetermined and these conceptions can develop only in a single, progressive direction. Theoretically unfounded as it is, such a view is the more incorrect given imperialism's desperate struggle against the progressive development of the emerging countries, its mounting ideological activism that seeks to influence the socialist conceptions in these countries.

Whatever the case, one thing is already clear: the revolutionary democrats' doctrines can be neither an alternative nor an antipode to scientific socialism, but a stage in the passage to the latter — if, of course, these doctrines are free or are freed of anti-communism. Their substance changes in the heat of anti-imperialist battles, as the national liberation struggle develops. The course of the revolution, the logic of the struggle, confirms and underscores the importance of class struggle, the role of the working class in social development. Events show incontestably that it is wrong to take up some tenets of scientific socialism while rejecting others.

A true picture of the life and creative processes in socialist countries, as well as closer relations with the world of socialism,

¹ See, V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 439.

undermine the anti-communist prejudices that have been shaped by long years of slanderous imperialist propaganda.

Of course, it would be a gross error to oversimplify the problem, to exaggerate the proximity of the ideological positions of national democratic parties to Marxism-Leninism, to overrate the shifts that have occurred in these views. This is the more true since the presence of particular Marxist propositions in revolutionary democratic ideological constructs, the enunciation of such propositions by revolutionary democratic leaders, can at times create a misleading impression. This is not at all because such propositions are reproduced insincerely, but because Marxism-Leninism is an integral philosophy; individual propositions, when combined with other, alien theses, suffer principled ideological damage. Moreover, as mentioned, the sense of these propositions is not infrequently distorted by revolutionary democrats when they are given concrete interpretation and practical application.

We should note especially that recognition of the progressive role of revolutionary democratic conceptions is of course not the same as admitting that their *entire* content is progressive. Some elements in these conceptions can even serve as the ideological prerequisites for the political degeneration of certain circles of revolutionary democracy, as preconditions for development "in reverse".

Further, this does not mean that the role of these conceptions is uniform. Quite to the contrary, any objective analysis and corresponding conclusion that at the present stage revolutionary democratic theories have a progressive import must be based on a clear understanding of the contradictory character both of these conceptions and of their impact on social processes, on the consciousness of the masses in the former colonies and dependencies.

True, these theories are under present circumstances an important conduit for spreading socialist ideas and the slogan of socialism, they are a tool for bringing rather broad social strata in the formerly enslaved countries to an anti-capitalist position in an ideological and practical sense. However, it is also true that they may, within certain limits, impede the popularization of some of the most important ideas of scientific socialism, and on a number of issues give rise to a distorted

picture of scientific socialism, may in certain respects promote an anti-Marxist bias.

While these conceptions can play a progressive role as compared with the petty-bourgeois and Narodnic conceptions of the past, they may also, given a negative evolution, acquire new reactionary import, acting in this case as an ideological cover for a retreat to a capitalist path of development, for a break with the forces of world socialism and the international workers' movement; they may be a step in the passage to a neo-capitalist or other such ideology, as well as to revisionist views. We can not ignore this side of the question.

What is important is the *correlation* of these contradictory aspects and tendencies, the concrete historical conditions in the emerging countries at the present stage, the goals of social progress and of the liberation movements in these countries. It is consideration of all these factors that justifies our conclusion that, taken as a whole, the revolutionary democrats' ideological constructs do not at this point in time play an *objectively* anti-Marxist role.

It is clear that Marxists can not treat these conceptions in the same way that they treat opportunist theories of "socialism" that have emerged in the developed capitalist countries, or in the way that they treat the "socialist" conceptions proclaimed by the national bourgeoisie, let alone by feudal-bourgeois reaction.

Communists do not view revolutionary democracy as an ideological opponent, they recognize that revolutionary democratic conceptions, often in a utopian-nationalist and even religious guise, advocate anti-capitalist ideas. Mohammed Harmel, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Tunisian Communist Party, remarked at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties: "Socialism can be neither Arab, African nor Destour. It can only be scientific. Of course, this conclusion should not lead us to a sectarian stance on non-Marxist socialist trends, which are a reflection of the immense appeal of socialism and which can serve as forms of transition to scientific socialism and are to a degree expressive of a socialist orientation."¹

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 187.

Criticizing anti-communist tendencies resolutely and uncompromisingly, Communists focus on and give unstinting support to democratic and anti-capitalist elements in the theories of revolutionary democracy. They seek an ideological dialogue with sincere, progressive advocates and propagandists of these conceptions, urging them to take, in an ideological respect, two steps forward where they often intend to take only one.

REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY IN POWER: PRACTICAL STEPS

1. The Principal Direction of the Domestic and Foreign Policies of Revolutionary Democratic Regimes

A prime characteristic of the political course of revolutionary democracy is that revolutionary democrats not only proclaim a sweeping anti-imperialist program of national liberation, not only announce that they have opted for socialism, but also carry out socio-economic reforms that change important aspects of the social life in their countries. In these countries, as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, said at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "Deep-going social changes, which are in the interests of the masses of people, and which lead to a strengthening of national independence, are being implemented in these countries, and the number of these changes has been growing as time goes on."¹

"New, progressive changes transpiring in the economic and political life of socialist-oriented Arab, African and Asian countries were noted at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR."²

Revolutionary democrats, within the framework of a policy directed to achieving economic independence and to creating a national economy, as a rule put an end to the dominance of foreign monopolies in the countries they lead. Foreign capital's "presence" is eliminated from a number of the principal

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, pp. 23-24.

² L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, pp. 15-16.

sectors of the economy—banking and insurance, the financial and monetary system as a whole, from the production and distribution of electrical energy, from transport and communications, from foreign and to a large extent from domestic commerce, and so on. As a result, the "internal channel" of losses caused by imperialist robbery has been considerably narrowed and in some cases closed off entirely. Without question, this is a major shift in the socio-economic life of these countries, in property relations.

In Egypt, most foreign capital was nationalized and "Egyptianized" after the imperialist aggression of 1956.¹ In Syria, foreign capital has also been virtually eliminated from the dominant areas of the economy. Radical measures in this direction have been taken in Burma, and the same policy is being carried out in Somali, the Congo and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

In Tanzania, soon after the adoption of the Arusha Declaration, the government assumed control (with compensation) over all banks owned by foreigners, 17 export-import companies and eight industrial enterprises. In subsequent years, the country's leadership has steadily expanded both the practice of nationalization and the system of state predominance in enterprises in which foreign capital participates. The result, as Basil Davidson has written in the journal *West Africa*, is that for the first time the Tanzanian economy is controlled by the Tanzanians themselves.²

In Algeria, almost all foreign banks and oil and gas marketing companies have been nationalized, insurance companies have become state property, as have a large number of foreign industrial enterprises and so on. Land tenure and use by foreign companies has been completely eliminated. The principal industrial sector—extraction of petroleum and natural gas—is being progressively put under state control. Between February and April 1971, it was decided to partially nationalize the French oil companies operating in the country, and a new law was passed for petroleum and natural gas, a law

¹ Subsequent governments of Egypt pursued the same course; they undertook new measures to "liberalize" conditions for the activities of foreign capital, which might be regarded as a departure from the policy of Nasser.

² See, *West Africa*, London, December 30, 1967.

that, in the words of the official communique, "generalizes the political doctrine of Algeria both with respect to foreign interests and with respect to their present and future operations"¹.

A shining example of the progressive regimes' drive to attain economic independence was the nationalization in Iraq and Syria of the Iraq Petroleum Company (which in 1971 controlled 61 percent of the petroleum extracted in Iraq) and the establishment of the state *Compagnie Nationale du Pétrole Irakien*.

In Guinea, banking and insurance, foreign and domestic commerce, the monetary system, diamond and gold mining, some bauxite mines, electrical power, railroad and air transport, various industrial and service enterprises and education have been removed from foreign hands.

It should be emphasized that the general policy of displacing imperialist monopolies and giving the economy national character is for revolutionary democrats combined with a manifest desire to cooperate (in certain forms and on a certain scale) with foreign capital. Here, of course, political designs and the selfish calculations of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie are sometimes felt. But this impulse stems above all from the conviction that, without an influx of financial resources and technical aid from abroad, it is extremely difficult or even impossible to carry out urgent economic tasks. In Egypt, for instance, a number of American firms, as well as the Italian state company ENI, have been granted concessions for the exploration and extraction of petroleum; these concessions cover about one-fifth of the country's territory. Foreign depositors have been given guarantees against nationalization. In agreement with the United States, and subsequently with West Germany, foreign investments in Egypt have been freed from dual taxation.²

Algeria, too, is taking active steps to bring in foreign capital, principally for the establishment of major industrial projects.

¹ *El Moudjahid*, April 13, 1971.

² In recent years, the Egyptian Government has made certain modifications in its policy toward foreign capital, expanding the limits within which the latter may operate. In this connection, the Western press has felt it possible to

A special investment code has been adopted that sets out the conditions under which private—above all foreign—capital may operate. As the French journal *Marchés Tropicaux* has noted, Algerian leaders "deplore" the "distrust" and hesitation of foreign capital and "do not miss an opportunity to emphasize that they value private initiative and that the investment code is a formal engagement by the state".¹ It is worth noting that, simultaneously with the nationalization of French companies, an agreement was concluded between the state oil corporation SONATRACH and American oil trusts.

Attracting and cooperating with foreign capital, revolutionary democrats seek to use this capital, under effective state control, for carrying out pressing economic, scientific and technological tasks. In addition, foreign companies are often harnessed to such forms of operation (in some countries this is the only one permitted) as mixed enterprises in partnership with the state.

Without a doubt, all of these measures, both in their character and in their totality, are directed not only to securing control over foreign capital, but also to *limiting* and, in the final analysis, *supplanting* it. In this, revolutionary democrats pursue both national liberation and *social* goals. They not only attain their country's independence, they also consolidate the social orientation they have chosen. After all, in a state with a socialist orientation the supplanting of foreign capital is in effect equivalent to the struggle against the most important factor of neo-colonial enslavement and against the forces in these countries promoting capitalist, private property tendencies and obstructing non-capitalist development.

state that Egypt "has opened the door to foreign capital" (*The New York Times*, December 1, 1972). In 1971, a new code designed to stimulate foreign investment came into force. The program of the government formed in the spring of 1973 provides for additional measures to attract foreign investment. During the National Assembly debate on the government statement, a number of speakers expressed the fear that these measures, as well as the steps that the statement listed for meeting the interests of the private sector, might be deleterious to the fundamental principles of Egyptian development. (See, *Pravda*, May 15, 1973.)

¹ *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens*, June 14, 1969, p. 1649.

Measures directed to supplanting foreign monopolies are combined with a policy (one that is, not infrequently, even more tough) aimed against the native big and sometimes middle bourgeoisie, to limiting or eliminating them or not permitting them to develop. This, too, is a manifestation of the social orientation of the policy of revolutionary democracy. Its policy in this respect clearly differs from the course pursued by pro-bourgeois and pro-imperialist regimes, which, tying their fate in one way or another to international and native capitalism, give out-and-out encouragement to local "free enterprise".

In Egypt, the private property of the big, and an appreciable part of the middle, bourgeoisie was liquidated through nationalization in the 1960s.¹ In Tanzania, where native bourgeois elements are extremely weak, a policy of restraining or blocking their development is being pursued, a policy of reinforcing the sharp reduction of the role of private capital in the country's economy that was secured through nationalization. Under the second five-year plan, which went into effect on July 1, 1969, the weight of private investments should be cut in half as compared to the first five-year plan—from 50 to 25 percent.

In Syria, the private sector, made up of middle and, above all, petty entrepreneurs, produces only about 15 percent of the country's industrial output.

In Algeria, by the end of 1968 the private sector accounted for less than 20 percent of the industrial enterprises (not counting petroleum and natural gas) and 50 percent of

¹ In Egypt, it was decided to include targets for the development of the private sector in the third five-year plan. In 1971, the private sector share of industrial output rose to 8 per cent, as against 5.5 per cent in 1970. In a speech to a special session of the National Congress, President Anwar Sadat emphasized that "the state will as before show concern for the private sector" of the national economy. After Nasser's death, particularly in the last few years, Egypt has begun pursuing a policy of "liberalization", meaning active stimulation of the private sector providing it with a number of preferences and privileges. Speaking in October, 1975, in the National Assembly, President Sadat said that Egypt was at present pursuing an "open door policy" and had hereby "put an end to the era when imported socialism had held sway in the country and had passed on to Egyptian Arab socialism based on the state and private sectors." (*Izvestia*, October 20, 1975.)

transport and services. It had entirely lost its place in banking and insurance, in the financial and monetary system, in the marketing of electric power, gas and petroleum products. Additionally, system of state control over existing private enterprises has been introduced, and the native bourgeoisie enjoys no special privileges vis-à-vis foreign capital. All these measures, in the estimation of the journal *Marchés Tropicaux*, "clipped the wings" of private capital.

In Burma, the private sector still remains important: in 1969-1970, it employed 745 thousand workers, or 54 percent of the total.¹ But it includes only enterprises with a very low output, and most private enterprises employ no more than 10 workers each. Here, too, a policy of limitation and control is being pursued with respect to the private sector.

In Guinea, limitation and elimination of the private sector and prevention of the development of a native bourgeoisie is an officially stated and constantly reaffirmed policy. After the achievement of independence, legislation sharply curtailed the opportunity for private enterprises—including commerce, their principal sphere of activity—to operate.

At the same time, a number of countries with a socialist orientation encourage, within certain limits, the activity of petty and sometimes middle entrepreneurs. Often what is at work here is not only and not so much the influence of "confessed" socio-political views as the drive to neutralize petty proprietors, whom reactionary forces attempt to win over, and especially to utilize the resources of the private sector in carrying out urgent tasks of economic development.

In periods of special economical difficulty, revolutionary democrats, including those who are quite adamant on this question, even undertake more or less actively to stimulate this "faction" of the private sector. This was the case, for example, in Guinea in 1963, when commercial and industrial activity was "liberalized". The same thing occurred in Burma in 1966-1967, when the government monopoly on commerce in many agricultural commodities was abolished; this led to a rise in the

¹ See, *Report of the Revolutionary Government of Burma to the People on the 1969/1970 Budget*. (In Burmese.)

private trader's share of domestic commerce to 48.2 percent.¹ The resolutions of the Extraordinary Congress of the Burma Socialist Program Party of April 1973 envision increased private activity in those areas where state enterprises are not profitable.

The Algerian leadership has recently simplified the procedure for state approval of projects for Algerian investment in production sectors. However, this has not yet brought substantial results. This reluctance on the part of the proprietors of private capital indicates that they consider the political climate in the country unfavorable for private enterprise.

In Syria, according to data provided by the November 1972 issue of *Le Commerce du Levant*, the state in 1971 participated in financing 1,178 projects in the private sector, to the tune of 574 million Syrian pounds.

While in countries with a socialist orientation tangible blows have been inflicted on private property (without abrogating it in principle)—on big and, to a considerable extent, on middle capital—through the confiscation of existing fortunes, measures aimed at preventing the emergence of new fortunes have not everywhere succeeded. Enrichment and corruption and the formation of a “new”, bureaucratic bourgeoisie have in a number of cases gone quite far. In some—especially in the economically more developed—countries, these elements, along with surviving groups of the old bourgeoisie, invest in the service sector, construction, real estate, renting it out or using it for speculative operations, and so on.²

¹ *Report to the People by the Union of Burma Revolutionary Council on the Revolutionary Government's Budget Estimates for 1968/1969*, Rangoon, 1968, p. 232.

² The progressive Egyptian journal *Al-Talia* characterized the situation in Egypt in this regard as follows: “The age of the ‘big bourgeoisie’ in the scientific understanding of this term ended in Egypt with the passage of the 1961 legislation on nationalization. This does not mean the disappearance of the ‘big rich’. Bourgeois elements at present can, in reliable and lawful ways, accumulate considerable wealth, which allows them to approach the old Egyptian bourgeoisie in standard of living. But this is not enough to call these people a ‘big bourgeoisie’, since however wealthy they become they remain under the action of the laws, which do not permit them to perform a ‘capitalist leap’ and force them to limit themselves to petty production from fear of

The clearest expression of the changes in property relations in the economies of countries with a socialist orientation, of the strengthening of progressive principles in them, is the establishment or abrupt expansion of national and public property within the framework of the state and cooperative sectors, and the elevation of such property to the dominant position. As a result of the policies pursued in the 1960s, in Egypt by the early 1970s, more than 90 percent of all basic industrial stocks were concentrated in the state sector, and the state sector determined the *direction* and *character* of the development of the economy as a whole.

Further, approximately 5 thousand agricultural cooperatives were established in Egypt; they are basically of a supply and marketing character and unite 2.5 million people.

At the same time, the private sector continued to play an important role in economic life: according to official figures, enterprises in this sector account for 30 percent of industrial production,¹ and this sector dominated agriculture. As the journal *Al-Talia* wrote in March 1972, there were in Egypt 144,556 private industrial enterprises employing 10 or fewer workers each. A total of 285 thousand people were employed at these enterprises (33 percent of the total industrial work force), and their output is valued at 142.4 million Egyptian pounds.²

In Burma, through nationalization and, to a lesser extent, through the establishment of new enterprises, the state sector

dangers that await them in the future. In Egyptian society, there are not only juridical and political limitations, but also class limitations that hamper the development of exploitative capitalist elements to the level of a big bourgeoisie” (*Al-Talia*, Cairo, March, 1972, p. 62). One must of course keep in mind that the “new economic policy” mentioned in the statement of the Deputy Prime Minister, Abdel Higazi, in the summer of 1973 envisions a significant expansion of private capital's freedom of action.

The government of M. Salem which replaced it went even farther. In Egypt laws which limit the activity of the Egyptian bourgeoisie are being revised now one after the other. In this regard, the newspaper *Al-Ahram* notes that the capitalists are increasing their power, making them capable of imposing their rule upon the state and of becoming the ruling class they were before the revolution.

¹ *Al-Ahram*, July 25, 1972.

² *Al-Talia*, March, 1972, p. 64.

in 1968 accounted for 60 percent of the value of industrial output, 100 percent of foreign and around 60 percent of domestic commerce.¹

In May 1970, a special plan was published under which the cooperative movement is assigned a role as an important stage in the transition from capitalist to socialist property. "Cooperative scheme to be introduced on systematic line," reads the message of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Burma, General Ne Win, on the occasion of the Peasant Day, "is a preliminary step toward speedy realization of socialist goals and will play a decisive role in the accomplishment of the peasants' prosperity."² In 1972, Burma counted, according to official figures, 16,833 consumer credit and production cooperatives with 5.71 million members. State demonstration farms and seed stations have been established.

In Iraq, enterprises in the state sector account for approximately 70 percent of industrial output.

In Guinea, 17 of the 38 largest industrial enterprises belong to the state sector, while 9 others are mixed, with state and foreign capital participating. As the Secretary for Industry, Mining and Energy emphasized in an interview with the newspaper *Horoya*, of the three sectors of emergent Guinean industry, the state sector is the most important, which corresponds to the government's economic policy.

The resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Democratic Party of Guinea (at the end of December 1962) set the policy of introducing social principles into the village by establishing cooperatives, setting aside "collective fields", and by creating state farms, nurseries and special centres for the modernization of agriculture. Consumer cooperatives were encouraged in the cities.

However, these measures did not produce stable and positive results. The majority of agricultural cooperatives (the number of which, according to official figures, at one time reached 1,500) broke up or fell under the control of rich

¹ Report of the Revolutionary Government of Burma to the People on the 1969/1970 Budget. (In Burmese.)

² The Working People's Daily, Rangoon, March 4, 1970.

peasants. Almost the same thing occurred with a considerable part of the consumer cooperatives. By the end of 1969, the state sector in agriculture produced only 0.1 percent of gross agricultural output. All this prompted the National Council of the Revolution in January 1970 and the Ninth Congress of the DPG in April 1972 to focus attention on the situation in the villages, to emphasize again the importance of the cooperative movement and to require the appropriate organs to take all necessary measures to organize cooperatives.

The state sector in Algeria, according to figures in *Jeune Afrique*, includes approximately 80 percent of the country's mining, industrial and commercial enterprises.¹ The state sector is also acquiring an ever stronger position in the petroleum industry. At the beginning of 1973, the state oil company, SONATRACH, controlled 80 percent of petroleum extraction, all oil refining, all production of natural gas and 90 percent of gas liquefaction.²

In agriculture, the Algerian Government adheres to a policy of strengthening the self-management sector established on the initiative of agricultural workers. Some 40 percent of all land cultivated and almost 60 percent of all agricultural production falls within this sector. "We are convinced," President Boumediène said in a speech dedicated to the 14th anniversary of the Algerian revolution, "that self-management is an essential achievement of our revolution and one of the bases of our economic development and our socialist society."³ Measures to strengthen the self-managing farms have brought many of them from operating at a loss to operating at a profit.

In Syria, the state sector accounts for approximately 85 percent of the country's industrial output, and for 20 percent of Syria's total economic activity; 70 percent of all capital investments go into this sector, and most of the increase in industrial output comes from the priority development of the state sector. The Syrian leadership devotes much attention to the development of supply and marketing cooperatives. By the end of 1972, the country had around 1,600 cooperatives

¹ *Jeune Afrique*, August 18, 1970.

² See, *Comment*, London, February 10, 1973.

³ *El Moudjahid*, November 1, 1968.

covering more than 90 thousand peasants. The Baath Party is moving toward converting the existing cooperatives into cooperatives of a higher, production type, holding these to be "the nucleus of new, socialist relations" in the village.

In Tanzania, too, the position of the state and the mixed state-private sector is constantly expanding. Land, mineral resources, water and forest resources, railroad, maritime and air transport, postal and telegraph communications, and the production and marketing of electric power all came under state control soon after the proclamation of independence. The state sector was considerably strengthened by the series of nationalization decrees already mentioned. The second five-year plan envisions a sharply increased state role in retail trade, too.

The pivot of Tanzania's entire economic and social policy has been the establishment of the so-called "socialist villages" ("ujamaa vijijini"), which are to be based on "mutual aid" and "the large family". By June of 1971, there were, according to official figures, around 2,700 such villages with a population of 840 thousand; these villages were located principally on infertile land.¹ At the time of the 16th Conference of TANU (September 1973), there were 5,556 "socialist villages" with a population of more than 2 million.²

Every family participating in "ujamaa" must work in a collective field and in a personal plot. Peasants first work in the public field (the return from which finances public undertakings) only when they are not cultivating their own plot. After two to three years, individual plots planted under commercial cultures are combined and cultivated jointly. Gardens producing food remain at the personal disposal of the peasants.

In the Congo, national property has been decreed in land, mineral wealth, timber, energy, water distribution and transport. The bases for a state monopoly in foreign trade have been laid. Between 1973 and 1975, oilfields, as well as distribution and storage facilities for oil products were

¹ *Tanzania. Ten Years After Independence. Report Prepared by the President of TANU Julius K. Nyerere, Dar es Salaam, September 1971, p. 37.*

² See, *Pravda*, September 26, 1973.

nationalized. Much attention is given to the development of the mixed, state-private sector of the economy.

Congolese revolutionary democrats have pursued a policy of establishing agricultural cooperatives and cooperative villages, as well as state farms with the aid of the youth movement and of the Service for the Renewal of the Village. However, this political line, for a number of objective and subjective reasons, has not yet produced noticeable results. Despite the difficulties, the government continues to adhere to the principles of this policy.

In Mali, by the end of 1968 the state sector accounted for 80 percent of industrial output, controlled the banking and financial system, insurance and foreign and domestic commerce. The state agricultural enterprise L'Office du Niger produced more than 40 percent of the gross cotton output, around 30 percent of the total rice harvest and 90 percent of exported rice, and had 95 percent of the country's agricultural machinery.

Peasants have united into cooperatives and established "collective fields". However, in Mali, too, the practical results from these measures have been limited and occasionally socially deleterious. In practice, what has happened is that peasants have been deprived of the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their own labor in the "collective fields". The harvest from these fields has in fact been taken without recompense by the state. There is a widespread opinion among the peasantry that the income from the sale of the output of the "collective fields" goes to support officialdom. During the national seminar on questions of the cooperative movement in the village (May 1968), the government openly admitted the serious failures in its agricultural policy and in the development of the cooperative movement.¹

Without question, in countries with a socialist orientation the state and cooperative sectors are an important weapon in the struggle against foreign, above all monopoly, capital, in the struggle for economic independence and the establishment of a national economy. These sectors are meant to be an effective instrument of non-capitalist accumulation that will provide funds for economic development and social undertakings.

¹ See, *L'Essor*, June 1, 1968.

In addition, in countries led by revolutionary democrats the state and cooperative sectors are assigned, in accordance with the policy enunciated, the role of an instrument and a specific form for introducing into the economy social principles with an anti-capitalist bias. To one degree or another, this remains true despite certain failures, despite frequent inconsistency, and so on. The state sector thus becomes the economic basis for the entire nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist policy of revolutionary democratic regimes. Not infrequently, it serves as an obstacle to the emergence or spread of private enterprise.

This is quite clear in the example of the more developed countries such as, say, Syria. If there were no state sector, private industry and the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie would have developed rapidly here. Instances of corruption and self-enrichment by officials in the state sector do not negate this conclusion. This stratum, completely bourgeoisified in its psychology, gives itself over to parasitic consumption, but is as a rule not strong enough to use its illegally gotten wealth as a basis for major or often even for medium enterprise. Their socio-political role is another matter. In this respect, they are quite capable of acting as the potential basis for a pro-bourgeois policy.

The situation is basically the same in Tropical Africa, though certain specific features are present here. In these countries, too, the state sector hampers the formation of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and at the same time serves to a certain extent as the basis for the emergence of previously almost non-existent bourgeois and pro-bourgeois elements.

Of course, in developing countries as everywhere, the role and character of the state sector depend on the class substance of the political power and even, we should add, on the character of the regimes, not infrequently petty-bourgeois at their basis but with differing socio-political orientations. It is for this reason that the state sector in countries with a socialist orientation is, like the political power itself, of a *transitional* character. A bitter struggle among various social and political forces continues around the question of the role and tasks of the state sector. Along with bureaucratic groups, local entrepreneurial circles and speculative elements attempt to use it in

their own interests. The Egyptian paper *Al-Gomhouria*, in an article entitled "The 'Third Sector' and Its Specific Features", wrote of the "middlemen's offices", "proprietors of fashionable stores, luxurious villas and automobiles", "controlling affairs on the black market", who strive to put the state sector at the service of the private sector, to turn the former into an appendage of the latter. To combat this, the paper called for extensive democratization of the management of the production process, for giving power to the actual producers of material goods through control over the course of production and over the marketing of output, for lending the workers' and peasants' movement a political character.¹

Revolutionary democratic regimes pursue, more or less persistently, a policy directed in effect against various forms of obsolete socio-economic relations. In this connection, we must speak first of all of agrarian relations, which are of immediate concern to the vast majority of the population of these countries. Reforms carried out in this area have resulted in important progressive changes, though they have not meant that the agrarian question has been solved fundamentally.

In Egypt, the agrarian reform, carried out in several stages under laws passed in 1952, 1961 and 1969, has changed the face of the Egyptian village in a major way. The reforms led to the expropriation from the landed gentry of 1 million feddans of land, or 15 percent of all the land under cultivation. By the beginning of 1970, 804 thousand feddans of the expropriated land had been distributed among 420 thousand peasant families. This means that the reform has affected more than 2 million peasants. At present, according to the Egyptian press, about 60 percent of all the land under cultivation belongs to those who have a holding of 5 or fewer feddans (the corresponding figure in 1952 was 36.4 percent).² In 1964, peasants were released from payments for the gentry land received, and their payments to the state now stand at less than one-fourth of the figure originally set. Rent has been stabilized at a moderate level and the dispossession of renters has been banned. Agrarian reform has contributed to undermining not only the economic, but also the political influence of the gentry

¹ See, *Al-Gomhouria*, March 30, 1972.

² *Al-Taawn*, Cairo, September 5, 1972.

and feudal landlords. They have been deprived of political rights, or these rights have been significantly curtailed.

At the same time, socio-economic changes in the Egyptian village have led, as in some other countries, to an increase in the number of rich peasants and village bourgeoisie, to a strengthening of their economic position and political influence. The Egyptian paper *Al-Gomhouria* has written that "middle fellahin" with holdings of from 5 to 20 feddans (there are 145 thousand such persons) control 17.7 percent of all the land under cultivation. At the peak of seasonal work, the paper observed, these fellahin exploit the labor of landless and land-hungry peasants, as well as seasonal workers.¹ "Middle fellahin" are the most influential stratum in the administrative councils of cooperatives and in village councils. In many settlements and villages they hold more than 70 percent of the seats on the committees of the Arab Socialist Union.

In 1971-1972, some measures connected with agrarian reforms were subjected to partial review. For instance, it was decided to pay compensation over a period of 9 years to approximately 5 thousand landlords for the excess land (over the 50 feddans per person permitted) confiscated from them under the 1969 law. In January 1972, in line with the President's decision not to extend the period in which the 1962 decree "On Political Isolation" would remain in force, 12 thousand persons who had come under the purview of agrarian and other progressive laws and had been excluded from political life were restored to their rights. In 1975 it was decided to raise the rent rate by 20-25 percent for the land rented by the peasants.

Fundamental agrarian reform has been carried out in Syria. The reform has struck a powerful blow at gentry landownership. According to official figures made public at the Third Conference of the General Federation of Peasants of Syria (April 1970), during the reform 1.5 million hectares of land were confiscated from gentry owners; of the land confiscated, by the time of the Conference 780,762 hectares had been distributed among 52,504 peasant families. In addition, 379,328 hectares of state land had been distributed, on favorable terms, with payment of one-quarter of the value of

¹ See, *Al-Gomhouria*, September 21, 1972.

the land, among 32,120 families of land-hungry and poor peasants who had, as a rule, rented these allotments.¹

Burmese leaders, too, have gone the route of breaking up old relations in the village and carrying out deep-seated reforms. Through the implementation of laws adopted in 1963 and 1965, as well as through subsequent measures, rent payments to gentry were abolished and land that had become the property of the state was handed over to peasants. The bases of feudal-gentry and usurious exploitation in agriculture were seriously undermined, the class of feudal and gentry landowners was virtually liquidated, and the middleman speculator, as a rule, eliminated.

According to official statistics, while in 1962-1963 84 percent of the peasant farms had less than ten acres of land (and the majority had less than five acres), by 1969 55 percent of all peasants had holdings of between five and ten acres. Under the laws adopted, it is illegal to force peasants from their land, to arrest them for debts, or to seize their harvest, agricultural implements, working stock or property as payment for debts.

Of course, these measures, as spokesmen for the Revolutionary Council have repeatedly admitted, do not always achieve the intended results. In a number of instances, capitalist and surviving feudal elements continue to rob the peasants, taking part of their output from them. Rich peasants seek to distort the government's agrarian policy and agitate for cancellation of debt payment to the state. In addition, they have occupied the dominant position in the distribution of agricultural credits. Burmese leaders have therefore directed some measures against the rich peasants, too. In 1968, for instance, the Revolutionary Council instituted a new credit policy that envisions a certain limitation of the rich peasant's influence in the village and some easing of the situation of laboring peasants.

In Algeria, agrarian reforms have recently been carried out in the private sector. Prior to the agrarian reform, land in the private sector was distributed as follows (see table on p. 112):

These figures show that 75 percent of farmland in the private sector belonged to major landed proprietors and rich

¹ *Al-Baath*, April 19, 1970.

Holdings	Number of landowners	Percentage	
		of land	of landowners
Over 50 hectares	16,350	25	2.8
From 10 to 50 hectares	147,045	50	25
From 5 to 10 hectares	114,275	15	19.6
From 0.5 to 5 hectares	308,999	10	52.6
Total	586,669	100	100

peasants making up 27.8 percent of landowners. At the same time, the 52.6 percent land-hungry peasants had in all only ten percent of the land. Approximately 0.5 million Algerian peasants had no land whatsoever.

On November 1, 1971, the Charter of the Agricultural Revolution came into force. Its implementation, as Algerian leaders have repeatedly emphasized, is one of the prime tasks of the country's social development. This Charter calls for putting agriculture on a modern technical footing, for the limitation of major landowning, the distribution of land among the poorest fellahin, and the establishment of cooperatives. Additionally, an official goal of the agrarian reforms is the political activation of the peasantry.¹

The first stage of the agrarian reform was officially announced on June 17, 1972. The purpose of the first stage was to register communal, khabus (belonging to Moslem religious organizations) and state lands, to transfer them to the reserves for the "agrarian revolution" for subsequent distribution to landless and land-hungry peasants. In addition, it was intended in this first stage to establish various types of cooperatives.

According to the Algerian press, after three years of the "agrarian revolution" 54,700 land-hungry and landless peasants had received around 800,000 hectares of state land and 960,000 palm trees.²

¹ See, *El Moudjahid*, November 3, 1972.

² *El Moudjahid*, June 6, 1975.

On the first anniversary of the "agrarian revolution", Houari Boumediène announced the beginning of the second stage of agrarian reform. This stage directly affected the interests of major landlords; its purpose was to nationalize and limit large-scale land holdings, to distribute these lands to landless peasants and to develop further cooperatives among the Algerian peasantry.

Finally, the third stage of the reform envisages introducing system in cattle grazing and in the exploitation of forests and reservoirs.

In the course of the first two stages of the agrarian reform, around 6,000 cooperatives of different types have been set up—the majority of them being production cooperatives.¹

The creation of "socialist villages" has begun (about 100 such villages are to be set up by 1980); in August of 1973 the National Union of Algerian Peasants was organized, and by early 1974 it had one million members.²

In 1970, Iraq adopted a law sharply curtailing feudal property, undercutting the bases of pre-capitalist forms of exploitation in agriculture and significantly improving the situation of the peasantry. Its implementation, as announced by the Eighth Regional Congress of the Baath Party in March 1974, concluded the liquidation of feudal land property and of semi-feudal relations. The 1958 Land Reform Project had not been implemented, and 11 years later ten percent of the landowners continued to hold 70 percent of the area cultivated. The new law has already resulted in major and progressive shifts in the Iraqi village. While before 1970 approximately 3 million donums (one donum equals 0.25 hectare) had been distributed to peasant,³ by the second half of 1975, 6,165 million donums had been distributed. According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, more than 10 million donums of land had been confiscated from major landowners.⁴

Payment of compensation to feudal and gentry landlords for alienated land has been ended, and the land has been given in

¹ *El Moudjahid*, June 15, 1975.

² *Le Monde*, June 23-24, 1974.

³ *Tarik-al-Shaab*, January 21, 1976.

⁴ *Tarik-al-Shaab*, September 30, 1975.

free and permanent use to landless and land-hungry peasants. The number of cooperatives—established along with state farms on land confiscated from the gentry and envisioned by the new law—has grown markedly. *Tarik-al-Shaab*, citing official sources, has reported that in January of 1976 there were in Iraq 1,382 agricultural cooperatives with 300 thousand members and 13 million donums of land. The paper noted at the same time the increasing influence of feudal landlords and well-to-do peasants in many cooperatives.¹

An important feature of agrarian reforms in progressive states is the fact that they include measures directed to improving the situation of the poorest peasantry, to creating cooperatives and providing them with a wide range of assistance.

One of the principal goals proclaimed by revolutionary democratic regimes is rapid economic progress and an end to economic backwardness. This policy is tied in with the introduction of the principles of planning. In all states with a socialist orientation, without exception, an obligatory element of economic policy is the drawing up of economic plans for a number of years ahead. In a number of countries, these plans are becoming increasingly realistic because of the strengthening of the state sector, the curtailment of foreign monopolies' influence and through accumulated experience. In some countries, special permanent planning organs have been established.

In Egypt, for example, during the 1960s, on the basis of the five-year development plans, the gross product increased by more than 60 percent which made it an agrarian-industrial country.

In Burma, the Revolutionary Council has pursued a determined policy of economic growth primarily through the development of agriculture and branches of industry connected with processing local raw materials. Attention has also been given to the development of heavy industry and transport. However, all this, for a number of different reasons, has not brought the expected results. Agricultural output has not grown substantially. As the Burmese press has noted, the

¹ *Tarik-al-Shaab*, January 21, 1976.

situation in industry is also unsatisfactory. The Revolutionary Council has recently adopted new measures to improve the situation.

Certain economic difficulties are being experienced in Guinea, too. Naturally, we must not underrate the fact that, in the years of independence, several dozen industrial processing enterprises have been built in the country. The bases for the primary processing of minerals, for mechanical engineering and metallurgy, a construction materials industry, for chemical, lumber, wood-working, light and food industries have been laid. The total mileage of roads has more than doubled. However, many enterprises in the state and mixed as well as the private sectors are not operating at the planned output and are working at a loss.

Though in the three- and seven-year plans for the economic development of Guinea much attention has been given to agricultural growth, the targets have not been reached. At a session of the National Council of the Revolution in March 1972 and at the Ninth Congress of the Democratic Party of Guinea in April 1972 the need to bending all efforts toward solving the country's economic problems, especially in agriculture, was again stressed. The facts testify that the measures outlined have had a certain effect and the economic situation of the republic in 1975 improved.

Important economic shifts have occurred in Algeria, primarily in industry. The production of petroleum and natural gas has increased substantially, and there has been noticeable success in the creation of new industrial sectors. Investment targets in the first four-year plan (1970-1973) were surpassed.

The current four-year plan for 1974-1977 envisions a three-fold increase in capital investments over the preceding four years—10 thousand million dinars. According to the plan, the annual rate of growth of the gross domestic product will be no less than 10 percent.

In Tanzania, industrial and agricultural output has increased markedly since independence. During the first five-year planning period (1965-1969), more was accomplished in the development of industry than in the country's entire preceding history. However because of the extremely low initial level and extreme poverty, this could not produce

important economic shifts. The journal *The African Communist* has written that in agriculture, "performance was more than satisfactory".¹ Production of commercial cultures—cotton, coffee, sugar, etc.—has risen sharply.

In the course of the fundamental socio-economic transformations carried out by progressive regimes, there have been what are in effect inevitable temporary losses and difficulties in material production (the experience obtained so far shows that this can be considered a regular phenomenon). They are the cost of the new direction in social and economic development, a consequence of the resistance of local and foreign reaction. This tendency in the former colonies and dependencies is especially acute because of backwardness, poverty and other complicating factors of an objective and subjective nature.

Among the most important achievements of the revolutionary democrats are, without question, measures in the areas of education, culture, public health and the training of native personnel. For example, while in Egypt in 1952-1953 only 40 percent of the children of school age attended primary school, by 1967-1968 the figure had risen to 80 percent. During the 1969-1970 school year, the number of those studying in primary, incomplete secondary and secondary school was 5 million, while there were around 200 thousand students in universities and institutes.²

In Burma, 2.1 times more children were in school in 1970-1971 than at the time Ne Win's government came to power.³ Education has become free of charge.

In Algeria, the number of pupils in primary school doubled between 1963 and 1969, the number in secondary school more than tripled in the same period. As in other countries with a socialist orientation, in Algeria active steps are being taken to revive national culture, to create a national theater and film industry and so on.

The immense expansion of the network of schools and other academic and cultural institutions leads in effect to the creation of a system of mass *popular* education, which means not only a

¹ *The African Communist* No. 39, 1969, p. 31.

² *Year-book of the Central Bureau of Statistics. 1952-1970*, Cairo, 1971, pp. 184, 185, 186, 192, 202 (in Arabic.)

³ *Guardian* No. 6, Rangoon, 1972.

quantitative but also a great *qualitative* shift of a *democratic* character, a shift of considerable progressive import. Changes are occurring, too, in the ideological content of education and culture. These changes are associated with deliverance from the "colonial heritage", with the curtailment and exclusion, though to varying degrees, of imperialist influence, with the "Algerianization", "Africanization", and so on, of the system of personnel training, with the introduction of new programs of instruction and new textbooks, and, finally, with the assistance of socialist countries in the development of education.

In this area a turn is occurring, or has to a significant extent already occurred, from pro-colonialist ideas of servility to the imperialist West, from an apologia for the West's "civilizing mission" and its "way of life", from ideas of militant anti-socialism and anti-communism, to a nationalist and revolutionary democratic ideology. Ideas of national independence, patriotism and national pride, of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, and socialist slogans have begun to hold an important, and sometimes a dominant, position in the educational system. True, all this is given a nationalist interpretation and socialist ideas are presented in the official interpretation of the revolutionary democratic parties, juxtaposed, directly or indirectly, to a communist view of the world.

But it is especially important that all of this is part of the broader change of the ideological climate in the same direction, a manifestation of increasingly strong new tendencies in the education, conscious and spontaneous, of the popular masses. One can say that a *cultural revolution sui generis* is unfolding, a revolution that reflects the influence of nationalist ideology and official doctrines of socialism, and also, to one degree or another, the influence of the socialist countries, of the international workers' movement and local Communist parties. Of course, an objective and multi-dimensional evaluation of this process, of its social import, is impossible unless we take into account the heterogeneous roles of nationalism, and also the fact that in some countries religious ideas are actively injected into the educational system.

The increased opportunities for spreading Marxist ideas is a feature that at this stage is of no small importance in the

development of the cultural life of many countries with a socialist orientation.

It is almost universally true that revolutionary democracy has been able to do much more in the social than in the economic sphere. Changes in this area, having in mind the dynamics of different classes and social strata, their role and influence, the social atmosphere as a whole, and so on, are quite indicative and substantial, since in no small measure they manifest the political orientation of revolutionary democratic regimes.

There have been significant shifts in the social caste of the countries led by revolutionary democrats, largely in a democratic but partially, too, in an anti-capitalist direction. Quite naturally, the important changes in the ideological situation, of which we have already spoken, are a part of these shifts.

As a rule, the economic basis of feudal-gentry elements has been undermined or even eliminated, their political influence has often been undermined, too, and the position of the tribal nobility has been seriously shaken. An important social consequence of the course pursued is the fact that the basis—above all the economic basis—of the “old” capitalist elements, chiefly in the city, has been weakened. As a rule, the strata of foreign bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie associated with it, the native big and in part middle bourgeoisie, has been eliminated. However, the emerging bourgeois, rich peasant elements in the village and new urban bourgeois strata, bureaucratic groups and, in some countries, even contractors, not infrequently exercise a growing influence. The development of these “new” strata reflects the contradictory character of the practical results of reforms in the social sphere. However, while recognizing this we must not neglect the fact that in other developing countries the formation of pro-bourgeois and, especially, bourgeois elements is proceeding much faster and on a much larger scale.

Almost everywhere, the working class has grown numerically and continues to grow, chiefly in the state sector. The proportion of workers employed at the larger, more modern enterprises is increasing. The stratum of landless and land-poor peasantry is shrinking. The intelligentsia has appreciably increased in number.

These processes, for all that they are indisputable, are reflected in only fragmentary data. For instance, in Egypt the number of workers in industry increased by 150 percent from 1954 through 1972—from around 400 thousand to more than 1 million persons.¹ In Guinea, the number of African workers increased from 75.9 thousand to 100-120 thousand persons between 1958 and 1967, the proportion of industrial proletarians increasing at the same time. In Tanzania, the number of workers employed in processing industry doubled between 1963 and 1970—from 22 thousand to 43.4 thousand persons.

Either through legislation or through constitutional changes, the most scandalous vestiges of the feudal and colonial past have been eliminated and democratic norms of social and political life proclaimed. Thanks to the passage of progressive social and labor legislation, to the change in public life as a whole in these countries and to the general orientation of the policy of revolutionary democratic regimes, the position of the masses has improved. In Egypt, for instance, wages have been raised and a minimum wage established for industrial workers in the state and private sectors and in agriculture, and free medical assistance and a pension system introduced. In 1961, it was decreed that 25 percent of the profits of state enterprises should be distributed among the workers and other employees of these enterprises, that these profits should go to meet employee needs. Worker participation in the management of enterprises is also provided for by law.² The implementation of land reform has had a positive effect on the life and labor of large groups of peasants.

In accordance with the Charter for the Socialist Organization of Enterprises, in Algeria laborers' assemblies (more than 500 of them by the beginning of November, 1975) have been set up at industrial enterprises. They are meant to ensure the participation of workers and employees in production

¹ *Pravda*, June 27, 1972.

² Under Article 26 of the new Constitution, workers should hold no less than 50 percent of the seats in enterprise councils. The same article guarantees workers, peasants and artisans 80 percent of the seats in the administrative councils of agricultural and industrial cooperatives.

and decision-making at different levels. The chairmen of these assemblies, together with representatives of enterprise management, form management councils that concern themselves with questions of production, as well as social insurance, improvement of working conditions, and so on.

In Burma, a law passed in 1964 proclaims the workers' right to work, rest and education, to compensation for on-the-job injuries, to support in old age and in case of disability. Equal pay for women for equal work has been established, and paid vacations have been introduced. Burmese peasants have derived even greater benefits from measures adopted by the new authorities.

There have also been noticeable shifts in social and labor relations in Syria. Labor legislation has established an eight-hour day in the state and private sectors, and two- and three-week annual paid vacations have been introduced. The pension system has been improved. Workers have obtained representation in enterprise and institution control commissions.

In Guinea, labor and wage legislation reflecting the interests of laboring persons has been adopted. Similar measures have been adopted, in one form or another, in other countries with a socialist orientation.

The revolutionary democratic regimes' policy of creating an independent economy and pursuing rapid economic progress, of eliminating the dominant position of foreign and big native capital, is in the interests of the masses. The masses gain much, too, from measures to extend education and make it democratic.

Taken all together, this leads, directly or indirectly, to an improvement in the social status of working people, to an increase of their importance in the public and political life of their countries. Moreover, some measures carried out by revolutionary democratic governments are directed specifically to gaining the immediate political support of the masses and, with their aid, limiting the political power and influence of conservative forces.

In Burma, for example, people's workers and peasants councils, which at present cover approximately 7.5 million persons, have been established as mass organizations for

working people.¹ The system is capped by the Central People's Workers Council and the Central People's Peasants Council, one-third of the members of which are appointed and two-thirds elected by regional councils. Workers' and peasants' seminars are conducted annually. The principal task of the councils is in effect to ensure the political influence of the Revolutionary Council and the Burma Socialist Program Party on the masses, to promote increased production and to defend the interests of urban and rural laborers. Events have shown already that the councils contribute to the activization of the laboring masses.

A network of mass organizations—trade union, youth, women—exist alongside ruling parties in other countries with a socialist orientation, too. Their work is based on official political and ideological guidelines. Their activity, which is above all propagandistic in nature, promotes heightened political consciousness among the masses, to the extent that this activity reflects the officially enunciated theses on the need to increase the role of working people, to step up the struggle against imperialism, to expand contact with all anti-imperialist forces.

In a number of states with a socialist orientation, under law no less than 50-60 percent of the members of local or of all elective organs of state must be workers and peasants.

The increased role of the masses is objectively furthered, too, by measures carried out by some revolutionary democratic regimes for training political and military cadres primarily from the laboring strata. In Guinea, the people's militia is now manned chiefly by young workers, as well as by white-collar workers. Students at the Central Institute of Political Science under the Central Committee of the Burma Socialist Program Party—the graduates of which form the organizational backbone of the Party—are chosen from regular Party workers, state civil servants, peasants and workers.

In speaking of all these socio-political measures, one must always keep in mind that, not infrequently, their true substance is considerably diluted in the course of their practical implementation. It happens at times that the policy pursued by

¹ See, *Botataung*, August 30, 1972.

revolutionary democratic regimes leads in some ways to a heightened role and social status for the laboring masses but in other ways raises obstacles to these same goals and has in fact the reverse effect. The fact is that some revolutionary democratic leaders, despite their incontrovertible contact with the masses, have a reserved, not to say negative, attitude to the masses' *independent political initiative*. These leaders do not favor stimulating the masses' *initiative*, but only strictly controlled and "channeled" activism to enlist their social support which can be mobilized in special cases or emergency situations as though "at the push of a button".

This approach stems from the social-class properties of revolutionary democracy, from the psychology and habits of some political leaders, from the authoritarian inclinations peculiar to them, and at times from their deep-seated political conceptions. Despite the officially proclaimed recognition of the decisive role of the masses in public life, these leaders in practice proceed from the fact that political initiative in the matter of progressive development must come exclusively *from above*, while socio-economic advances are in effect "bestowed" on the people. As a result, some of the progressive measures undertaken by revolutionary democratic regimes and some of the organizational forms they have created are sometimes, to varying degrees, marked by purely superficial democratism.

Typical, too, is the position of a number of national democratic leaders who have a negative attitude toward an effective political organization, i. e., party, preferring to rely on state levers. Strict political and administrative control is frequently exercised over working people's organizations, and their activity is limited. This is a prime reason for the weakness of mass organizations in some countries with a socialist orientation, for their inability to serve as an effective support for progressive regimes in their hour of trial, for the occasional "withering away" even of those that demonstrated their fighting character in the years of struggle for independence.

A non-class approach to social divisions in society—an approach leading to conscious or unconscious erosion of the concepts "worker" and "peasant"—has a negative effect. The well-known progressive Egyptian figure, Khaled Mohei El-Din, has emphasized that "there have been gains for peasants and

workers who have advanced some excellent people to important places"; these gains are due to the fact that workers and peasants had been allotted 50 percent of the seats on all administrative organs. But he noted at the same time that "the definition which put directors of even big companies in the category of worker and the owner of up to 25 acres (this is a relatively big area in Egypt, especially in view of the rising prices of agricultural produce) in the category of peasant, allowed seats intended for workers and peasants to go to the middle groups.¹ Moreover, if one bears in mind that the remaining 50 percent of the seats in the National Assembly are meant for the middle groups, it becomes clear that the class composition of the legislature has changed in favor of the latter."²

The activities of the local administration often run counter to the official line and also create obstacles to the development of the masses' political initiative. Such activities are not infrequently aimed at discrediting democratic measures.

While we can speak of the social and political achievements of the masses in countries ruled by revolutionary democracy, while we can speak of the elevation of the role of the masses in public life, the question of the material situation of working people, especially in the city, is more complex. Rising prices, often combined with shortages, absorb (at least in some of these countries) an appreciable part of the material benefits and privileges obtained as a result of socio-economic reforms and government undertakings, and at times even cause a worsening of working people's standards of living. It must be kept in mind, however, that this is not the result of anti-worker policies, but of the overall economic situation in these countries.

Finally, we should note specially the effect that the activity of revolutionary democratic regimes has had in creating a national community on a national basis by developing a national consciousness, breaking down regional isolation, forming an economic community and developing a national

¹ A new definition of "peasant" and "worker" was adopted in 1968.

² *World Marxist Review* No. 8, 1966, p. 23.

culture. In August 1974 *France nouvelle*, an organ published by French Communists, said that the progress in consolidating the national unity in Tanzania is one of the most significant achievements of that country.

The revolutionary democrats' social orientation shows clearly in the international policy they pursue. The most distinctive features of this policy are sharp opposition to imperialism and colonialism, solidarity with present-day revolutionary—especially national liberation—movements, and positive neutrality in an anti-imperialist sense. This foreign policy in effect makes revolutionary democratic regimes a vanguard given state organization for the forces of national liberation in their struggle against imperialism.

States led by revolutionary democrats are characterized by striving to develop multi-sided contacts and close cooperation with the socialist community. And this cooperation is viewed not only as a political and economic necessity, but also to a large degree as a natural phenomenon in relations among states that are companions in a common struggle. Nasser in his time expressed this point of view succinctly, declaring that Egypt and the Soviet Union have "common ideological and strategic interests in the struggle against imperialism".¹

The President of Iraq, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, said much the same thing in a radio and television address on May 1, 1973. He placed at the center of Iraq's foreign policy goals the strengthening of the combat alliance with the national liberation movement on three continents and "fostering the ties of alliance with the socialist countries, including in the forefront the Soviet Union, with the object of progressing toward durable and steady strategic alliance".²

The semi-official mouthpiece of the Iraqi Baath Party, commenting on the visit to Moscow by the Vice-President of the Revolutionary Command Council and Vice-Regional Secretary-General of the Arab Baath Socialist Party S. Hussain, and characterizing the position of this party on relations with the Soviet Union, wrote: "We are convinced that relations of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and with the

¹ *Al-Gomhouria*, July 24, 1968.

² *The Baghdad Observer*, May 3, 1973.

entire socialist community will gradually strengthen and develop, since they have a firm foundation and are developing within the framework of a firm strategic union."¹

The Sixth Regional Conference of the Syrian Baath Party adopted a resolution that called for strengthening efforts aimed at consolidating comprehensive cooperation with socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union.²

To a certain extent, we can consider the revolutionary democrats' reliance on the Soviet Union in the construction of projects that are of principled national significance—the Aswan and Euphrates complexes, for example—a foreign policy manifestation of their social orientation.

It is indicative that revolutionary democratic governments took, as a rule, an anti-imperialist position with respect to the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia. They showed an understanding of the dangers that the situation that had taken shape there held for socialism and of the legitimacy of the actions of the five socialist states of the Warsaw Pact; some revolutionary democratic governments openly supported these actions.

States with a socialist orientation resolutely opposed American imperialism in Indochina. As a rule, they established diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, recognized the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; both at the state level and in the name of public opinion in their countries, revolutionary democracy sharply condemned imperialist aggression. Revolutionary democracy expressed solidarity with the legitimate struggle of the Vietnamese and other peoples of Indochina for their independence.

All or almost all revolutionary democratic states have in essence supported the policy of the socialist states on the question of European security and have recognized and established relations with the German Democratic Republic. Countries with a socialist orientation have recognized the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. They have called for the immediate withdrawal of American troops from South

¹ *Al-Thawrah*, April 7, 1975.

² *Pravda*, April 22, 1975.

Korea and for granting the Korean people the opportunity itself, without foreign intervention, to settle their internal affairs, including the question of the peaceful unification of the country on a democratic basis.

States headed by revolutionary democrats have condemned Israeli aggression and have demonstrated their solidarity with the just cause of the Arab peoples. They persistently oppose all manifestations of colonialism and lend active support to those fighting for the liberation of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. They support progressive forces fighting reactionary, neo-colonial regimes. They took a position of firm solidarity with democratic Chile, condemned the military fascist coup in that country and the Pinochet regime.

Countries with a socialist orientation have not confined themselves to rebuffing attempts to draw them into various blocs and organizations for "cooperation", blocs that imperialists and their accomplices have created or wish to create; they actively oppose the basic direction of imperialist policy throughout the world.

Progressive nation states also take a position either coinciding with or close to that of socialist countries on such extremely important international issues as strengthening the peace and security of nations, disarmament, banning nuclear weapons, peaceful settlement of territorial disputes and border conflicts, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the elimination of foreign military bases, and so on.

Participating in the movement for non-alignment, revolutionary democratic states strive to anchor this movement to anti-imperialist positions. The efforts of these states have, for instance, played a very important role in thwarting the attempt to deprive the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries of an anti-imperialist orientation.

Of course, in the foreign policy sphere, too, the properties of revolutionary democracy, properties engendered by its specific social and philosophical character and its nationalist approach, make themselves felt. For instance, some revolutionary democrats are inclined to maneuver between the two systems on the world arena.

Narrowly nationalist persuasions at times lead to the adoption of special views on the nature of the contemporary

era and its principal contradictions, on the role of the various revolutionary streams of the present-day world, on the significance of the struggle of the international working class, and so on. Some revolutionary democratic circles, at least, are inclined to support the notorious conception of "poor" and "rich" nations. The well-known Algerian paper *El Moudjahid*, for instance, once wrote: "In the face of industrial, and in particular imperialist (emphasis added — *Auth.*) countries, which try to keep our peoples from recovering their national wealth, the poor countries must unite their forces and means."¹ One can recall that attempts were made to put this idea of the "common fate" of backward countries in counterbalance to "rich nations" at the center of the Algiers seminar on the question of socialism in Arab countries (May 1967).

Some revolutionary democratic figures have shown a tendency to adopt the thesis that there exists in the international arena a revolutionary "third force" in the person of the formerly enslaved countries that now have "revolutionary regimes" — this third force often being held to include Cuba, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (now the Socialist Republic of Vietnam), and others. It should be noted, too, that some revolutionary democratic groups take a special position on the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, the nuclear arms limitation treaty, and so on.

It is important to stress that, along with far-reaching socio-economic changes, a clear-cut anti-imperialist stance in foreign policy, close, friendly ties and cooperation with socialist states, and solidarity with anti-colonialist and liberation movement throughout the world are typical of and an integral feature of a socialist orientation and a revolutionary-democratic policy. These are very closely related, in fact fundamentally linked, although one aspect may develop at a faster pace than another.

This has been persuasively shown in Egypt. The departure from the progressive principles of the Egyptian revolution that had been proclaimed by Nasser and carried out in the country's domestic life, the notorious "liberalization" of

¹ *El Moudjahid*, October 11, 1967.

economic policy, the revision of laws that had limited the activity of the local bourgeoisie, and the opening of doors to foreign investments have in effect gone hand in hand with the shift toward the capitalist countries, above all toward the United States, in foreign policy, and the swing away from cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The logical outcome of this was the resolution of the People's Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt, adopted on the initiative of Anwar Sadat, revoking the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and Egypt.

It is characteristic that the progressive forces in the Arab world view the decision of the Egyptian leadership in precisely this light. The Algerian newspaper *El-Moudjahid*, for example, writes that the worsening of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union in effect began with Sadat's rise to power, when he threw open the doors to free enterprise and foreign capitalism.

Despite the massive official campaign, supported by the entire apparatus of authority, distinct opposition to the leadership's one-sided decision to cancel the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and Egypt has emerged in Egypt.

The abrogation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, serves neither the present nor future interests of Egypt, progressives in that country hold. They urge continuing efforts to normalize Soviet-Egyptian relations. This, they maintain, is the best interests of Egypt which cannot do without strong friendship with the USSR in its struggle against imperialism and Zionism.

Progressives in Egypt oppose agreements envisaging a broad influx of foreign capital, especially US capital. They consider that it will have a ruinous effect on the Egyptian national economy, in particular on the state sector. And this is understandable since they do not wish foreign companies to profit from the labor of the Egyptian people. They consider that the presence of such foreign capital in any country leads to social changes that hinder the advance of progress. In an interview with the newspaper, *Tarik Al-Shaab*, the Secretary General of the National Peace Council in the Arab Republic of

Egypt, Khaled Mohei El-Din, stated that Egypt's cancellation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union serves neither the immediate nor future needs of the country: "We, representatives of the progressive national wing, will continue to fight for the normalization of Soviet-Egyptian relations because it corresponds to the interests of Egypt. Egypt needs friendship with the USSR in peacetime as well as in time of war. Moreover, in our struggle against imperialism and Zionism, we can not do without the firm friendship with the USSR."

Khaled Mohei El-Din pointed out that agreements envisioning an extensive influx of foreign, and in particular American, investment in Egypt, will have a ruinous effect on the Egyptian economy. He noted: "Progressive public opinion in the Arab Republic of Egypt is opposed to the penetration of foreign capital into the Egyptian economy, particularly in its state sector. We do not want the labor of the Egyptian people to bring profit to foreign companies. Moreover, their presence in any country leads to such social changes that impede any progress."

* * *

As is evident, the overall political line of revolutionary democracy in power is anti-imperialist, and on a number of important questions of social development anti-capitalist in social orientation, and meets the vital interests of the masses. Not coincidentally, the practical activity of revolutionary democrats has been rated highly in the documents of the international communist movement, the CPSU and other Communist parties. The policy of the revolutionary democratic regimes has been such that these countries, as was observed at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969, have entered on a non-capitalist way of development.¹

The programs and principal directions of the activity of revolutionary democratic parties, as B. N. Ponomaryov,

¹ See, *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 28.

Candidate Member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU and Secretary of the CC CPSU, has stressed, have "a number of common features allowing us to view them as a political force capable of taking on the solution of the tasks of the anti-capitalist stage of the national liberation revolutions".¹

2. Factors Contributing to Contradictions in the Activity of Revolutionary Democracy

Our basic conclusion on the overall direction of revolutionary democrats' policy does not, of course, obviate the question of the inconsistency that they show in practical implementation of their policy; the more so since under certain circumstances this inconsistency, as events have shown, threatens the progressive policy enunciated.

We saw in the preceding section just how complex and contradictory is the relationship between the overall direction and some of the results of the activity of revolutionary democracy, and we touched on the not infrequent instances in which the results have not only failed the expectations but have also not been in line with the very social orientation of revolutionary democracy.

This is explained in no small measure by the difficulty of the tasks facing revolutionary democracy. The non-capitalist development of the former colonies and dependencies is an extraordinarily complex process. The revolutionary power and progressive forces must do more than radically change existing property relations and the cultural life of society. They must also perform enormous work in the creation and development of new productive forces, and at the same time attempt to improve the situation of working people. The problems also stem from the backwardness and persisting dependence, chiefly economic, of these countries on imperialism, from their continuing tie to the international capitalist economy, from the intrigues and subversive activity of neo-colonialism. The importance of these factors—primarily of an objective

¹ *Kommunist* No. 15, 1971, p. 68.

order—is clear as they have been discussed in detail. We shall therefore confine ourselves to two further observations.

Many Marxist scholars are of the opinion that, in the present historical situation, non-capitalist development is possible in any country with predominantly pre-capitalist social relations, *irrespective* of the degree of that country's backwardness. There is now no doubt that this proposition is well-founded theoretically, for the success of non-capitalist development is determined by the influence and interaction of domestic and international revolutionary factors, the balance of which is dynamic and capable of change. And under present conditions, internal weakness can in greater or lesser measure be compensated for by stepping up the action of international factors.

Yet facts have shown that the accepted formula, precisely because of its general character, is at times interpreted one-sidedly, which results in an underrating of the role of internal socio-economic conditions. On the other hand, to the extent that the international factor favoring the progressive, non-capitalist development of the former colonies and dependencies is in practice stable with respect to states differing in the level of their development, it is exceptionally important that there be some *minimum* of internal objective prerequisites. And *extreme* socio-economic backwardness, all other conditions being equal, can in some cases be an obstacle difficult to overcome.

Experience suggests another consideration: in the present international situation and given the world socialist system, it is as a rule necessary that the country (or group of countries) pursuing non-capitalist development possess—and this is an important element in the aforementioned minimum of internal objective prerequisites—a healthy economy with (naturally, on condition that aid be forthcoming) real prospects for efficient, "profitable" development.

We should like to dwell in more detail on another problem—complicating factors of a subjective character (closely intertwined with objective factors, of course), which are built into revolutionary democracy itself and play a major, perhaps the decisive, role in the fact that the principal direction of revolutionary democracy's policy and certain

results of this policy are not always sufficiently in accord with each other.

We must first touch on the socio-political heterogeneity of revolutionary democracy, a circumstance that manifests itself at virtually every level of party and state activities in countries pursuing non-capitalist development and, what is more, in the entire political superstructure, which is not infrequently the arena in which issue is joined between different and even antagonistic class tendencies. There are differences of no small importance not only between countries but even within revolutionary democracy in a single country when it comes to the point of determination in the anti-imperialist struggle, cooperation with the masses and readiness to rely on them, attitudes toward national-capitalist tendencies, toward scientific socialism, toward the socialist world—in a word, differences both in the degree of *revolutionary commitment* and in *commitment to democracy*. An intrinsic feature of revolutionary democracy is the breadth of the political spectrum within its ranks.

Revolutionary democracy at times recognizes its own political variety. The Algerian weekly, *Algérie-Actualités* has written that the "country's vanguard" lacks "political homogeneity" and political program, that the vanguard also is marked by a "social diversity that is not always guided by identical aspirations. This social diversity is an additional factor for political differentiation".¹

The bourgeois press writes of this eagerly and often with unconcealed satisfaction. Eric Rouleau described as follows some of the circles of the previous leadership of the Syrian Baath Party, removed from power on November 16, 1970 as a result of the "betterment movement": "We should guard against hasty conclusions. Syria, despite appearances, is not a 'genuine and deep-rooted' socialist republic. None of its leaders are known for their Marxist culture; some of them even manifested in the past openly anti-communist sentiments. They all claim to be of the left, in fact of the fighting left; some of them are in fact authentic socialists, others have

¹ *Algérie-Actualités*, September 29 and October 5, 1968.

suddenly converted, having once belonged to the Baath right wing."¹

The internal political "stratification" of revolutionary democracy is the result above all of the heterogeneous class basis of revolutionary democrats, as well as of the social characteristics and fragmentation of the strata that make up revolutionary democracy. As we know, the political issue of peasant, petty-bourgeois forces is a constantly renewed multiversity of unstable political groupings.

Because of their position in the social structure, intermediate strata are in immediate contact with other social groups—not only with the laboring masses, but also with exploiting strata. And this cannot but affect their political line. Beyond that, the rich peasantry, as already noted, is to one degree or another represented both in revolutionary democracy itself and in its social basis.

It should be kept in mind, too, that no few persons have climbed on the revolutionary democratic bandwagon for the sole purpose of slowing the revolutionary process; and some purely opportunist elements also have jumped on board. Of no little influence, too, is economic and political corruption, which infects some party and state cadres.

The fluctuations typical of the class support of revolutionary democrats as a whole touches various "factions" of the mosaic social foundation to differing degrees. These "factions" do not react uniformly, either, to the pressure of imperialist forces, domestic reaction and the native bourgeoisie, or to the world struggle between the forces of capitalism and socialism.

Finally, the diffusiveness of the political and ideological orientations of revolutionary democracy makes itself felt, and this provides scope for differing and at times opposing interpretations of these orientations.

At the present stage, there is even a tendency for the substantive differences in political position within the framework of revolutionary democracy to increase as a result of growing differentiation within revolutionary democracy. The sharp activation of these processes is currently the

¹ *Le Monde*, October 18, 1966.

typical feature in the development of revolutionary democracy. This is the result of many factors both of an internal and of an international order, including intense imperialist pressure on some links of the national liberation movement. The main cause, however, lies in the fact that in a number of countries with a socialist orientation further realization of the democratic program of the national liberation revolution requires socio-economic and political reforms that affect the interests of private property to a much greater extent and are likewise directed against the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and lead to an increased influence of the masses on affairs of state. Social progress in these countries is now approaching a point at which the implementation of new and fundamental changes in social relations and in the political structure can make the non-capitalist choice irreversible.

The political differentiation referred to has in some instances resulted in dissociation and open conflict between different factions of revolutionary democracy and has even led to severe political crises.

The political heterogeneity of revolutionary democracy is quite naturally reflected in the political course it pursues. In effect, all the ideological orientations and basic issues of revolutionary democratic policy—the status and character of a vanguard party, the problem of democracy, the attitude toward the private sector and foreign capital, foreign policy, attitude toward communism, and so on—are objects around which overt and covert struggle swirls, with all the consequences that stem therefrom. This struggle varies in character: from being acute to muted, from remaining within the limits of the existing balance in the ruling organs to creating explosive situations and organizational re-shuffles. What we have in mind is not a natural contention of differing points of view within a more or less common political position, but what is in fact a conflict between different social orientations.

We have already observed this difference in position when we dealt with revolutionary democracy's ideology. Let us look at a few more examples, all from Egypt in the 1960s-early 1970s. When the Committee of 100, established in July 1968, at a session of the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union,

recommended that the future Central Committee of the ASU be made up in half of worker and peasant representatives, Hassanein Heikal objected. "The People's Assembly," he wrote, "is a legislative organ. Guaranteeing 50 percent of the seats in it to representatives of the workers and peasants is a vital necessity. The Central Committee is an organ of a completely different sort, its task is to develop policy. Clearly, it is necessary that workers and peasants participate in the Central Committee, I wish only to discuss the proportions of their participation. I consider that it is not at all mandatory that workers and peasants make up 50 percent of the members of the Central Committee."¹

The Egyptian press split no less decisively on another question of principle—the significance of an advanced political party, and the ways to create it. Some Egyptian journalists declared² that they did not see what substantive changes would be brought about through reorganization of the Arab Socialist Union into a party. The ASU, they held, is an alliance of the forces of the laboring nation—workers, peasants, intelligentsia and national bourgeoisie. They stressed that the ASU organizations and leadership form an apparatus corresponding to the leadership organs and structure of a party, and thanks to these organizations the ASU has the capacity to carry out mass political activity to the same degree as a party; that there is only one difference between the ASU and a party: a party represents a specific class, expressing and fighting for the realization of the interests of that class, while the ASU is the union of the people, and it defends their interests.

These journalists disagreed with "the insistent demands of some persons" that a party be created, that the ASU be transformed into a party, since, they held, there is a difference in principle between the motives for creating a party in countries with one-party system and the reasons for the creation of the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt.

Other Egyptian publicists—particularly A. Hamrouch, the former editor-in-chief of the weekly *Rose el-Youssef*

¹ *Al-Ahram*, September 14, 1968.

² See, for example, *Akher Saa*, Cairo, September 13, 1967.

—maintained that the ASU, which unites millions of people, can be turned into an organization of fighters able to defend the revolution, on condition that a “vanguard political apparatus” be created. Hamrouch noted that such a “political apparatus, having strong and organized ties and fulfilling a vanguard, leadership role, is in the world of politics called a party”. He emphasized that “a party is united by a single ideology”, and he wrote: “I favor the creation of a party out of the ASU.”¹

Relations with the Soviet Union also became the subject of a polemic—a heated one at that—in the Egyptian press. In the summer of 1972, some Cairo papers and journals made slanderous attacks on the USSR and its foreign policy. The editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Akhbar al-Jom*, I. Kouddous, now also chairman of the Administrative Board of Al-Ahram Publishing House, for example, attributed “expansionist interests” to Soviet policy in the Middle East.²

These fabrications were rebuffed by other Egyptian papers. Answering Kouddous and his confederates, *Al-Gomhouria* wrote that “existing Soviet interests” in Egypt are “inseparably tied to the ideology of the Soviet Union and are dictated by the humane mission it carries out on the international arena: the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism and comprehensive support to the peoples in the cause of liberation”. The paper added that “the noble Egyptian people will never forget what the Soviet Union has done for it”.³ In its turn, *Rose el-Youssef* maintained that the policy of the Soviet Union is clear and plain—it does not meddle in the internal affairs of other countries, has always rejected the idea of exporting revolution and earnestly favors the establishment of friendly, mutually advantageous relations with the countries of the Middle East. The paper also emphasized that attacks on the Soviet Union are a constituent element of the plans directed against progressive Arab regimes.

Simultaneously, these papers exposed the authors of anti-Soviet publications. With the latter in mind, the editor-in-chief

¹ *Rose el-Youssef*, Cairo, September 18, 1967.

² *Akhbar al-Jom*, Cairo, July 29, 1972.

³ *Al-Gomhouria*, July 10, 1972.

of *Rose el-Youssef*, Abdal Rahman al-Sharqawi, wrote that “they have volunteered to speak in Arabic on non-Arab questions, in order to fish in troubled waters”. “The purpose of these scribes, who are attempting to undermine Arab-Soviet friendship,” continued al-Sharqawi, “is to sow despair in Arab hearts and to prepare them to accept an accomplished fact and assure them that they cannot get by without America, the patron of Israel and the champion of our enemies.”¹

The existence of this sort of contradiction on the most important questions of principle can also be seen in other progressive states. Touching on the situation in Tanzania, for instance, *Rinascita* noted that “the presence of social friction within the country finds expression on the political field, especially within the party. The struggle between two positions continues: some defend a party of the entire people and ‘African’ socialism, others, oriented toward Marxism, call for the transformation of the nationalist party into a revolutionary vanguard and for open avowal of scientific socialism.”²

The facts indicate that the inconsistency shown in many important aspects of the activity of revolutionary democracy and in the latter’s official ideology cannot be attributed solely to the socio-political properties of revolutionary democracy’s basis, for which vacillation is an immanent quality. We should without a doubt also look for the causes in the political heterogeneity of revolutionary democracy itself.

Making for vacillation is not the only political weakness of the social basis on which revolutionary democrats can or do rely—above all the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie. It would, of course, be a gross error to underrate the political and revolutionary potential of the peasantry. But it must also be recognized that even where the anti-colonial struggle has deeply touched the peasant mass, after the conclusion of this short and stormy period a considerable part of the peasantry has again sunk into a state of political inertness.

This by itself sets the relatively narrow limits—even given general approval of the course pursued by the regime—of active, immediate, consistent political support that the peasant

¹ *Rose el-Youssef*, August 21, 1972.

² *Rinascita*, August 11, 1972.

masses are prepared and able to give under existing conditions. In his article "The Struggle of Parties in China", Lenin, analyzing the course of events and the position taken by the peasantry during the development of the revolution in 1913, wrote: "The peasantry, lacking a leader in the person of the proletariat, is terribly downtrodden, passive, ignorant and indifferent to politics."¹ This characterization retains its significance to this day. The properties Lenin noted are typical of major strata of the peasantry in the former colonies and dependent countries, and progressive nation states are no exception.

Nor can revolutionary democratic parties and progressive regimes count on continuous, active support from the urban petty bourgeoisie, urban poor and intermediate strata. Under such conditions, the numerical weakness of the working class in most countries with socialist orientation, as well as other properties of the working class that for the present to a certain extent limit its social potential, is a highly unfavorable factor.

The attitude of some circles of revolutionary democracy to the social role of the proletariat, to extending democracy in political life, to developing mass initiative not controlled administratively, not only fails to "compensate for" or overcome the weaknesses of its social basis, it aggravates them. These circles of revolutionary democracy clearly follow a policy limiting democracy to external appearances. A. Hamrouh, whom we have already cited, wrote of this side of the matter: "Democracy is one of the weapons of socialism, but we keep it sheathed, we fear it, though it is in our hands."²

Enormous difficulties are created by the dominance of vestigial views of the world, by the low level of political consciousness and culture among most of the masses, by their lack of a tradition of political activism, organization and discipline, of high-efficiency labor. These are the more important in view of the policy revolutionary democrats pursue with respect to the masses.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, p. 282.

² *Rose el-Youssef*, January 12, 1968.

Events have shown that in some cases some of the masses are politically unprepared to absorb the ideas and aspirations of revolutionary democrats and remain indifferent to or understands them one-sidedly. The leaders and progressive press of Burma, for example, have repeatedly noted that measures undertaken by the Revolutionary Council, the policy that it follows in the interests of the peasants and workers, have been understood by many of the country's laboring people simply as provision for the "natural" *rights* and *advances* of the peasants and workers, have been understood outside the context of the *tasks* and *obligations* that the implementation of this policy presumes. Attention at the worker and peasant seminars has been repeatedly turned to the low level of labor discipline, to widespread economic mismanagement and careless attitude to production assignments.¹ Many peasants, obtaining considerable privileges and benefits, have at the same time begun to reduce their sale of rice to the state, often holding it back for speculators, and evade repayment of state loans.

Similar phenomena can be observed to one degree or another in other countries pursuing non-capitalist development. In recent years, too, the contradictory role of primitive communal, patriarchal and tribal forms of collectivism has come to light. Of course, the lack of development or absence of private property in the means of production, and of the social consequences that stem therefrom, is of positive import in the struggle for a new social order. However, social conservatism, too, is inherent in the tribal and patriarchal way of life. It is inseparable from traditions of social inértness and passive submission that fetter the peasantry's mass initiative, its creative, labor activism. B. Ngotyana has justly noted in *The African Communist* that "old customs may be a hindrance instead of an advantage when it comes to peasant mobilization".²

Finally, part of revolutionary democracy's social basis consists of social strata and groups whose political position has

¹ As a matter of course, these phenomena are also the result of other important factors, particularly the material situation and living conditions of the laboring masses.

² *The African Communist* No. 39, 1969, p. 33.

undergone considerable change. These forces and groups have gained much from the implementation of revolutionary reforms (which they supported) and have considerably increased their political and economic influence; however, further development of the revolution is no longer in their class interest. Consequently, they adopt a conservative posture. It is these strata and groups that, together with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, are the social basis for degeneration. And the rightist orientation of certain figures within the revolutionary democratic camp is often the political expression of the interests of these strata.

The efficacy of the activity of revolutionary democracy as a political, reforming force would be considerably greater if its parties and organizations did not have substantial weaknesses—many of them, of course, the result of objective causes. There is no need to demonstrate the fundamental importance of the directing force—parties that occupy an advanced political and ideological position—for the success of the entire process of social progress. Yet the parties and political organizations that revolutionary democrats have created are largely national anti-imperialist coalitions (fronts) that are inter-class conglomerations, aggregates of the most diverse social forces. Often, all or nearly all of a country's gainfully employed population joins them. The Democratic Party of Guinea, for example, had at the time of its Eighth Congress around 1,850 thousand members (out of a total population of 4 million), the former Convention People's Party of Ghana had up to 2 million members (out of a total population of 7 million), the Arab Socialist Union has 7 million members and the Tanzanian African National Union has 2 million members.

Writing of TANU, *The African Communist* has observed: "While its nationwide extent and popular character is undoubted, what remains to be seen is whether it can act as a vanguard, whether it has sufficient trained cadres, and whether it can make a decisive impact at grass-root level."¹ The well-known Egyptian public figure Lotfi El-Khouli has remarked that the Arab Socialist Union "is not a party. It is a national front that unites all those, irrespective of their class

¹ *The African Communist* No. 39, 1969, p. 37.

background, who wish for the country's economic independence and for the establishment of socialism".¹

Many revolutionary democratic organizations have shown themselves to be effective instruments for fighting colonial regimes, and they have performed a great service in winning political independence. They are also playing an important role at present. It is indicative that the intervention of Portuguese colonialists and their hirelings in Guinea in November 1970 again brought to light the strong points of the Democratic Party of Guinea, its capacity for rapidly mobilizing the people around a slogan expressing their interests.

Yet the development of the current, "social" stage of the national liberation revolution and of the anti-imperialist struggle—and the demands put forth are not simply the old demands stepped up a notch, but to a large degree qualitatively new demands connected with the deepening of class contradictions—has shown the need for organizations of a different character, too, has demonstrated and underscored the full significance of the weaknesses of revolutionary democratic parties and organizations. Their weaknesses are: a) social heterogeneity, the lack of political and ideological unity and of a precise ideology in general; b) certain organizational looseness, a lack of strong and conscious discipline; and c) the low political and educational level of the majority of party members, and their not infrequent political passivity.

It would be wrong to hold that revolutionary democrats do not see—even if to differing degrees—at least some of these weaknesses and are not attempting to overcome them. The goal of creating vanguard parties and introducing the necessary changes in existing parties is being pursued in a number of different ways. Burmese revolutionary democrats have for a long time taken the path of creating a "cadre party". They have paid special attention to developing the organizational nucleus of the future party—the Central Organizing Committee, its staff and other organs—and have advanced to the foreground the ideological training of cadres,² as well as

¹ *Jeune Afrique*, November 20, 1971, p. 24.

² More than 15 thousand persons have gone through the Central Institute of Political Science in the first five years of its work.

candidates and sympathizers through active propaganda work. Only at the fourth seminar of the Burma Socialist Program Party (November 1969) was it decided to turn the cadre party into a mass working people's party. By the time the First Congress of the Party was called in June 1971 the Party numbered 334 thousand members and candidates.¹ The Congress established the policy of securing and strengthening the directing role of the Party in the country's social development and announced measures to achieve this end. This policy was reaffirmed by the Party's Extraordinary Congress in April 1974 (according to official data, by that time the Party numbered 578,742 members and candidates, including 184,273 peasants and 229,316 workers). The 15th Conference of TANU passed similar resolutions.

The revolutionary democrats of the Congo have in fact disbanded the former party of the National Revolutionary Movement and have created the Congolese Workers' Party. They first confined themselves in effect to setting up only its directing organ, the Central Committee, and concentrated their efforts on the ideological training of Party members—and only those who participated in the founding congress were considered members. The next task set was to focus on the ideological training and individual selection of Party members, principally from above. By the time of its Second Congress (December, 1974), the Congolese Workers' Party had 1,431 members, 39 percent of whom were workers, 32 percent peasants, 12 percent military personnel and 22 percent intelligentsia. The report to the Congress emphasized that the Party still faced the task of forming its own cadres so as better to implement its program. In virtually all revolutionary democratic parties, there has been increased attention to the ideological education of party members.

While taking note of these efforts, we must at the same time stress that, as a rule, there have as yet been no fundamental changes. The vast majority of revolutionary democratic parties have not changed their basic character. And in some countries these parties have not yet emerged from the organizational (or reorganizational) stage. In Algeria, for instance, despite the

¹ *The Working People's Daily*, July 4, 1972.

fact that a "Party Year" was proclaimed as long ago as 1968, the reorganization of the FLN continues to this day. In an address to the nation on the occasion of the 18th anniversary of the Algerian revolution, President Boumediène criticized the substantial weaknesses in FLN activity. For the Party to play the role of dynamic and efficient engine of revolution, he said, it is necessary "radically to transform its mode of leadership and its methods of work".¹

What, then, are the reasons for this situation? If we leave aside social factors and political heterogeneity, of which enough has been said already, and if we leave aside the factors specific to each country, we should put in first place the fact that revolutionary democrats have not yet overcome—and often continue to adhere fully to—their non-class conception of their parties and their bias toward a "peaceful" resolution, within the framework of the party, of social contradictions.

Further, the establishment of an advanced party is met with fierce opposition by certain factions within the ruling groups. These factions fear that such a party will be an effective tool for extending the revolution and moving farther toward the left. One may well say that the question of the party, its character and the direction of its further development, is one in which cleavages within revolutionary democracy are most acute and noticeable. Indicative in this respect is the heated struggle that has been going on in Egypt for a number of years over the role and future of the Arab Socialist Union. We have already touched on some of the reverberations of this struggle.

A contributing factor, too, is the fact that some revolutionary democrats are inclined to rely not on the popular masses but on state levers; they fear that the creation of an advanced party will be attended by a mass activism that they will not be able to keep within carefully controlled limits. Moreover, when a national democratic party or organization is of an almost boundlessly broad character, encompassing the greater part of a country's population, it is often easier to control the party, easier to combat political opponents, who are unable to secure reliable support within the party because of the party's very amorphousness. At the same time, the victor in such a struggle

¹ *El Moudjahid*, November 1, 1972.

can often secure party approval for his policy by organizing mass demonstrations.

Finally, of prime importance is the pressing lack of experienced and steadfast revolutionary cadres, the "purely" organizational weaknesses of professional cadres and activists, the inability of many of them to deal with problems of party life, and so on.

As is evident, many of the subjective obstacles to the creation of vanguard parties, to turning revolutionary democratic organizations into such parties, are rooted in objective factors, chiefly the backward socio-economic conditions of the former colonies and dependent countries.

The issue of revolutionary democratic parties and the prospect for turning them into advanced parties is further complicated by the appearance of new negative factors.

We should speak first of bureaucratization, of the development in some cases within party and state organs of a group or even stratum whose community of interests is no longer based on steadfastness to revolutionary ideals and party goals, but on the specific interests of the group as a quasi-social formation, on the defense of their privileged position. This stratum—a sort of social rust—opposes itself, at first spontaneously and then increasingly consciously, to the people. It extends far beyond the *apex* of the state, party and trade union apparatus. Every level of this apparatus is to some extent infected by the tendency toward bureaucratization and degeneration.

While the class nature of the petty bourgeoisie, the general backwardness of social relations and the strength of some pre-capitalist, medieval traditions is the social root of bureaucratism, its economic basis is the low level of development of productive forces and social production, the tenacity—inevitable under these circumstances—of non-economic forms of capital accumulation and enrichment.

It is no coincidence that tendencies toward bureaucratization are interlaced, and often merge, with the tendency toward corruption—they reinforce each other. As revolutionary democrats themselves recognize, corruption has infected certain levels of the state and party apparatus in the countries they lead.

President Nasser spoke more than once of the "new class"

that developed in Egypt after the July revolution—a class that included some officers who had participated in the revolutionary coup. President Sékou Touré has publicly exposed bribe-taking, parochialism, and neglect of revolutionary principles among some revolutionary cadres.

Professor Jean Suret-Canale, a member of the French Communist Party and a leading Africanist, has written, apropos of the events connected with the anti-government conspiracy in Guinea in 1971: "In Guinea, as elsewhere, independence was followed by the rapid ascent of a new bourgeoisie, for whom the advent to leadership posts had but one meaning: taking the place of the evicted colonialists. The hostility of the new bourgeoisie to the political orientation of the Democratic Party of Guinea, to measures aimed at limiting or impeding the internal development of 'African' capital, to relations established with socialist countries, was no secret to anyone."¹

Bourgeois authors pay close attention to corruption among some elements in the state and party apparatuses in countries with progressive regimes. As a rule, they write of it with evident relish and great exaggeration, seeing here a suitable opportunity to "stigmatize" these regimes, and often to attack communism.² Professor Samir Amin of Dacar University, who is not inclined to take this stance, nevertheless writes of the contradictions, in a number of advanced nation states, between the needs of the economy and the appetite of the "new state bureaucracy", contradictions that lead to a squandering of existing resources.³

It would be a mistake to hold that the revolutionary democratic leadership attributes no importance to the dangers of bureaucratism and corruption and is not fighting this danger. As far back as 1966, a decree on the struggle against economic crimes was promulgated in Algeria, and special tribunals empowered to pronounce death sentences in especially serious cases were established for this purpose. In

¹ *France nouvelle*, October 19-25, 1971, p. 23.

² Robert E. Dowse, *Modernization in Ghana and the USSR. A Comparative Study*, London, New York, 1969; *Combat*, Paris, April 15, 1966.

³ Samir Amin, *Trois expériences africaines de développement: le Mali, la Guinée et la Ghana*, Paris, 1965, p. 227.

September 1969, Algeria established a special institute of general financial supervisors, whose mandates were personally issued by the President of the country.

Tanzania has adopted a Leadership Code which became a part of the Arusha Declaration and, with respect to members of Parliament, took the shape of a constitutional amendment to the effect that members of Parliament, as leaders of Tanzania, must conform to the standards set. Under the Code, members of Parliament and TANU leaders are forbidden to join the boards of capitalist companies or to hold shares in them, to receive more than one salary, own more than one house, use private property for profit, derive income from renting dwellings, and so on. In April 1973, a meeting of the Central Committee of TANU, chaired by Nyerere, discussed the implementation of the Code and called several leading state and Party officials into the meeting to explain the source of their income. In 1973, a Committee for the Enforcement of Leadership Code was set up.

However, the measures taken by revolutionary democratic regimes not infrequently fail to produce the desired results. Of course, in a situation where the drive for enrichment has acquired great force and where bribes were a way of life during colonial rule, where nepotism is often based on persisting patriarchal and tribal ties, combatting corruption is an extremely complicated affair. At that, certain—at times influential—forces oppose the effort.

As we know, for example, the Eighth Congress of the Democratic Party of Guinea, on the initiative of Sékou Touré, underscored the importance of fighting corruption, and in its general resolution stated that “no one can hold a responsible position in the Party or state at any level if he practises the exploitation of man by man ... if he uses commercial or industrial enterprises for personal gain ... if his conduct is in violation of revolutionary morality and austerity.”¹ However, at the special session of the National Council of the Revolution in September 1970, Sékou Touré had again to call for a cleansing of corrupt elements from Party and state institutions.

¹ *Horoya*, October 3, 1967.

Yet the dangers of bureaucratism and corruption often grow. The “highest” expression of this tendency are the emerging or developing elements of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie which constitute a serious obstacle to the implementation of the policy already adopted by revolutionary democratic regimes; sometimes these elements even paralyze their progressive development. Compromising these regimes in the eyes of the people, such elements weaken the regimes’ mass basis. Finally, joining with domestic reaction and neo-colonialists, they are often ready to undertake the most acute forms of struggle against the revolutionary democratic power.

It is the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that comprises the immediate social basis and active force in the “Thermidorean” degeneration of progressive regimes. As a rule, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (along with imperialism) is the principal political instigator of reactionary coups against revolutionary democratic regimes.

Bureaucratism and corruption have a negative effect on internal party life, and mass organizations—trade unions, youth organizations, women’s organizations, etc.—are often the victims of this paralyzing process. As a result, ties to the masses—first political and then organizational—weaken and acquire a purely formal character. Political methods of influencing the masses are often replaced by administrative measures, and attempts are made to solve intricate political and economic problems administratively.

Not infrequently, all this considerably reduces the party’s effectiveness as a political instrument, its creative potential, its ability to mobilize the masses, to implement progressive policies and defend the existing revolutionary authority. It reduces the party’s ability to guarantee the continuity of the social orientation proclaimed and being acted upon.¹

¹ Thomas Hodgkin, a leading English expert on Africa who has a positive opinion of Nkrumah personally and his activity, has written that there were “too many careerists and men on the make, too few committed and devoted party workers”. (*The Times*, March 5, 1966.) It is indicative, as the Ghanaian sociologist Peter Omari writes, that no few persons who called themselves supporters of Nkrumah took the side of the new regime immediately after the coup. (See, Peter Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah. The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship*, N. Y., 1970, p. 161.)

Events in a number of countries have demonstrated that in their hour of trial the weakness of some revolutionary democratic parties is fatal for progressive regimes. The Algerian weekly *Algérie-Actualités* wrote after the military coup in Ghana that parties that should have been the connecting link between people and leaders have not performed or have been unable to perform this role and have turned into parties of bureaucrats more loyal to the leaders of states than to the cause for which they should be fighting. This, said the paper, results in isolation from the masses.

The problem of so-called strong men has had a definite impact on the fate of revolutionary democratic regimes in some countries. A general observation should be made here. Without question, the social backwardness of the former colonies and dependencies, the properties of their socio-political environment, encourage the appearance of "strong men" who win a dominant position in the social life of their countries and around whom cults may even develop.¹

However, an understanding and explanation of this phenomenon should not be, as is the case in some works, a simple statement of it made in a neutral and objectivistic way and, even less, a means of its approval. Events have shown irrefutably that even when we have to do with persons who are on the whole progressive, whose activity taken overall is without question positive, the system of personal power as such has at its roots important negative aspects. It is always permeated to some degree with distrust of and always hampers the development of the masses' initiative, the development of political activism and consciousness and the democratization of public life as a whole, without which success in progressive development lacks firm roots.

Even more important is the fact that these and other negative aspects of the system are strengthened and acquire increasing importance as a result of an evolution that

¹ In addition to the reasons usually adduced for the appearance and "deification" of such personalities, we should keep in mind that for some party and state cadres a cult around the leader of *their* country is a means for nationalist affirmation and for winning prestige on the international or at least the African, Arab, or such like arena.

sometimes occurs in developing countries. Often for the "strong man", interests of state are inseparable from personal interests, they are in effect equated. In practice, this not infrequently leads, especially when a regime, as a consequence of a crisis, economic complications, or of properties built into the system of personal power, becomes increasingly isolated from the masses and meets with deepening difficulties, to the sacrifice of state interests and social progress in favor of the interests of power as such, in favor of the single goal of retaining personal power and prestige at any cost. In this case, the regime's progressive coloration fades and there is an aggravation of the properties of a purely personal regime that attempts to mask its change of political colors through increased social and nationalist demagoguery.

The failure of the struggle against bureaucratism and corruption has in some advanced nation states been connected in large measure with these processes. One can go further and note that personality cults themselves have fed these phenomena. The appointment of high-ranking and low-ranking officials according to the principle of personal fealty, as well as through family ties and acquaintance, is inevitably attended by the devaluation of other qualities, by a spontaneous or conscious reduction of demands on their political character and competence; such principles of selection prompt indulgence of "weaknesses" and "mistakes". Total dependence on and obedience to the "patron" is naturally complemented by an equally total independence of lower-ranking cadres, of the masses, by a neglect of people's requirements and interests. The widening pursuit of a "career", possible only on condition of complete immersion in the system of personal power and total submission to its demands, goes in tandem with the weakening and undermining of revolutionary stimuli and ideals in the activity of party cadres and facilitates bureaucratic and bourgeois degeneration.

The situation in the state apparatus typical of all the advanced nation states, for all levels and institutions of state authority, is a serious obstacle to the implementation of revolutionary democracy's basic political program. This apparatus devours large sums of money but is not a sufficiently effective tool for implementing the social orientation chosen.

We refer to a lack of training and experience on the part of an appreciable body of the personnel, to the weakness or absence of organizational skills and, in particular, to the encumbrance caused by reactionary and mercenary elements who sabotage the regime's undertakings and in fact conduct *their own* policy, which runs against the course set by revolutionary democratic forces. The Algerian weekly *Révolution et Travail* has emphasized, with respect to reactionary elements in the state apparatus, that revolutionary decisions remain on paper because of the obstacles raised by these elements.

The negative effects of the situation in the state apparatus are magnified by the fact that they make itself felt in the economy, too, above all in the work of the state sector. In a number of countries with a socialist orientation, the unprofitability of some enterprises in the state sector stems from shortcomings in the work of the management level.

An enormous debit accrues to revolutionary democracy from the fact that inconsistency and contradictions in its political line are often combined with vacillation and passivity in implementing policy already adopted. It is to be understood that the most general and deep-seated reason for this derives from factors of a socio-class order, from the political and ideological posture of revolutionary democracy, from the unceasing internal struggle of groups with dissimilar orientations. But other factors, also socially conditioned, of course, also play their role: the pattern of political behavior characteristic of certain circles of revolutionary democracy, their political psychology, which is in part a residue from the preceding stage of the struggle.

These circles are marked by a preference for agitational work over party organizational and economic work, by the frequent substitution of "left" rhetoric for practical undertakings and painstaking work on the creation of new forms of public life, by an inclination to verbal radicalism and the revolutionary phrase. It is worth remarking that as a result of all this, even the extremely important campaign to unmask imperialism and its agents becomes at times a cloak concealing passivity in carrying out progressive measures.

Characteristic of some revolutionary democrats is a discrepancy between word and deed, a peculiar faith that talk by

itself ensures the solution of a problem. They are not sufficiently aware that advancing a slogan is not the culmination but the beginning of work in realizing a goal; moreover, they lack the taste for such work. Finally, they are often inclined to underrate the difficulty of problems facing the young nation states and put forth deliberately unrealistic goals.

Developing a well thought-out, carefully weighed and realistic economic policy that takes sober account of the economic potential of a specific country, that has a proper orientation on relations with the petty proprietor and producer, foreign and native private capital, on the links and balance between the public and private sectors—this is an immensely difficult problem. To what extent is it possible and necessary, in the vital interests of economic progress, to permit the operations of private capital so that private capitalist anarchy not slip out of control? This is a key problem, not only for economic but also for political development along non-capitalist lines, since the impact of this anarchy is even more dangerous in the political realm, in the arena of class struggle. The developing bourgeoisie, after all, will not be satisfied with the growth of its economic potential and economic initiative alone. It makes claims for political representation and aims to influence the political process, the development of the entire superstructure. This is the more serious a question since the potential of the bourgeoisie in this regard cannot be measured in its immediate position alone—it exerts a considerable influence, both purposeful and spontaneous, on the petty proprietor and the middle strata as a whole.

That is why the question of the maximum permissible limits with which the private entrepreneur and the private proprietor may operate and provide the greatest possible benefit, chiefly in the economic sphere, without creating a *real political threat* to the new order, is one of the most difficult questions that a revolutionary party taking the helm of state must answer. It is worth noting that one of the more important reasons for this difficulty are "left" mistakes often committed on this question.

This threat is especially serious in countries pursuing non-capitalist development and led by revolutionary demo-

crats, because of the nature of the revolutionary democratic party and state power and the severe shortage of politically and ideologically well armed (in a class sense) cadres to meet this threat. We might recall that Lenin stressed with respect to NEP: "We have no fear of capitalism, because the proletariat has the power, transport and large-scale industry firmly in its hands and will succeed, through its control, in channeling it into state capitalism."¹

But, taking full account of the difficulty of devising an effective economic policy for countries headed by revolutionary democratic forces, one must recognize that failures that sometimes occur in this respect are the result of factors that we discussed when analyzing the overall policy of revolutionary democracy. Here it is appropriate to recall that the purposeful elaboration of a realistic policy and persistence in its implementing is occasionally replaced with impulsive actions that ignore the objective properties of the situation and economic laws; it also should be recalled that attempts are occasionally made to solve extremely difficult social and socio-economic problems "at one fell swoop".

According to Modibo Keita, for instance, in Mali "too much emphasis was placed on collective fields".² In the summer of 1968, the government of Mali undertook an offensive against petty traders with the aid of the police and "vigilance brigades". Street trade was forbidden, as was the home delivery of produce and other commodities, which was the principal means of livelihood for a considerable part of the population that had no possibility of finding other work.

Nationalistic parochialism is a serious encumbrance to the activity of revolutionary democracy. Such parochialism not infrequently prevents revolutionary democrats from effectively cooperating with other emerging countries and—what is especially important—from creating and strengthening a common anti-imperialist front of progressive nation states. This is sometimes felt, too, in the development of relations with socialist states, preventing a correct understanding of particu-

lar foreign policy actions by socialist states and hampering a proper evaluation of communist and socialist construction in the Soviet Union and the states of the socialist community.

We ought also to stress the extremely negative influence of the lack of cohesion, even at times the split, in the progressive forces in a number of progressive nation states resulting primarily from the position taken on this question by influential revolutionary democratic circles, from those circles' anti-communist prejudices. Nor can we ignore the fact that discord in the revolutionary democratic milieu stems not only from the clash of different political tendencies, but also from tribal and caste conflicts, power struggles, and so on.

All this occurs in a situation where progressive reforms are bitterly resisted by domestic reaction, supported and emboldened by imperialism. Reaction has many faces: the feudal and tribal nobility traditionally associated with colonialists, fragments of the former colonial administration—bureaucrats and members of the armed forces and police; pro-bourgeois groups—from the bourgeoisie proper to decomposing bodies of party and state functionaries who have "changed flags"; pro-Western circles in the native intelligentsia; finally, political careerists pure and simple. Domestic reaction did not sustain decisive defeat at the preceding stage of the revolution.

Such are the most important difficulties and obstacles—chiefly of a subjective order—that revolutionary democrats encounter. These obstacles cannot, of course, be termed insurmountable, though there is no question that they are extremely complicated.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 45, pp. 195-96.

² *Jeune Afrique*, May 8, 1966, p. 10.

REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY AND THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL CLASS FORCES

1. Imperialist Policy Toward Revolutionary Democracy

Given the present global—both in the geographical sense and in the scope of the social processes involved—struggle between two socio-economic systems, the attitude of the antagonistic class forces to particular social phenomena can serve as one of the basic criteria by which we judge the historical role and significance of these phenomena. From this perspective, imperialism's posture toward revolutionary democracy and revolutionary democratic regimes is of substantial analytic interest, as well as being important in the plane of practical politics.

Imperialism is *socially hostile* to revolutionary democracy. This, it is worth noting, is the way revolutionary democrats, judging by their numerous statements, see the matter. Typical in this respect is the declaration by the journal *Révolution africaine* that imperialism's "primary objective" in the Third World is "the destruction of progressive regimes that by their nature oppose the exploitation of man by man and financial oligarchies".¹

Neo-colonialists pay special attention to and conduct a special policy with respect to countries headed by revolutionary democrats. This reflects one of neo-colonialism's distinguishing traits: a multifaceted policy toward the formerly colonial and dependent world, a policy that takes into consideration the socio-economic orientation of the emerging states and the

differing abilities of the forces heading these states to defend the right of their peoples to independent development.

Without question, progressive states often play a major political and strategic role in their geographical regions and possess important natural resources. But this is not the only reason for the great importance that neo-colonialists attribute to the course of development in these countries. Imperialists view the advanced nation states as one of the principal fronts in the struggle between bourgeois and socialist ideas in the Third World.

They fear the growing prestige of socialism in the former colonies and dependencies, they fear the revolutionizing influence that the advanced detachments of the national liberation movement have on the course of developments in this zone. They calculate that the collapse of the non-capitalist "experiment" in progressive states would weaken the pull toward socialism throughout the Third World. We can understand how essential this is for imperialism if we take into account that the wager on deciding the fate of the Third World in their interests is an important element in the global imperialist strategy.

In addition, countries with revolutionary democratic regimes are an important point in the neo-colonialists' struggle against the development of close and friendly relations between the emerging states and the world of socialism. On this front, imperialists would like in particular to compromise the cooperation between socialist and developing countries, to demonstrate that such cooperation is "ineffective" and has but a "limited role".

That neo-colonialist policy aims at inflicting defeat on revolutionary democratic forces, at undermining their influence in the zone of national liberation, is not a matter of debate. The policy is evident first and foremost in the position taken by the imperialist press. "A dead end", "economic catastrophe", "complete chaos", "totalitarian dictatorship", "stumbling from one difficulty into another", "heading toward the abyss"—these and other more negative expressions are how bourgeois publicists and special literature (even its liberal part) evaluate the activity of revolutionary democracy.

¹ *Révolution africaine*, November 29 and December 5, 1968.

This line has been manifest, too, in the true rapture with which the imperialist press and neo-colonialist circles have met military coups directed against some revolutionary democratic governments, and in the position that the Western powers have taken with respect to the new regimes that have come to power.

Many observers noted in particular the fervid, unusually prolonged, gloatingly triumphant reaction to events in Ghana. In the United States and Britain, for instance, articles hailing the coup and imbued with frank hatred of Nkrumah himself and of the fallen regime appeared almost daily for over two months. The London *Times*, in an article entitled "Ghana's Turn", wrote that the new regime "faces a job of salvage. If they generate confidence, and want help, Ghana would be worth salvaging again. The basic obstacle to reform was Dr. Nkrumah, and it has been removed."¹

No less indicative was the position taken by imperialist governments. Immediately after the coup, G. Mennen Williams, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, announced that the United States could establish good relations with the new authorities in Ghana. As *The New York Times* wrote: "The United States moved with relative swiftness to recognize the new regime in Accra in a deliberate attempt to support the new Government against any bid by the deposed President, Kwame Nkrumah, to reassert power...."² Like the United States, Great Britain and West Germany also hastened to give official blessing to the military conspirators who had seized power.

Furthermore, the coup had hardly been carried out before the US Government, followed by the government of West Germany, announced the delivery of food supplies to the military regime—a measure that had been categorically denied to the Nkrumah government a scant four months before. The political sense of the position taken by the imperialist powers was also evidenced by a demonstrative gesture: the ambassadors of the United States and West Germany were the first to contribute money to the so-called Assistance Fund for Former Political Prisoners that was set up

¹ *The Times*, February 25, 1966.

² *The New York Times*, March 5, 1966.

after the coup. Finally, we must mention, too, that in October 1967, the head of the military regime and President of the National Liberation Council, General Ankrah, was solemnly received in the White House.

The bourgeois press followed with scarcely veiled—and at times open—sympathy the activities of U Nu, who unfurled the banner of armed rebellion against the revolutionary democratic regime in Burma. Raising a great hue and cry about the "reign of chaos" in Burma, they advertized in every way they could the position of the former Prime Minister of Burma, gave him encouragement and in effect called on him to "save" Burma by restoring the bourgeois parliamentary system.¹

Imperialism's hostility to progressive governments is also clearly distinguishable in the practical policy that they follow with respect to revolutionary democratic regimes. It is a policy of struggling against and eliminating these regimes, *one way or another*, because they are *progressive* and oriented toward socialism. "*At the minimum* (emphasis added — *Auth.*), the US must seek the rejection of the antagonistic system..." in developing countries, emphasized Jacob Kaplan, recently a high official in the State Department.²

This policy was adopted by imperialists almost from the moment revolutionary democracy emerged as an important factor in the socio-political arena of enslaved countries, and it has since then in *essence* suffered no serious changes. The *forms* in which this policy is implemented, the neo-colonialists' *tactics* have, however, evolved substantially.

In the 1950s, the imperialists' policy toward revolutionary democrats was that of an open hostility, tough and inflexible. This was a policy of frontal attack on revolutionary democratic regimes, and it was a constituent element in the total aggressive and adventurist policy of imperialism, first and foremost American imperialism, a policy that wagered heavily on military coercion and police methods.

¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 3, 1969. Also see, *The New York Times*, August 12, 1969; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 28, 1969; *The Times*, August 30, 1969.

² Jacob J. Kaplan, *The Challenge of Foreign Aid*, N. Y., 1967, p. 115.

American foreign policy in this period was dominated by the sinister shadow of John Foster Dulles. Eugene McCarthy, the well-known American Senator, has observed that under Dulles "containment of communism" and the "maintenance of order" were viewed as the "special burdens of the United States".¹

In effect, ruling circles in the United States approached countries headed by revolutionary democrats, and Asia and Africa as a whole, without any special consideration for the social and economic processes objectively transpiring in them; their approach was exclusively within the framework of a global—military at that—"conflict with communism".

Dulles's policy toward revolutionary democratic regimes proceeded from the following premises: the need for and possibility of maintaining close military-strategic and political ties between the imperialist powers and the previously enslaved countries, in effect control of the latter by the former; the "omnipotence" of the United States and its "capacity" to impose the "only rational" social order on the Third World; regimes, political parties and groups that did not stand with the West in the worldwide "fight against communism"—and especially if they opposed the West and took a radical position—were covert adherents of communism, or were "fellow travellers". Thus Nasser, S. Touré, M. Keita were among those accused of sympathetic attitude toward communism.

The principal methods the imperialists employed in their relations with states led by revolutionary democracy, after unsuccessful and openly neo-colonialist attempts to "domesticate" them, were first and foremost crude pressure, blackmail, and at times even military action. As we know, in the summer of 1956 the United States and Great Britain, contrary to promises they had tendered, refused to finance the Aswan project. The fall of the same year saw the Anglo-Franco-Israeli attack on Egypt. After this aggression failed, there followed an economic blockade of Egypt by leading imperialist powers.

Guinea, after its refusal to enter the "French Community",

¹ Eugene J. McCarthy, *The Limits of Power*, N. Y., 1967, p. 5.

became an object of French acts of repression. French specialists were suddenly recalled from Guinea, financial and other assistance was halted, and important commercial ties were cut. France also attempted to isolate Guinea within Africa, especially from other African countries that had formerly been French colonies.

Supporters of the "New Frontier", who took over key positions in the American Administration after John Kennedy entered the White House, called for a review of this policy. They based their position primarily on the fact that the previous policy has failed, had sooner furthered the radicalization of the domestic policy of revolutionary democratic regimes and their rapprochement with the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The strategists of the "New Frontier" called for a more flexible policy vis-à-vis the progressive national states.

The policy of the Kennedy Administration was guided by the Administration's overall foreign policy goals and by an evaluation of the situation in the countries with a socialist orientation. The "Kennedy team" recognized that imperialism—American included—did not have the strength to halt the process of national liberation, that major social shifts both within the emerging countries and in their relations with the outside world were inevitable. The goal of the United States was taken to be something else: "to turn the tide" of events in the national liberation zone,¹ to support certain reforms and, what is more, to help carry them out—if not initiate them—so that they proceed along a line and on a scale acceptable to American imperialism.

What was at issue was the support of reformist changes that were meant to stop the revolutionary upsurge in its tracks, to give a push to the development of capitalist relations and to strengthen bourgeois groups—on a scale and in a way, naturally, that did not threaten the basic position of American monopolies.

While Dulles relied principally on force of arms, the "New Frontiersmen", though they scarcely renounced force, wa-

¹ *To Turn the Tide* was the title of a collection of John Kennedy's speeches published in 1962.

gered chiefly on economic leverage. The American press noted the "much greater interest" of the new government in the problems of the economic development of the emerging states. It was calculated that imperialist monopolies, relying on the might of world capitalism as a whole and on their own position in the former colonies and dependencies, and also taking advantage of the internal weakness and backwardness of native capitalism in the Third World, would be able to exercise decisive influence over the course of development and social orientation of these countries, would for the foreseeable future be able to retain control over them.

The Kennedy Administration developed its policy with respect to revolutionary democratic regimes in line with this overall policy. The initiators of the change in imperialist policy spoke of the "mistakenness" of treating revolutionary democrats as though they were either "covert" Communists or communist "fellow travellers". They stressed that not all was lost for the West in countries headed by revolutionary democrats.¹

Beyond that, some of the "New Frontiersmen" did not exclude the possibility of using revolutionary democratic groups against elements farther to the left. This aspect of imperialist, particularly American, policy has been taken for granted, too, by some leading left-nationalist and progressive figures in the developing countries themselves, e.g., in the Arab countries.

While Dulles and those who supported his policy basically followed the principle that "anyone not with us is against us", the men of the "New Frontier" took a more realistic view of the American imperialism's potential and preferred to be guided by a different principle: "anyone not with them (i.e., not with the socialist states — *Auth.*) is not against us".

¹ "...We now knew that Africa is fluid, volatile and everchanging," wrote William Attwood, a spokesman for the "Kennedy team" and the American Ambassador to Guinea from 1962 through 1964. "Its nations are never 'lost' or 'safe' from any outsider's point of view.... All we can be sure of is that Africa will be different next year and every year for a long time to come, and that the pace and nature of its evolution depend in large part on how much attention it gets from the rest of the world." (William Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks. A Personal Adventure*, N. Y., 1967, p. 292.)

The plans of the "Kennedy team" in effect proceeded from the view that the social process and political institutions in countries led by revolutionary democrats were of a transitional nature. "New Frontier" ideologues proposed that the United States officially take an emphatically loyal position with respect to the direction of socio-economic development chosen by progressive states and thereby prevent a further deterioration of relations between these countries and the United States, as well as the other imperialist powers, and forestall their "excessive" orientation toward the USSR and other socialist states.

This would, in their view, win time and provide additional opportunities for countering the further radicalization of national democratic regimes, would help to strengthen right-nationalist groups seeking a reactionary degeneration of these regimes and, if their efforts fail, would provide an opportunity for helping them overthrow the progressive power.

In connection with the arguments put forth by spokesmen for the "New Frontier", the description of American policy toward Egypt provided by Professor John Badeau, Director of the Middle East Institute of Columbia University and the US Ambassador to Cairo between 1961 and 1964, is of some interest. In an article published in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Badeau rejected the arguments of those who demand a "harder line" so as to "change both the form of the UAR Government and its foreign policy". Admitting that the socialist orientation of the Egyptian leadership is not greeted with enthusiasm in American ruling circles, the former ambassador stressed: "The fact is we cannot disentangle ourselves from the dilemma of supporting some governments of which we do not fully approve unless we are prepared to abandon them to the sole mercy of the USSR.... In the end, therefore, this is a situation which we must tolerate, for we have no alternative."¹ If we leave aside the propagandistic anti-Soviet camouflage in Badeau's arguments, it must be admitted that they throw some light on the mainsprings of American policy with respect to

¹ *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1966, p. 9.

one particular progressive nation state. Badeau subsequently elaborated on this argument in his book.¹

In place of overt and fruitless hostility toward the governments of Egypt, Ghana, Guinea and Mali, in place of the malicious accusations of "communism" typical of Dulles's policy, the new Administration opted for a more flexible course with the goal of exercising substantial influence on the evolution of internal processes in these countries, of blocking the convergence of their position with scientific socialism.

During Kennedy's presidency, the United States took active steps to normalise and improve relations with Egypt, Guinea, Mali and Ghana, and this brought certain results. The US Government agreed to help finance the hydroelectric project on the Volta River. The bourgeois press unanimously concluded that this was done because of the consequences that had followed upon the refusal to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam and was a departure from the Dulles line. American journalists and specialists in international relations wrote openly that the decision to grant Ghana a loan for the construction of a dam and electric power plant on the Volta was taken only because the American Government, and the British Government echoing the Americans, felt that it would be better "to have the West rather than the Soviet Union move in with aid to Ghana". The *New York Times*, for one, reporting this information, observed: "Officials recalled the case of Egypt's Aswan High Dam in 1956, when the United States withdrew its support of the project and the Russians stepped in."²

The United States also began to extend financial and technical "aid" to Guinea, to provide food to Algeria under the "Food for Peace" program, and substantially increased its "aid" to Egypt in 1963 and 1964. In 1964, the UAR obtained "foreign aid" from capitalist countries to the tune of 8.21 dollars per capita (as against 1.38 dollars in 1961 and 1962)—second only to Israel among those receiving such aid,

¹ See, John S. Badeau, *The American Approach to the Arab World*, New York, Evanston, and London, 1968, p. 13.

² *The New York Times*, December 16, 1961.

and almost twice as much as Turkey, Taiwan and Pakistan.¹

The Kennedy Administration's overall strategy and practical program with respect to revolutionary democrats and the regimes they lead holds more than the merely historical interest of showing how American imperialist policy, and to a large extent imperialist policy as a whole, was developed and formulated. On this question, American imperialism continues to adhere, *in matters of principle*, to the policy charted by the authors of the "New Frontier". In effect, this can be said also of the other imperialist powers.

As before, the primary goal is to "freeze" the anti-imperialist, national democratic revolution in states following a non-capitalist way before they pass beyond the democratic stage and proceed to the phase leading directly to socialist development. This is the more true because, in view of the strategists of imperialism, events have brought to light some new circumstances that were not manifest or did not exist previously and that reaffirm the viability of the course adopted.

During Kennedy's presidency—and later too—Western politicians not infrequently premised their actions on the assumption, as Arthur Schlesinger, Professor at New York University and a former special assistant to President Kennedy, has noted, that Marxism was spreading through the developing world like wildfire. President Nixon recalled this view in a critical tone in his February 1970 Message to Congress. "Once," he said, "many feared that they (the developing countries—*Auth.*) would become simply a battleground of cold-war rivalry and fertile ground for communist penetration."²

It is now more clearly apparent that the final decision on the direction of the former colonies' and dependencies' social development will be along-drawn-out affair and will be the result of an intense and unique struggle in which zigzags are

¹ Manubhai Shah, *Developing Countries and UNCTAD*, Bombay, Vora, 1968, Statistical Tables, Table No. 6.

² *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s. A New Strategy for Peace. A Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, February 18, 1970*, USGPO, Washington, 1970, p. 2.

both possible and likely; that the choice of a socialist orientation does not necessarily ensure the victory of socialism and does not exclude the possibility of backward movement, of a "return" to the capitalist path.

The opinion has begun to prevail among imperialist politicians that the danger of an immediate and massive break between emerging countries and capitalism was exaggerated, and that there are substantial and objective obstacles to the rapid spread of scientific socialism in the Third World. Consequently, the struggle for the retention of these countries within the capitalist system should be based on a long-term program.

The well-known American columnist Drew Middleton wrote that the idea of giving extensive support so that all could avoid communism had yielded to a selective approach based on the principle of giving aid to key countries, encouraging economic regionalism and to confidence that communism is not going to take over all of Africa tomorrow. Middleton's statement can with every justification be taken to reflect the current imperialist strategy with respect to developing countries.

Naturally, this view could only reinforce the attitude that revolutionary regimes are transitional, with a considerable potential for evolution in reverse, that they are a field of battle between opposing tendencies. This view strengthened the orientation toward persistent and flexible "work" with them, calculated, if necessary, *with a view to the future*.

The situation resulting from the schismatic and anti-Soviet activity of Peking was interpreted as an argument for this "unhurried" and flexible tactics. In the view—not entirely unfounded—of imperialist figures, Peking's policy has created certain political and ideological difficulties for revolutionary democrats and has complicated their progressive evolution.

One can assume, too, that revolutionary democratic regimes—regimes that, for all their socially progressive orientation, are profoundly nationalistic at heart—have begun to be viewed by imperialists from a broader perspective. We refer to the emerging strong reactionary, regressive potential of nationalism as a factor not only opposed to progressive influence from without, but also aiding the onslaught against revolutionary democracy's socialist orientation from within

and, what is more, occasionally capable of provoking discord even among Communists. If we take this as a premise, it is legitimate to link the present imperialist policy toward revolutionary democracy with the more important shifts in revolutionary democracy's foreign policy line, so-called "national communism" included.

In this sense, the arguments of Roger Masters, Professor at Yale University, are symptomatic—from the viewpoint of their *general direction*, not their concrete formulation. Masters has openly stated that as nationalist tendencies come to the force in some elements of the communist movement, "the flexibility open to American policy-makers also increases. From this perspective, the possibility that new communist regimes may come to power in backward lands, especially in Asia, should not terrify us".¹

If the question can be so framed with respect to the forces of communism, a similar motif is quite capable of playing a most important role in the shaping of imperialist policy toward revolutionary democracy.

Today, imperialists still see their minimum program as checking the progressive evolution of revolutionary democracy. The maximum aim is to interrupt the non-capitalist development of countries led by revolutionary democrats, to turn these countries back to the capitalist path and, in the final analysis, to remove progressive regimes from power. Imperialists still avoid hastily labelling these regimes "communist", not only because of the evident facts but also from the consideration that such a policy only makes efforts to return these countries to the capitalist path, to defeat progressive forces, more difficult. Even more than before, spokesmen for the "brain trust" of imperialist policy feel, as Hans Morgenthau, Professor at the University of Chicago and the recognized head of the school of "political realism", writes, "indiscriminate anti-communist intervention achieves what it aims to prevent..."².

¹ Roger D. Masters, *The Nation Is Burdened. American Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, N. Y., 1967, p. 203.

² Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*, New York, Washington, 1969, p. 126.

For a proper appreciation of imperialism's posture toward revolutionary democracy, it is important to keep in mind, too, that neo-colonialists, against the background of the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideas and the prospect of increasing influence on the part of communist groups, are occasionally inclined to view revolutionary democrats as "the lesser evil". Furthermore, hopes have not been abandoned that revolutionary democrats will serve as a barrier against forces farther to the left.

Naturally, all this does not mean that imperialism's hostility to revolutionary democracy has declined or that imperialism does not utilize the sharpest, most uncompromizing forms of struggle against it. We should note that even "New Frontier" policy did not rule out the use of pressure, blackmail, or the notorious "cloak and dagger" methods against revolutionary democrats. The Kennedy Administration, for example, did everything it could to remove revolutionary democrats from power in Guyana. In late 1961, Kennedy loudly announced that "the United States supports the idea that every people should have the right to make a free choice of the kind of government they want. Mr. Jagan who was recently elected Prime Minister in British Guyana is a Marxist, but the United States doesn't object because that choice was made by honest elections, which he won". However, as Cheddi Jagan has pointed out, soon after his declaration the Kennedy Administration fell upon the progressive regime of Guyana in a "three-pronged attack".¹ It put diplomatic pressure on Britain to "put off" granting Guyana independence and to change the electoral system in the country, and on the government of Venezuela to renew its claims to two-thirds of the territory of Guyana. At the same time, the CIA "encouraged" demonstrations, strikes, mutinies and an air and naval blockade for the purpose of overthrowing the government of the People's Progressive Party and providing Britain an excuse to refuse independence to Guyana so long as the PPP was in power.

The Kennedy Administration did not hesitate to use "assistance" as a way of pressuring the governments of Ghana,

¹ Dr. Cheddi Jagan, *The Caribbean and Centres of International Power*, 1974, p. 48. See his *The West on Trial. My Fight for Guyana's Freedom*, London, 1966, pp. 303-22.

Guinea and Egypt. The American press, reporting on the conditions under which a loan was granted to Ghana, noted in particular that "the money is expected to be made available to Ghana in stages so that any sharp deviation in President Nkrumah's political or fiscal course could be dealt with before all the funds are spent".¹ With respect to Guinea, William Attwood tells in his book how in response to Guinea's request for "aid" the following demands were rather unceremoniously made: the assignment of a new Guinean representative on matters of implementing the American "aid" program; a reduction in the number of "Soviet bloc" technicians in Guinea; a phase-out of the Soviet planes being used in civil aviation; cancellation of the meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions to be held in Conakry; approval for a group of Guinean trade union leaders to visit the United States, and so on.²

Acute forms of struggle, use of the ultimatum, and forcible removal of progressive regimes from power if that be momentarily advantageous, continue to be an organic part of imperialism's overall policy toward revolutionary democracy. The difference is the shifting emphasis on a given aspect of this policy which is determined by the situation and the political tastes of different imperialist governments.

The coup in Ghana and Israeli aggression in the Middle East are clear examples of the "extreme" measures taken to eliminate progressive regimes in the former colonial and dependent countries. This policy was also evident in the imperialist intervention in Guinea in November 1970, aid by some African countries known for their dependence on French imperialism to groups of dissidents prepared to invade Guinea, support through Thailand for the activity of U Nu, and numerous similar cases.

With respect to the levelling of ultimata, it is enough to mention the US cut-off of food deliveries to Algeria during the Johnson Administration, the repeated refusal to provide food shipments to Ghana, and the suspension at first of food and

¹ *The New York Times*, December 16, 1961.

² William Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks, A Personal Adventure*, pp. 127-28.

then, in 1966, of all other American "aid" to Egypt. Under American pressure, the International Monetary Fund, too, for many years refused to grant Egypt a loan. At the end of 1964, "aid" to the Congo (Brazzaville) was suspended, the same occurring with Ghana a few months before. "Aid" to Syria was also suspended following a period of persistent blackmail. West Germany in turn cancelled its "aid" program to Tanzania.

France, which agreed to provide financial assistance to Mali and in early 1968 officially backed Mali's currency, at the same time, according to reports in the Western press, sought a reorientation of Mali's foreign trade toward the Franc Zone, a reorganization of the state sector (i.e., its reduction and gradual elimination), and access for private foreign capital to Mali's economy and commerce.

It should again be emphasized, however, that all these actions were only one element, only one part of the total flexible policy (though in substance and direction it is a *fighting policy*), that imperialism follows with respect to revolutionary democrats. Alongside and at the same time as exerting political and economic pressure, at the same time as undertaking openly subversive activities, neo-colonialists often follow a policy of adaptation and external loyalty, of pliability and waiting for "their hour", try by all means to avoid a worsening of relations with progressive countries and set their sights on gradually changing these countries' domestic and foreign policies.

The United States, for example, continues to provide "aid" to Guinea and Tanzania and from time to time makes overtures of friendship to Algeria, in spite of the latter's criticism, sometimes quite sharp, of American policy. In particular, the United States delivered to Algeria, between 1962 and 1966, 700 thousand tons of wheat worth 100 million dollars. At the end of 1966, another 200 thousand tons were delivered on credit. Interrupted in the summer of 1967, American grain deliveries were renewed in 1968.

The "flexibility" of American policy was cited by Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams as one of the reasons for the success of the reactionary forces in Ghana.

For its part, France provides "aid" to the Congo and Algeria. Before the events of November 1970, there was a noticeable

improvement in France's relations with Guinea.¹ One can also cite the fact that Britain provides assistance to Egypt and Burma, West Germany—to Egypt, Guinea, Tanzania, Burma and the Congo, the United States—to Tanzania, and so on. Finally, the capitalist countries of the West both on a bilateral basis and through international organizations extended a total of 332 million dollars in "aid" to the regime of M. Keita in Mali.

The capitalist powers' policy toward revolutionary democracy is implemented through a system of political, socio-economic and ideological measures.

In the field of political and ideological influence, in distinction from the recent past it is now stressed in numerous ways that capitalist powers completely reject the idea that relations with developing countries as a whole and state of socialist orientation are an arena in which the two world systems clash. "We want no military allies, no spheres of influence, no big-power competition in Africa," said the open letter of the American Secretary of State, William Rogers, addressed to President Nixon at the end of March 1970 and approved by the President. "Our policy is a policy related to African countries and not a policy based upon our relations with non-African countries."² This letter, which Rogers himself called "the first full statement of this kind by the United States Government in recent years",³ was advertized as an outline of the principles of American policy.

In the Message to Congress which formulated the "fundamental" principles of the last Administration's foreign policy, President Nixon declared: "We have two major concerns regarding the future of Africa: That the Continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict in any form."⁴

Capitalist diplomacy further asserts that the Western powers recognize fully the right of the countries concerned to

¹ In July of 1975, diplomatic relations were restored between France and Guinea. In an interview with a correspondent from Guinean radio, President Giscard d'Estaing announced France's "readiness" to support Guinea's efforts in national economic development and social progress.

² *International Herald Tribune*, March 30, 1970.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s*, p. 85.

determine their own social orientation and intend to "respect" the direction of social development and principles of foreign policy chosen by progressive nation states.

The following example, although it pertains to the period of Johnson's presidency, is a good illustration of this tactics, which imperialism uses to the present day. During the visit to Washington by General Ne Win, Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Burma, high-ranking US statesmen and President Johnson himself continually emphasised Burma's right to determine her own course of development and their complete understanding of her policy. The *New York Times* recalled that four years earlier, when Ne Win became head of the Burmese Government, Washington considered him a dangerous neutralist and a potential communist ally. The newspaper pointed out that times must surely have changed if the President of the United States received and praised the most neutral of the neutralist Asian leaders, who moreover is a militant socialist.

The Western powers are no less insistent that they are prepared to move ideological differences to the background and to develop wide-ranging relations with countries headed by revolutionary democratic regimes on a businesslike and friendly basis, to grant them aid without any discrimination or attempts to meddle in their domestic affairs. The same motif of a readiness to put "businesslike" relations first to stand "above" ideological differences rings in the message *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s*: "The United States," the message reads, "will measure African progress in terms of long-run social and economic accomplishment, and not in the political flux which is likely to accompany growth."¹

Bourgeois politicians invariably underscore the theme of "Western respect" for the "national values", "unique" ideology and "constructive" spirit of nationalism in the developing countries, the "irreplaceable role" of the latter in the rebirth and progress of these countries. However innocently, kindly disposed and even flattering (especially in form) these statements may sound, in practice—in the place and time they are made, and in the placing of emphasis—they are aimed at

¹ *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s*, p. 87.

wholeheartedly encouraging reactionary, narrowly nationalistic tendencies within revolutionary democracy, at providing active support for certain revolutionary democratic groups that wish to shut themselves off from the accumulated experience of the world liberation struggle and to base their policies exclusively on "national cultural, religious and other values".

Finally, stimulating anti-communist prejudices and sentiments among revolutionary democrats, prodding them into a sharp political struggle against Communists, hold a special place in imperialist policy. This is not infrequently accomplished within the broader framework of speculating on developing social differentiation and frightening revolutionary democrats with the specter of acute class contradictions. Imperialists proceed from the premise that anti-communist tendencies lead to a weakening of the domestic and international position of revolutionary democratic regimes. And anti-communist pressure now often takes on more flexible forms. The most primitive, base clichés are employed less often. Special attention is given to seeing that the anti-communist maneuvers of imperialist policy appear not as a manifestation of the ideological motif of capitalist states and of their interests in the struggle with world communism, but as concern for the independence and successful development of the emerging countries.

Neo-colonialists attempt in every way possible to take advantage of the nationalist sentiments widespread among influential groups of the public in the previously enslaved countries, to utilize their sensitivity on this score to kindle distrust and antipathy to Communists as adherents of an internationalist ideology. In this respect, the cultivation of nationalist prejudices and the fortification of national circumscription and egoism is one of the tools used to heat up anti-communist tendencies.

Those then, are some of the elements of the official political and ideological doctrine of neo-colonialism, a doctrine aimed squarely against revolutionary democracy. One property of this doctrine is that it does not entirely boil down to disguise and deceit meant to take advantage of the weak spots in revolutionary democracy. It also includes elements in which

there is a *coincidence of the aspirations* of certain groups of revolutionary democrats with imperialist intentions toward revolutionary democracy at the present stage.

An integral supplement—really the seamy side—of this officially stated position is the policy of establishing contact with real or potential opposition groups both within revolutionary democracy itself and outside it (not to mention out-and-out conspiratorial activities), a policy of encouraging socio-economic processes leading to the development and expansion of pro-bourgeois strata, of stimulating corruption in the state and party apparatus, of securing the degeneration of progressive regimes and a change in their orientation.

A dual game is thus played.¹ As a result, imperialists secure themselves the possibility—in case the efforts gradually to change the policy of particular states with a socialist orientation are clearly ineffective—of setting opposition forces in motion to overthrow revolutionary democratic governments.

We must especially note the following circumstance: in many cases, imperialists in effect proceed from the premise that the principal factor with a real influence on relations between revolutionary democratic countries and the outside world and on their domestic policy is the economic factor. They see in economic “assistance” an important lever for exercising political influence on these states. At the same time, strategists of neo-colonialism also count on the socio-economic effect of such “assistance”, hoping that it will strengthen the spontaneous and “conscious” elements who favor a capitalist orientation in the economies of the progressive nation states.

The development of this approach is undoubtedly furthered by the fact that the imperialist powers have the greatest potential precisely in the economic realm. The countries with a socialist orientation are still closely tied to the world capitalist economic system. The imperialist powers are the dominant purchasers in these countries. As a rule, they also provide the

¹ A typical detail illustrating this tactics in operation: in November 1972, the United States, Great Britain and Italy sent delegations to the celebration of the second anniversary of the repulsion of Portuguese aggression against Guinea—an aggression that was to have been supported by groups of local plotters connected with other imperialist powers.

greater share of the loans, credits and technical assistance that progressive states receive, and the growing indebtedness of these states to the capitalist countries is used especially assiduously to tie them to the world capitalist economy and to realize the goals of neo-colonialist policy. By June 1975, the Tanzanian overall debt connected with the “aid” from capitalist countries and international credit organizations amounted to 400 million dollars¹; in Algeria by early 1975 it was over 2.4 thousand million dollars²; in the People's Republic of the Congo by the end of 1972 it was 212 million dollars³; in the Republic of Guinea by the end of 1973—226 million dollars.⁴

Attributing special significance to economic ties, neo-colonialists bank on presenting these ties as ideologically “neutral” or at least more neutral than political relations. It is in this light that imperialists strive to present the economic cooperation they offer.

Imperialists take advantage of the difficult dilemma facing revolutionary democrats: solving their countries' economic, and consequently social, problems, implementing the program of economic and social progress, developing their natural resources, requires the attraction of financial resources and not infrequently the technical assistance of capitalist countries. This is, however, fraught with serious dangers for the social orientation chosen by countries going the non-capitalist path. Therefore, the problem of “assistance”, of economic ties between countries with a socialist orientation and international capitalism, is one of the principal sectors of the struggle between imperialists and the forces of revolutionary democracy.

Imperialist tactics can be illustrated in brief in the example of Guinea. Imperialist powers, especially the United States, after a rather lengthy period of temporizing began to develop extensive economic ties with Guinea, to provide her with

¹ *Quarterly Economic Review. Annual Supplement*, Tanzania, Mauritius, London, 1975, p. 11.

² *Algérie-Actualités*, January 5-11, 1975, p. 5.

³ *Bulletin de l'Afrique noire* No. 18, Paris, April 16, 1975, p. 15963.

⁴ *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens* No. 1546, Paris, June 27, 1975, p. 1869.

economic and technical "assistance". In September 1968, an agreement was signed between Guinea and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the US Agency for International Development (AID) for the extension of a loan for carrying out the so-called Boké Project for the development of Guinea's rich deposits of bauxites. As Sékou Touré noted, the undertakings envisioned "will have a decisive influence on the entire economy...."¹ Arrangement on the financing of this project was reached as early as 1963, but the Western powers delayed its implementation.

Under the agreement, Guinea received around 85 million dollars in a two-part loan: 64.5 million dollars in hard currency, and the equivalent of 21 million dollars in Guinean banknotes. The first part came through the IBRD, the second through the AID. The United States also agreed to grant Guinea more than 100 million dollars' worth of credits for financing the operations of Bauxite de Guinée.

Development of the deposits is undertaken by the mixed company Bauxite de Guinée, in which the Guinean Government will have a 49 percent share, the remaining 51 percent being held by Halco Mining, a consortium of seven major American, French and Italian aluminum companies. The aluminum-producing companies have signed contracts with Bauxite de Guinée for the annual purchase of 4.7 million tons of bauxites, to be raised to 5.1 million tons beginning with the sixth year of operations. Bauxite de Guinée counts on selling subsequently 1.5 million additional tons.²

The agreement and subsequent contracts were concluded on quite rigid terms: 3-4.5 percent annual interest to be paid in hard currency, fixed periods for installment payments with interest rising to 5 or 6 percent in case of delays, strict guarantees in the form of Guinean promissary notes covering the value of the loan given to the bank, to be redeemed as the loan is repaid, and so on.

It should be kept in mind that Americans already control 48.5 percent of the shares of an international consortium mining bauxites in the Kimba area and producing alumi-

¹ *Jeune Afrique*, February 23, 1971, p. 36.

² *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens*, September 28, 1968, p. 2354.

na—the FRJA, (now FRIGIA) which provided the Guinean budget with its basic (though comparatively small) source of convertible currency. It was intended that the Boké complex would soon become an important additional source of convertible currency income.

West Germany, too, noticeably expanded its contacts with Guinea in the 1960s. Between 1959 and 1969, West Germany extended Guinea credits amounting to approximately 150 million marks. In September of 1969, West Germany and Guinea signed a new agreement on economic cooperation. Guinean-West German contacts have been stepped up in some other areas, too.

This process was interrupted, though private West German firms continued to take part in the FRIGIA and Bauxite de Guinée companies, by the rupture of diplomatic relations between Guinea and West Germany in January of 1971 in connection with the participation of West German citizens in the conspiracy and aggression of Portuguese mercenaries against the Republic of Guinea. In May of 1975 (after the West German government had unanimously admitted and condemned the participation of its citizens in this aggression), diplomatic relations were restored, and the communique published in this connection stated that this would contribute to closer ties and to the development of cooperation between Guinea and West Germany.

The principal goals that the imperialist powers, first and foremost the United States, have set themselves in developing extensive economic links with Guinea are as follows: keeping Guinea within the world capitalist economic system and tying it into this system even more tightly; setting up important additional socio-economic obstacles (both immediate and calculated for the future) to Guinea's development along non-capitalist lines; strengthening the private sector in the country's economy and increasing bourgeois-bureaucratic elements; making Guinea's rapprochement with the socialist countries, above all the Soviet Union,¹ more difficult and

¹ It is indicative that the participants of the extensive anti-government conspiracy discovered in Guinea in 1971, irrespective of the imperialist state with which they were connected, had as their priority goal impeding the development of relations between the USSR and Guinea.

blunting the edge of the Guinean Government's anti-imperialist domestic and foreign policy; securing for themselves an important, if not leading, role in the exploitation of the country's natural resources, which have great economic and strategic significance and bring large profits.

All the major projects for which agreements on implementation and financing have been concluded should, according to the imperialists' calculations, increase the one-sided specialization of Guinea's economy, leading to an orientation principally to the production of bauxites, with a simultaneous development of closer ties to the world capitalist economy. Imperialists would like in all this to create a state-capitalist complex in Boké that would lead, to one extent or another, to a restructuring of the country's economy and that would have an important negative effect on the bases of the state sector.

Furthermore, according to the neo-colonialists' calculations, the agreements concluded might, having secured imperialist capital a solid foothold in the basic sector of the development of the country's natural resources, provide a precedent and create more favorable conditions for the penetration of such capital into Guinea.

Neo-colonialists hoped, further, that within Guinea implementation of the agreements concluded would strengthen the position of forces—by consolidating the elements directly associated with the operations of foreign firms and other groups, including some in the state apparatus—that deem it necessary for the development of Guinea's economy to rely primarily on the state-capitalist sector in which both local and foreign capital participate. They have no less in mind the strengthening of circles that favor capitalist tendencies in the country.

Neo-colonialists would like to use the system for training native personnel for the enterprises under construction for the additional purpose of winning over certain strata of Guinean specialists and functionaries and forming among them groups oriented toward the imperialist powers. The imperialist powers have stepped up their economic activity along other lines, too.

Over a number of years, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—and through it, the United States—using "aid" and the problem of stabilizing Guinea's currency, have sought to

place the country's foreign trade and state sector under effective IMF control.

In Guinea's example, too, one can trace the imperialist tactics of carrying out projects that provide a dual effect—economic benefits to them and favorable political and propagandistic repercussions.

The Guinean leaders, of course, are aware of the neo-colonialists' purposes. Trying to utilize imperialist capital for the development of the country's natural resources, they at the same time defend their country's independence, the socialist orientation chosen, the right of Guinea to determine for itself its domestic and foreign policy. Sékou Touré has remarked with respect to the agreement on the Boké complex: "I affirm that a capitalist monopoly neither exists nor will exist in Guinea.... The Guinean people will deal with private capital on the basis of agreements guarding the people's interests."¹ It is worth remarking that the Portuguese colonialists' provocations against Guinea provided grounds for the reaffirmation of the progressive and anti-imperialist direction of the policy of the Guinean Government. The leaders of Guinea—and this is quite indicative for the subject under discussion—did not hesitate to openly and roundly denounce imperialist circles in the United States and, especially, West Germany.

The neo-colonialists' policy of preserving and expanding economic cooperation to the maximum extent possible and expedient is evident, too, in the example of other states headed by revolutionary democrats. It is particularly indicative that economic contacts between the United States and Egypt were maintained even during the progressive development of the Egyptian revolution and had a tendency to expand in the subsequent years.

In 1969 alone, the Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank, David Rockefeller, the former President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Eugene Black, the IBRD's current President, Robert McNamara, and a number of delegations from the IBRD and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) visited Egypt. In addition, in May of the same year, a group of representatives

¹ *Jeune Afrique*, February 23, 1971, p. 37.

of the American-Arab Society on Trade and Industry—one of the largest private societies in the United States, with a membership of 235 companies, including aviation, transport, textile, tourism and banking institutions and the major world oil trusts—visited Egypt. Egyptian-American cooperation has taken on major proportions, too, in the exploration for and extraction of oil, in tourism and the construction of hotels and pharmaceutical plants.

Other such illustrations could be drawn from the relations between the imperialist powers and other states with a socialist orientation.

Progressive regimes and the forces of revolutionary democracy are targets of an extensive imperialist ideological campaign. Some of the aspects of this campaign have already been noted in our analysis of neo-colonialists' political tactics toward revolutionary democracy. We should like, in addition, to note that in recent years politicians and ideologues of neo-colonialism have followed closely the socialist conceptions advanced by revolutionary democracy. This is one of the principal lines along which imperialism exercises ideological influence on revolutionary democracy.

The outpouring of works dedicated to these conceptions is swelling rapidly. Bourgeois scholars and publicists at first demonstrated an especially negative attitude toward the doctrines of revolutionary democracy and to conceptions of "national socialism" as a whole; they offered only a naked apologia for the "Western way of life" and "free enterprise". However, the great popularity of revolutionary democratic conceptions and the increasingly widespread opinion among bourgeois specialists that private enterprise in the former colonies and dependencies could not by itself, without support from the state sector, achieve the consolidation of capitalist relations and, finally, greater familiarity with these conceptions (which indicated that it was wrong to identify them with Marxist-Leninist doctrine), forced neo-colonialist ideologues to alter their point of view.

Of course, even now some bourgeois researchers declare without beating around the bush that "socialism is unnecessary" for developing countries, are frankly negative toward revolutionary democratic conceptions, call them "neo-

Leninist" and apply other "negative" labels or—and many more do this—judge them to be a "variety of romanticism", "rather a collection of moral ideals than of economic principles".

However, other bourgeois scholars and publicists, with a different approach, express the main line of neo-colonialist ideology. Stating that the conceptions of socialism advanced by revolutionary democrats are legitimate, and occasionally even praising them, imperialist ideologues seek to encourage the weak and at times reactionary sides of these conceptions.

Propagandists of neo-colonialism aspire in effect to assist in meeting imperialism's major goal with respect to revolutionary democracy. Along this line, their purpose is to obstruct the ideo-philosophical rapprochement between revolutionary democrats and the socialist world, to obstruct their evolution toward scientific socialism, to emasculate the progressive, anti-imperialist and social content of revolutionary democratic conceptions, to introduce into these conceptions elements of anti-communism and to juxtapose them to Marxism-Leninism, to create or strengthen the ideological conditions for the degeneration of certain revolutionary democratic circles.

The principal themes that stand out in this campaign to influence revolutionary democracy ideologically are as follows.

First, an anti-communist line is actively pursued, with the use of the whole set of the corresponding arguments—from the standard assertions down to the especially popularized thesis that Marxism-Leninism is "inapplicable" to "non-European conditions", to the "specific" situation in the previously colonial and dependent world. The latter thesis is strongly emphasized by leading figures in imperialist countries and by bourgeois ideologues.

For example, the well-known American economist and political scientist, Walt Rostow, recently one of the influential figures in American foreign policy and now Professor of Economics and History at the University of Texas, maintains that communism and the "model" of social reforms it offers are "useless" for the Third World.¹ Jean Ziegler, a Professor of Sociology, consistently defends the same thesis in *Le pouvoir*

¹ Walt Rostow, *Politics and the Stages of Growth*, Cambridge, 1971, p. 288.

africain. He writes that the "specificity of the processes of African socialization is irreducible to Marxist models".¹ He is seconded by the German bourgeois scholar Claus Naether, who writes that most "social revolutionary African countries" are moving "from following the Kremlin line in the direction of at best reformist countries".² Finally, the American scholar Angus Maddison has also tried to prove that Soviet experience cannot be used elsewhere.³ The list of such assertions could be drawn out indefinitely.

Second, neo-colonialist ideologues lay great stress on and underscore actual or supposed differences between revolutionary democratic conception and scientific socialism. They seek in every way possible to impose the idea that Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the world outlook of revolutionary democrats are incompatible and fundamentally opposed. Simultaneously, they go out of the way in extolling the "advantages" of these conceptions over the theory of scientific socialism. The American Professor P. E. Sigmund, maintaining that "the modernizing nationalists have developed an alternative set of ideological assumptions and propositions", declared that "this ideology is in many ways superior to Marxism-Leninism, since it is more pragmatic and more related to the problem of modernization than are the simplistic dogmas derived from the experience of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe which comprise the Marxist-Leninist solution".⁴ Sylvain Urfer, on the staff of L'Institut d'Études politiques de Paris, has also come out with elaborate arguments of the same sort, in which the Marxists' approach, labelled "dogmatic", is juxtaposed to revolutionary democratic conceptions.⁵

Third, pro-imperialist ideologues make extensive use of the idea of the "national uniqueness" of revolutionary democratic

¹ Jean Ziegler, *Le pouvoir africain*, Paris, 1971, p. 75.

² Claus Michael Naether, *Ein Kontinent sucht die Freiheit*, Frankfurt a/M, 1968, pp. 101-02.

³ Angus Maddison, *Economic Growth in Japan and the USSR*, London, 1969, p. 135.

⁴ *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, ed. by P. E. Sigmund, Jr., New York, London, 1963, p. 37.

⁵ Sylvain Urfer, *Ujamaa. Espoir du socialisme africain en Tanzanie*, Paris, 1971, pp. 19, 109, 133-35.

conceptions of socialism. They are zealous advocates of this "uniqueness", and are not at all embarrassed by the manifest falsity of this position for spokesmen of the imperialist powers that, during the period of colonial domination, tried in every way they could to suppress the national culture of the enslaved peoples. Reactionary publicists and scholars insist that it is precisely these conceptions—and these alone—that meet the specific requirements of developing countries.

Fourth, the neo-colonialists' tactical line also involves casting aspersions upon the position of Communist parties vis-à-vis revolutionary democratic conceptions. They strive mightily to raise doubts about the sincerity with which Communist parties recognize and support the progressive aspects of these conceptions and attribute to Communist parties the intention to undermine revolutionary democratic conceptions—which of course provokes hostility to Communists among revolutionary democrats. The West German sociologist Fritz Schatten, for one, states that the communist "hope" is that "African socialism will soon expose itself as a mere rhetorical façade erected by the men who hold power in Africa and that the African masses will soon see for themselves how little substance there is in the ideology..." And then Communists, who supposedly count on just this turn of events, will attempt to use in their own interests the situation that will arise as a result of the collapse of non-Marxist theories of socialism.¹ Finally, that quite well-known author of anti-communist works, Professor Richard Lowenthal of the Free University of Berlin, insinuates that the Soviet Union is trying to impose its own conception of non-capitalist development.²

Unquestionably, the struggle against the forces of revolutionary democracy, a struggle being carried on in many guises, is one of the main lines of neo-colonialist policy. Imperialism's efforts to work a change in the developmental orientation of progressive nation states are increasingly tenacious, increasingly urgent.

The danger stemming from this imperialist policy is rooted not only in the fact that imperialism has some important

¹ See, Fritz Schatten, *Communism in Africa*, London, 1966, p. 52.

² See, *Issues in the Future of Asia. Communist and Non-Communist Alternatives*, ed. by Richard Lowenthal, New York, Washington, London, 1969, p. 6.

leverage, not only in the insidious and resourceful tactics it employs, but also in certain of the properties and weaknesses of revolutionary democracy itself.

2. Communists and Revolutionary Democrats

Solid relations of understanding and cooperation between Communists and revolutionary democrats—the two active political currents in the contemporary liberation movement of the peoples of the former colonies and dependencies—is a factor of first-rate importance for the revolutionary process in these countries. This is of special importance at the present stage, especially with respect to progressive nation states. One can foresee that this factor will play an important role in further extending the national democratic revolution and bring it to its conclusion.

Relations between Communists and revolutionary democrats have two sides: *international*, i.e., revolutionary democrats' links with the international communist movement, with foreign Communist parties (and in countries where there are no Communist parties or organized Marxist groups this is in fact the only line of contact with Communists), and *national*, i.e., relations between revolutionary democrats and Communists within the framework of the countries concerned in the zone of national liberation. In both cases, these relations, though to varying degrees depending upon the case, are an important factor in the political evolution of revolutionary democracy and at the same time a criterion by which we can judge that evolution. On the relations between revolutionary democrats and Communists, their cooperation and alliance, depends in no small degree the place and role of revolutionary democracy in the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle.

Neither the shaping of revolutionary democracy's political and ideological position nor the role that it plays in the progressive development of the newly independent countries can be understood outside the context of the enormous work that Communists have carried out throughout the world and in the emerging countries themselves. On the other hand, the life itself has irrefutably shown that abnormal relations between revolutionary democracy and Communists has a highly

unfavorable effect on revolutionary democracy's position and evolution.

One can hardly deny, for instance, the negative impact of the hostility that influential revolutionary democratic circles in some Arab states have at times shown to "their" Communist parties. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the Burmese Communist Party's policy of armed struggle against the revolutionary democratic regime, a policy decided upon under Maoist influence, has placed the Party in a position that objectively impedes the regime's progressive evolution and effectively aids those circles in and outside Burma that wish to turn Burmese development back, to change the orientation of the Revolutionary Council.

Complications on "national grounds" can also have a negative effect on cooperation between the progressive regimes concerned and the socialist states.

There are a number of reasons for the special importance of cooperation between revolutionary democrats and Communists *at the present stage* of the historical development of the formerly enslaved countries. It derives first and foremost from the specific character of the present stage of the national liberation revolution, from the socio-economic character of that revolution's principal tasks, from the deepening social polarization and the vital necessity stemming therefrom for consolidating all forces able and ready to support fundamental social reforms and a progressive course of development. Further, in this situation the firmness in matters of theory, the practical organizational and propaganda skills of Communist Party cadres and the support of the social forces on which Communists have an influence acquire even greater value.

On the other hand, at the present stage close contact with the socialist states is a most important factor, among other things, for the general evolution of the revolutionary democrats' posture. Finally, it is precisely at this stage that the "incitement" of revolutionary democrats against Communists, the instigation of a political struggle between them is extensively used by imperialists in order to retard social progress in the previously colonial and dependent countries.

Closing the ranks of Communists and revolutionary democrats is exceptionally important for strengthening regimes with

a socialist orientation, for extending and consolidating the class and political basis of their struggle for national independence and social progress, for developing and implementing a scientifically based policy in domestic and foreign affairs. It is important, too, for counteracting counterrevolution and for "neutralizing" groups within revolutionary democracy itself that are inclined to capitulate. There is no need to show how important this consolidation is for the success of the liberation movement and the development of revolutionary processes in countries that remain under the yoke of colonial and puppet regimes or have fallen under bourgeois control.

Understandably, the dissimilar situations that have taken shape in different countries—we have in mind both the overall situation and the socio-economic peculiarities of these countries as well as the history and varied shadings in the relations between revolutionary democrats and Communists—leave their mark on the development and prospects for cooperation between Communists and revolutionary democrats. This does not, however, affect matters of principle that apply to the problem as a whole and that hold true in every case.

Recent years have seen an expansion of contacts and cooperation between Communists and revolutionary democrats, and this has often been one of the most important manifestations of revolutionary democracy's evolution in a positive direction. In the *international* field, this expanding cooperation has followed the line of party or—with respect to socialist countries—state contacts, which are at the same time a unique (and in some instances the principal) form of contact and dialogue between Communists and revolutionary democrats.

Inter-party relations reflect to one degree or another the political rapprochement between revolutionary democrats and Communists and in turn further this rapprochement. This reflected in reciprocal visits by party delegations, attendance at party congresses and participation in other important official and public undertakings; in the exchange of experience in various areas of political, economic and ideological life; in comparison of points of view on the important questions of contemporary world development; in the coordination of

activity in international democratic organizations and in the course of mass anti-imperialist campaigns of an international character; in increasing access to Marxist literature in countries with a socialist orientation; in cooperation in the training of cadres of party, trade union and youth movement activists for national democratic parties, and so on.

Links between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and revolutionary democratic parties—both those that head progressive nation states or are carrying on an armed struggle against colonial and racist regimes, and those that are in opposition to reactionary and neo-colonialist regimes—have developed on an especially broad scale. Only in recent years, the Soviet Union has been visited by dozens of party and party-government delegations from Syria, Iraq, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Burma, the Congo, Guinea, Tanzania, Somali and Lebanon, as well as from the African Party of Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the African National Congress of South Africa, the Liberation Front of Mozambique, the Congress Party of the Independence of Madagascar, the Zimbabwe African People's Union, and so on. These delegations came to the Soviet Union for the political negotiations, cordial discussion of fundamental problems of the anti-imperialist struggle, to study the activity of the CPSU, its methods of directing political and economic life, mass organizations and ideological work. In the same period, CPSU delegations visited Syria, Iraq, Algeria, the Congo, Guinea, Somali, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and other countries. The CPSU now maintains inter-party relations with more than twenty revolutionary democratic parties of Asia and Africa, with some of them they have acquired a stable character and are carried out on the basis of special protocols and plans for specific undertakings.

It is becoming a tradition for delegations from revolutionary democratic parties to attend congresses of the CPSU. This successful development of ties between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the forces of revolutionary democracy was manifested especially clearly at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, which was attended by representatives of 19 revolutionary democratic parties, as against nine such delegations at the preceding congress.

Between its 24th and 25th Congresses, the CPSU continued to strengthen its ties with revolutionary democratic parties, as was noted in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 25th Congress.¹ As at the preceding forum, representatives of 19 revolutionary democratic parties attended the 25th Party Congress.

Representatives of revolutionary democratic parties have also attended the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth, the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, and international scientific and political conferences that have been held in the USSR.

Party, youth and trade union personnel from a number of countries with socialist orientation are being trained in the Soviet Union. Soviet teachers work in party and trade union schools in the Congo, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and elsewhere.

Relations between the forces of revolutionary democracy and Communist parties in other countries of the socialist community are developing along the same lines. Party or party-state delegations from the German Democratic Republic, for instance, have visited the Congo, Guinea, Syria, Iraq and other countries; delegations from Bulgaria have gone to the Congo, Algeria, Syria and Iraq; from Czechoslovakia to Syria and Iraq; from Rumania to the Congo and Syria, and so on. Delegations from national democratic parties have visited the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Yugoslavia, etc. They attended the Tenth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Eighth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.

Contacts between revolutionary democratic parties and Communists in capitalist countries are also developing, first and foremost with the largest parties in capitalist countries—the French and Italian. Delegations from the French Communist Party, for example, have visited Guinea, Algeria, the Congo and Syria—some of these countries repeatedly.

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, p. 15.

Representatives of the Italian Communist Party have been received by the Algerian FLN, the Democratic Party of Guinea, and the Syrian Baath Party. For their part, French and Italian Communists have received—sometimes as guests at their congresses—delegations from the Democratic Party of Guinea, the Algerian FLN, the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath) of Syria, revolutionary democrats from the Congo, and so on. These parties work in conjunction with revolutionary democrats in carrying out a number of international undertakings.

Active contacts were established between the delegations of Communist and national democratic parties attending the 24th Congress of the CPSU. The delegation of the Congolese Workers' Party, for instance, signed a joint communique with representatives of the Communist Party of Portugal that emphasized their mutual solidarity and their desire to expand and strengthen fraternal relations with each other.¹

An important political result of the increased contacts, and at the same time a prerequisite for their further development, is the fact the influential revolutionary democratic circles have begun to view cooperation with Communists along party lines in international affairs as a natural and, what is more, necessary factor for achieving the overall goals of the anti-imperialist struggle. This posture has been set down in a number of revolutionary democratic documents—both their own and those adopted jointly with Communist parties. The Soviet-Syrian communique on the occasion of the visit of a party-state delegation from Syria to the USSR in February 1971, reads: "The parties took note of the great importance of the cordial relations established between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and expressed their mutual desire for further development of these ties in the interest of strengthening the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic, for counteracting the conspiracies of imperialism and colonialism, and for supporting the struggle of peoples for national independence, peace and social progress."²

¹ *Bulletin quotidien de l'Agence Congolaise d'information*, Brazzaville, April 16, 1971, p. 3.

² *Pravda*, February 4, 1971.

A similar point of view was reflected in the Soviet-Iraqi communique on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of the President of Iraq, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr,¹ in the message of the President of the Revolutionary Council of Algeria, Houari Boumediène, to the Soviet leaders on the 58th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.²

Alongside the increased tendency in the majority of revolutionary democratic parties to establish ties with the international communist movement, a further hallmark of recent years has been the enrichment of the political and ideological substance of these ties, a greater opportunity for Communist Party delegations to meet with party activists and the population.

One positive result achieved in this period, too, has been that certain revolutionary democratic circles have to one extent or another recognized the political meaning and auxiliary function of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism under the present conditions of the worldwide class and anti-imperialist struggle. This is reflected in a number of statements by political figures and the press in progressive nation states, statements that have noted in particular that imperialism makes extensive use of the "specter of communism" for the purpose of placing obstacles in the way of the anti-imperialist, independent course of the former colonies and dependencies, of hampering the creation of a broad, popular anti-imperialist front. The Algerian FLN's weekly *El Moudjahid*, for one, wrote that using communism for purposes of intimidation is at present one of imperialism's ideological weapons. Moreover, the FLN, in a joint communique on negotiations with the Italian Communist Party, condemned "anti-communism in all its forms and the causes that give rise to it", considering it "a factor for weakening democratic and anti-imperialist forces and encouraging the forces of reaction".³ One cannot but see that this is an example of the tendency we are speaking of when we take into account the policy followed by the FLN leadership on this question in recent years.

The Syrian paper *Al-Thawrah* has written that when reaction

¹ *Pravda*, September 20, 1972.

² *Pravda*, November 9, 1975.

³ *L'Unità*, October 20, 1971.

says it is fighting communism, this should be taken to mean that it is opposing the liberation movement as a whole. When reaction warns against "communist imperialism" this means that it is calling for capitulation to it.

However, we should qualify this by noting that statements such as the above obviously do not enjoy universal support in revolutionary democratic leadership circles, which we will take up later, and because of this are at times not backed by the appropriate specific conclusions. On the other hand, they are often more likely to express the fact that revolutionary democrats have seen through neo-colonialism's stereotyped anti-communist "game" and do not wish to follow in the wake of imperialist propaganda than to indicate that revolutionary democrats have completely overcome anti-communist prejudices. Therefore, shifts reflected in such statements and in the corresponding practical political line, though they are unquestionably a real factor making for cooperation between Communists and revolutionary democrats, can be combined with the retention of preconceptions about Communists, especially preconceptions of a nationalist sort.

The attitude of revolutionary democrats to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in 1969 can be taken as an index measuring the strength of the tendency toward rapprochement with the international communist movement, toward developing ties with it. Revolutionary democrats reacted positively to the Meeting and its resolutions. As we know, Gamal Abdel Nasser sent a special message of greetings to the Meeting—an act that several years previously would without question have been unthinkable. "Let your historic Meeting," wrote Nasser, "be a new strongpoint in the struggle against the forces of oppression and exploitation, since it is a support for the victory of the aspirations of freedom and peace." He also spoke of "unity of forces fighting for the future".¹ The Meeting was also hailed by the leader of the African Party of Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands, Amilcar Cabral.

Many other national democratic parties also took a positive stance toward the Meeting and, to a certain extent, declared

¹ *Pravda*, June 12, 1969.

their solidarity with it. The official Burmese paper *Botataung* called the unity of the ranks of the Communist and Workers' Parties demonstrated at the Meeting a "major victory for the anti-imperialist forces". In an article dedicated to the results of the Meeting, the paper wrote that the Meeting had shown "the firm determination of the Communist Parties to go hand in hand in the struggle against imperialism and for peace, freedom, democracy and socialism".¹

The national democratic press followed the work of the Meeting attentively and published materials from the Meeting and its own approving commentary. The organ of the Congolese Workers' Party, *Etumba*, for example, published the speech by L. I. Brezhnev at the opening of the Meeting under the heading: "The Opening in Moscow of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties".² Reports on the work of the Meeting were published in every issue of the *Bulletin quotidien de L'Agence Congolaise d'information*, which brought to the reader's attention all of the most important aspects of the work of the Meeting. The Syrian *Al-Baath* devoted an entire type page to an analysis of the Main Document of the International Meeting.³

It must be emphasized that the Meeting itself, the attention that it devoted in its work and documents to the problems of the liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa, the high evaluation it gave to the role of the national liberation movement in the world revolutionary process and to the activity of revolutionary democrats, contributed signally to strengthening the ties between the revolutionary democrats and Communists. The platform of the Meeting and its Main Document contribute to strengthening the political and theoretical bases for cooperation between revolutionary democrats and Communists.

Everything said above is no less true of the work of the 24th Congress of the CPSU. The Congress demonstrated persuasively that the broadening and deepening of contacts between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the revolution-

¹ *Botataung*, June 28, 1969.

² *Etumba*, June 11-17, 1969.

³ *Al-Baath*, July 1, 1969.

ary democratic forces of national liberation was one of the characteristic features in the overall development of the alliance between the CPSU and the Soviet state with the national liberation movement in the preceding years. Just as the very presence of the delegations from many national democratic parties and organizations showed, the line these delegations took at the Congress once more confirmed that there is a common political platform on the urgent questions of the contemporary anti-imperialist struggle, for cooperation and rapprochement between Communists and revolutionary democrats.

The speeches of revolutionary democratic spokesmen at the 24th Congress were imbued with a militant, anti-imperialist spirit and expressed a high opinion of the Congress and active support for the basic principles of the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU. Some speakers made use of Marxist-Leninist propositions. Many revolutionary democrats viewed their participation in the work of the Congress from the perspective of the importance of studying and using the experience of the CPSU.

Without question, the presence at the 24th Congress of delegations from a large number of revolutionary democratic parties—a reflection of the definite shift toward expanding contacts with the international communist movement—was a defeat both for imperialism and for pro-imperialist and reformist forces in the national liberation zone.

Indicative, too, was the evaluation given to the 24th Congress of the CPSU by the press in progressive nation states. The *Somalian weekly Horseid* devoted two long articles to the 24th Congress, noting in the introduction to them that the articles were meant to give the reader a clear picture of the CPSU, its historic goals and major achievements, its influence on the life of Soviet people and its assistance to the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The paper hailed the Party of Lenin and Somali-Soviet friendship. The Egyptian weekly *Rose el-Youssef* wrote that "the resolutions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU should provide a firm basis for the development and strengthening of the revolutionary forces in the Arab world, forces waging a just struggle against American

imperialism and Israeli expansion.¹ The Burmese paper *Cheihmown* called the Congress "the greatest" international event.²

In some countries there has in recent years been a shift in the development of cooperation between Communists and revolutionary democrats on *national* soil. In Syria, for instance, Communists have begun to participate in the government. The Tenth Extraordinary Pan-Arab Congress of the Baath Party (October-November 1970) called for an expansion of "cooperation with progressive political elements and groups". Communists have entered Syria's People's Council (parliament).

An important event in the life of Syria was the creation in 1972 of the National Progressive Front, in which the Communist Party participates. The General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, in salutations sent on this occasion to the Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party and to President Hafez Assad, stressed the role played in the achievement of this historic victory for the progressive anti-imperialist forces of the Syrian people by the Communist Party and the Baath Party, headed by Hafez Assad.³ It must be mentioned that the Sixth Regional Conference of the Baath Party in April 1975 stressed the great significance of the Front.⁴

Important shifts toward the development of cooperation between the Communist Party and the ruling Baath Party in Iraq have also occurred. Even before their advent to power, in January 1968, the Baathists condemned the "mistakes" committed during the February coup of 1963 with respect to other progressive forces, first and foremost the Iraqi Communist Party. Carrying out important socio-economic and anti-imperialist reforms and running up against the mounting opposition of domestic reaction allied with imperialism, the new leadership of the Baath Party took effective steps toward establishing cooperation with other patriotic, progressive forces.

¹ *Rose el-Youssef*, April 12, 1971.

² *Cheihmown*, Rangoon, April 11, 1971.

³ See, *Pravda*, March 20, 1972.

⁴ See, *Pravda*, April 22, 1975.

The Iraqi Communist Party has given a positive evaluation to many aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the Baath Party and has taken note of its important services in the struggle against imperialism and reaction. The First Secretary of the CC of the Iraqi Communist Party, Aziz Mohammed, in an interview with the Beirut paper *Al-Ahbar* in July 1971, gave a positive evaluation of the existing Baathist regime and reaffirmed the readiness of Iraqi Communists to cooperate with the Baath Party in the democratic development of Iraq. Communists have supported the Baath policy of establishing a national petroleum industry and eliminating the predominance of foreign monopolies in this area, and of developing Soviet-Iraqi relations. Along with other forces in Iraq, they have condemned attempts by Arab reaction to suppress the Palestine Liberation Movement. Communists participated in the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Baath Party and have carried out a number of joint political actions.

In May 1972, representatives of the Communist Party entered the government of Iraq. In the Party statement published on this question, it was emphasized that this was "the result of positive steps taken by the authorities and the Baath Party leadership, the most important of which are the proposed National Charter, the purpose of which is to create a united front of national progressive parties and forces, the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi Republic, a treaty that is a turning point in relations between the two countries, and the beginning of petroleum extraction on a national basis with the assistance of the Soviet Union and Hungary".¹ In July 1973, the Communist Party and the Baath Party signed a joint statement on cooperation in the Progressive National Patriotic Front.

Contacts between revolutionary democratic forces and the Lebanese Communist Party are also expanding. At the Third Congress of the Party, which met in January 1972, representatives of around 15 revolutionary democratic parties and other progressive organizations in Arab countries, including the

¹ *Al-Sakafa al-Jadida* No. 36-37, Baghdad, 1972.

Syrian and Iraqi Baath Parties, the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon, the National Union of Popular Forces of Morocco and so on, were present. This was at the same time evidence of the increasing ties among the progressive forces of the Arab world. The 24 parties and organizations from Arab countries—Communist parties included—represented at the Congress issued a joint call for a conference of all Arab patriotic parties and organizations.

It was indicative too, that many of the representatives of revolutionary democratic parties speaking at the Congress emphasized the importance of cooperation with Communists, who are an inseparable part of the progressive anti-imperialist front.

The work of the Congress was given extensive coverage in the press of a number of Arab countries. Iraqi papers, for example, published reports on speeches made by representatives of the Iraqi Baath Party, and Communists from Iraq and other countries. Commenting on the work of the Lebanese Communists' forum, the Egyptian paper *Al-Gomhouria* wrote: "The elements uniting Communists with other progressive, patriotic and democratic forces in the Arab world are much greater in number and considerably more important than those that divide them." The paper emphasized that insignificant disagreements between these forces could be resolved through a democratic dialogue under conditions of mutual understanding and within the framework of a joint program of action against the imperialist Zionist occupation of Arab lands.¹ Finally, the organ of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, *Al-Thawriy*, specially saluted the Third Congress of the Lebanese Communist Party.²

An important step has been made toward strengthening the unity of progressive democratic forces in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen itself. From October 11 to 13, 1975 a

¹ *Al-Gomhouria*, January 11, 1972.

² *Al-Thawriy*, Aden, January 12, 1972. No less symptomatic was the effect that the Congress drew sharp attacks from certain circles in the Arab world. The Libyan newspaper *Al-Raid*, for instance, published anti-Soviet and anti-communist fabrications and attributed to Communists the preparation of "conspiracies against revolutionary regimes" in the Arab world (*Al-Raid*, Tripoli, January 11, 12, 13, 1972).

joint congress was held in Aden of three political organizations of the country—the National Front, the People's Democratic Union and the People's Vanguard Party. The Congress established a united political organization of the National Front, adopted its program and charter and elected its leaders.

Despite the active opposition of anti-communist forces in the Arab world, the Communist parties of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and the Sudan participated in the People's Conference in Support of the Palestinian Revolution alongside national democratic parties and organizations that included the Algerian FLN, the Iraqi Baath Party, the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and others.

The position taken by a number of national democratic parties in connection with the events in the Sudan in the summer of 1971 also deserves attention: the reactions of these parties showed, in one way or another, their attitude toward anti-communism. While some elements in the national democratic parties supported the repression of Sudanese Communists, the repressions were condemned by influential revolutionary democratic forces. Boumediène, for one, in an interview with the Lebanese weekly *Al-Dustour* declared that "these repressions are a mistake and are scarcely in the interests of the Arab nation".¹ The leadership of the Congolese Workers' Party, through the Party and government press, energetically protested against repressions, and likewise expressed its dissatisfaction with the position taken by the Peking leadership, which in effect showed its solidarity with the repressions.

Summing up, we can say that as a whole the contacts between revolutionary democrats and Communists are, on the international plane, undergoing intensive development. Cooperation within the national framework has also developed, though with some exceptions it is less well established and is a subject of heated discussion within revolutionary democracy. At the same time, the pressing requirements of social development in the emerging states and of the present phase of the liberation struggle demand that the level of cooperation achieved be raised.

¹ *Al-Dustour*, Beirut, October 3, 1971.

This summary naturally leads to the question of the future prospects for this cooperation—again, both on the international and on the national level. At issue above all are the objective prerequisites for cooperation between revolutionary democrats and Communists, as well as factors that make this cooperation more difficult.

It should be stressed that there is a broad basis for cooperation between revolutionary democrats and Communists. That basis is provided by their common anti-imperialist position, the readiness of revolutionary democrats to wage an active struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism; their orientation toward socialism; the relative proximity or similarity of many of the important constituent elements of the social basis the interests of which Communists and revolutionary democrats express.

Calling for the independent and progressive development of their countries, Communists and revolutionary democrats are objectively in the same camp, they face a common enemy. The fact that the anti-imperialist position of revolutionary democracy is not a position identical to that of Communists, as well as the fact that socialism and the movement toward it are in much conceived differently by them, is not, *at the present stage*, of overriding importance. They are agreed on the *main point*—that only determined struggle against imperialism, that only development in the direction of socialism permits the solution of the pressing national and social problems of their countries.

Revolutionary democrats are also urged toward cooperation with Communists by their objective position in the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle.

Both international and domestic conditions in the emerging countries provide a basis for presuming that in so far as we have to do with revolutionary democrats, petty-bourgeois democracy and the forces of socialism are not at all fated to “part ways”. They do not “part ways” above all because of the nature of the current tasks of social development at the present stage, as well as because, given the present situation in these countries, the democratic program has not only an anti-imperialist but also an anti-capitalist bias. They do not “part ways”, too, because revolutionary democracy and the forces of

socialism are now converging on an international scale—with in the framework of the international revolutionary process.

In fact, influential revolutionary democratic circles proceed from a recognition of their political proximity to socialist states in the course of the struggle against imperialism. Moreover, they are interested for purely practical reasons in comprehensive support from the socialist community and the world communist movement, in the development of contacts with it; they are also interested in close, cordial relations with socialist states.

It is worth noting that this self-interest in support from the Soviet Union, socialist countries and the international communist movement serves for revolutionary democrats as an argument—because of the internationalist position of world socialism—in favor of cooperation with Communists on the national level, too.

Revolutionary democrats, moreover, would like to utilize, even if within restricted limits and within the framework of their own conceptions, the experience of the socialist countries and Communist parties. The numerous statements by revolutionary democratic parties and their leaders on this score are not, as a rule, of a purely formal character; they are supported by concrete undertakings and efforts in this direction.

Communists and revolutionary democrats advance similar socio-economic programs for the current phases of social development in their countries. We cannot disregard the fact that Communists and revolutionary democrats are rather far apart in their understanding of how to carry out the urgent tasks of social development. Nor is it of minor importance that much in revolutionary democracy's platform remains for the time being mere declaration. However, none of this lessens the great significance that proximity of the stated goals of Communists and revolutionary democrats at the present stage has in facilitating cooperation between them. All the important present examples of cooperation between Communists and revolutionary democrats, their joint struggle and activity, would scarcely have been possible without such ideological proximity.

Nor can we disregard the revolutionary democrats' inter-

est—naturally, to different degrees in different countries—in utilizing Communists' experience, their organizational skills, their ability to organize propaganda activity and the work of mass organizations and the state apparatus. The special qualities of communist cadres in this respect are generally recognized. The competence, for example, of the Syrian Communists who have taken posts in the state apparatus and in economic organs has won recognition in Baath circles.

The rapprochement of Communists and revolutionary democrats is furthered, too, by the cardinal fact that the international communist movement recognized in time and gave a proper evaluation to the political significance of revolutionary democracy, took scientifically based and flexible position relative to it, supported the socio-economic reforms carried out under the leadership of revolutionary democracy and extended the hand of cooperation.

The spread of scientific socialism in the formerly enslaved countries, its influence on revolutionary democrats, who adopt certain of its propositions, likewise furthers, for all the remaining ideological differences, the development of new bonds uniting revolutionary democrats and Communists.

Such are some of the substantive, primarily *objective*, factors that further cooperation between revolutionary democrats and Communists. At the same time, we must not underrate factors that make their rapprochement more difficult.

Fundamental among these complications and difficulties is the social nature, the class properties of revolutionary democracy. Possibly more than in any other area, this is where the constant vacillation of the petty proprietor (and the middle strata as well), its intermediate position, its class "mutual defense", shows through. Here we should add, too, that well-to-do strata and kulaks in the village, whose attitude to Communists can in principle be nothing but negative or out-and-out hostile, are, as already mentioned, often represented to one extent or another in revolutionary democracy.

The nationalistic world outlook of revolutionary democrats, who adapt socialism to nationalism, is an important line of demarcation. It is not only—and often not so much—the incompatibility in principle of the nationalism of the revolutionary democrats and the internationalism of Communists that

is at issue. What is largely at issue is the fact that revolutionary democrats do not understand—we have in mind, of course, *socially* conditioned misunderstanding—the dialectical relationship between internationalism and patriotism. Internationalism in general, the internationalism of Communists in particular, is conceived by some revolutionary democratic circles to be incompatible with patriotism.

It is worth remarking that this approach often serves as the grounds for alleging that Communists "are not able" properly to analyze and frame the problems of their countries and of the formerly colonial world as a whole, since, so it is said, they are "weakly connected" with the national soil.

Other ideological differences also play an important role, above all on such issues as classes and the class struggle, the attitude to the working class, to the dictatorship of the proletariat and, especially, to religion.

Communist parties have repeatedly explained that they defend freedom of religion. They tirelessly stress that division and conflict among the masses over attitudes to religion lead, as experience has shown, to the most negative, even tragic, consequences for the liberation movement. Nevertheless, many revolutionary democrats continue to take a negative stance toward Communists' atheism.

In recent years, one more factor has been added: the not infrequent differences in attitude to the ideological conceptions and schismatic activity of the Maoists. This activity and the difficulties stemming therefrom are at times used by some revolutionary democrats, against Communist parties.

The complex of what might be termed as "political jealousy" on the part of some revolutionary democratic circles with respect to Communists also has a negative effect. Revolutionary democrats consider themselves the "genuine" socialist force and attribute enormous importance to gaining international recognition of this, in particular from the international communist movement. As a result, they are not infrequently wary of local Communist parties *in this respect*, too; they are wary of Communists' links with the international Communist movement, though here, without question, purely nationalistic motives also play an important role.

Political differences over the issue of democracy in the

advanced nation states has a major effect on cooperation between revolutionary democrats and Communists. We should recall that many revolutionary democrats subscribe in effect to the principle of developing the revolution "from above". Communists, on the other hand, favor stimulating the political initiative of the people, extending mass democracy, developing the revolutionary process both "from above" and "from below". They resolutely defend the need for consistently democratizing public life, for securing an extensive opportunity for all progressive, patriotic organizations to work. Communists favor the establishment of a regime relying on the effective political organizations of the masses, on a national front. They understand perfectly well that advances "bestowed" on the masses from above and not resting on the masses' active and organized support cannot be secure.

Of first-rate importance for relations between revolutionary democrats and Communists, too, is what can be conditionally called inter-party rivalry. Such rivalry is a frequent phenomenon in relations even between cooperating political parties.

Naturally, both Communists and revolutionary democrats try to expand their influence over the masses. Yet the social bases of both political tendencies, which contain the "reserve" for such expansion, though they are not identical for the two groups (revolutionary democrats, for instance, cannot really count on a firm position among the modern regular factory proletariat, nor can Communists count on appreciable influence among the upper circles of the middle strata, not to mention the well-off peasants), are to a marked degree, as already noted, similar or in any case contiguous.

The past history of inter-party relations, the reverberations of past differences and clashes, cumulative misunderstanding and distrust that are at times difficult to overcome in a short period of time—this, too, is not infrequently a complicating factor.

Once at the helm of state, revolutionary democrats are not inclined to share *real* power with anyone. Moreover, this tendency of the revolutionary democracy as a social force often dovetails with the interests of the ruling circles.

Moreover, revolutionary democrats, seeking to strengthen their dominant position and power, often advance pretensions

to a *political monopoly* and view with suspicion any seat of political organization, activity or influence that they do not control. This is the more true with respect to Communists, inasmuch as revolutionary democrats take account of the strength of Communists' doctrine and organization, the importance of these parties' international ties for their authority.

These fears are, moreover, artificially fanned by domestic and foreign reaction, which attributes "subversive" intentions to Communists and maintains that Communists are preparing to become the "political heirs" of revolutionary democrats, and, as the revolutionary process deepens, to push the latter aside as a force that has played its role.

We must also recognize that contacts and cooperation with Communists are one of the questions on which certain revolutionary democratic circles maneuver in their relations with the capitalist world and at times even in their relations with reactionary states in the national liberation zone. Distrust, estrangement and even hostility to Communists is not infrequently in line with these circles' own sentiments and at the same time facilitates obtaining imperialist loans, credits and technical assistance, and often insures a less negative attitude toward revolutionary democratic regimes on the part of the capitalist states and international monopolies, as well as on the part of certain forces in the Third World, a greater willingness on their part to make concessions to revolutionary democracy.

On the other hand, one of neo-colonialism's principal lines of subversive activity against progressive states is to fan distrust and differences among different progressive currents, to urge revolutionary democrats into a confrontation with Communists, to attempt to weaken the ties of progressive nation states with the Soviet Union and the socialist community. Imperialists, in effect acting in concert, and at times in contact, with the rightward-evolving conservative wing of revolutionary democracy, which is frankly hostile to Communists, aim at piling up every possible additional obstacle to revolutionary democrats and Communists closing ranks.

Some revolutionary democrats with a resolutely anti-imperialist stance nevertheless give way to these provocations

of reaction. Attempting to demonstrate their ideological "autonomy", they often come out "against both capitalism and communism", unaware that they are thereby yielding in practice to the enemies of the revolution.

As is evident, the factors complicating the development of cooperation and the rapprochement of revolutionary democrats and Communists differ in their total extent and in their acuity relative to the international communist movement and the Communist parties in the emerging states themselves.

While historically and from the perspective of long-term prospects the most serious complicating factors are differences—and their ideological expression—directly connected with the social nature of revolutionary democracy,¹ at the present stage the most serious obstacles to cooperation between revolutionary democracy and Communists are political differences. They concern above all the role of these parties in public and state life, the development of democracy and Communists' internationalist position.

Events have shown that, even given a certain ideological rapprochement, some revolutionary democratic circles in a number of countries follow a policy of limiting the influence of Communist parties. What is more, the adoption of Communists' slogans and of a number of the tenets of scientific socialism—this being an expression of the political evolution and radicalization of revolutionary democracy—is sometimes used at the same time by these circles in their attempts to weaken the position of Communist parties.²

¹ We have in mind "socially conditioned" contradictions in the narrow sense, for in the broad sense all the differences in principle between Communists and revolutionary democrats are connected in one way or another with revolutionary democracy's social nature.

² It is worth noting that political tendencies of this sort have drawn the attention of some bourgeois ideologues, and they openly recommend the use of such methods for combatting scientific socialism. For instance, Majid Khadduri, Professor at John Hopkins University and former head of the Center for Middle East Studies, proposes furthering "the rise of a new enlightened and progressive movement which might combine some ingredients of communism and nationalism and thus disarm the communist movement" (Majid Khadduri, *Political Trends in the Arab World. The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics*, Baltimore and London, 1970, p. 128).

Revolutionary democrats most often favor a one-party system—in other words, the existence of their party, their political organization alone. In effect, certain revolutionary democratic groups, while maintaining relations with Communists, simultaneously work for a situation in which, sooner or later, Communist parties will merge with or dissolve in national democratic parties and organizations.

Certain circles of revolutionary democracy would like to maintain contact and cooperate with Communists "on an individual basis". Certain forces in the Syrian Baath Party followed this line for a number of years. The practical expression of this policy were attempts by Baathist leaders to bring into the government, into some links of the state apparatus, Communists chosen by themselves, and not empowered by the Communist Party. The present Baath Party leadership, headed by Hafez Assad, has altered the situation. Proceeding from the interests of Syria's progressive development, of the anti-imperialist struggle, the leadership has begun to increase cooperation with Communists *as a party*.

Even when Communists are given the legal right to carry on political work, their activity is sometimes subject to various indirect constraints. It should be stressed, however, that putting pressure on Communist parties does not at all presume revolutionary democracy's renunciation of the policy of real cooperation with Communists. In essence, the two policies operate in parallel, or may even complement each other. Naturally, there are instances when cooperation has but a formal character, in practice serving as a cover for tactics of pressure and constraint.

Finally, certain circles of revolutionary democracy, especially the right wing, try to use the question of relations with the socialist world against Communists. Recognizing the services and the role in the contemporary world of "international communism" and announcing their desire to cooperate with it, they at the same time label Communists in their own countries "bad" and "dogmatists".

Despite all these difficulties, Communist parties, as their position shows, consider it legitimate in the national democratic revolution to orient themselves not toward a *tactical agreement* with revolutionary democracy, that would have force

for only a limited period of time and would cover only specific questions and actions, but toward a *strategic alliance*.¹

Hence the consistent policy of seeking practical cooperation with revolutionary democracy. Of prime importance in this is an objective evaluation—which Communists have made—of the social reforms carried out in states with a socialist orientation, of the substantial contribution that revolutionary democrats have made to the development of national and social liberation in the former colonies and dependencies.

In countries headed by revolutionary democrats, Communists support government measures aimed at strengthening national independence and social progress, seek to ensure that government programs are consistently implemented—the more so as these programs include many goals that Communist parties (as formulated in their documents) have always considered of first-rate importance in the former colonies and dependencies and for the realization of which they have struggled for decades. Communists call on all patriotic forces that are actively opposing the attempts of imperialist and domestic reaction to undermine progressive regimes to give the same support. The statement published by a conference of the Communist parties of Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon in January 1971 adopted as a principle “maintenance of progressive regimes, strengthening their economic and military capacity, extending the social reforms carried out by these regimes and developing cooperation and coordination among them in various areas.”²

¹ “We Communists, like other progressive forces”, said Khaled Bagdash in an interview with the paper *Népszabadság*, “hold that cooperation among the progressive forces is not a transitional or provisional tactic; this cooperation is a necessity stemming from objective conditions” (*Népszabadság*, May 31, 1966).

At the opening of the Fourth Party Congress (1974), he again stressed: “The Syrian Communist Party has proved by all its political practice that it considers alliance with revolutionary democrats a strategic, long-term stage and not a transient tactic.” (*World Marxist Review* No. 11, 1975, p. 11.) This principled position was also formulated by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party, A. Muhammed, on signing the joint statement of the Iraqi Communist Party and the Baath Party on cooperation in the Progressive National Patriotic Front (*Al-Thawrah*, July 18, 1973).

² *Al-Ahbar*, Beirut, February 21, 1971.

The Syrian Communist Party, in a statement of December 1970 on the situation in Syria and the participation of Syrian Communists in the government of Hafez Assad, noted: “In its address to the Tenth Extraordinary Pan-Arab Congress of the Baath Party, it (the Syrian Communist Party—*Auth.*) stated clearly that it will defend progressive advances and will struggle for their further development, that it is in agreement with the principles of the Movement of 23 February¹.... In a word, our Party let it be known that it is in accord with the left Baathists and will struggle against any attempts aimed against the country’s progressive regime.”

Communists do not, of course, renounce their right to criticize particular aspects of the ideological line or practical activity of revolutionary democrats in countries with a socialist orientation. Their position can be summarized as follows: support for progressive authority; the defense and strengthening of revolutionary advances; struggle for the preservation and extension of democratic rights and freedoms in the interests of laboring people, of progressive forces; opposition to non-progressive and anti-democratic undertakings.

Naturally, we are not talking about a negative approach “from the sidelines”, we are not talking about an emphatic withdrawal from political responsibility for the measures implemented by revolutionary democrats, but about an independent and constructive class position in an atmosphere of businesslike and friendly cooperation. A common struggle for the realization of measures already proclaimed by progressive regimes, for their consistent implementation—this line of action can without question increase mutual trust between revolutionary democrats and Communists.

In many Asian and African countries, Communist parties see their political task at the present stage as adhering to a line that will permit Communists, without juxtaposing themselves to revolutionary democrats but cooperating with them, to become a stronger force in the liberation struggle with a view to the interests and prospects for the development of that struggle.

¹ The Movement of 23 February, 1966 brought victory to the left wing of the Baath Party.

Since a number of demands in the minimum program of Communist parties in some countries, which have been taken over by revolutionary democrats, and implemented, to one extent or another, in the revolutionary democrats' name, redound to the political benefit of revolutionary democrats first and foremost, Communists attribute special importance to increasing their own political initiative and demonstrating this initiative to the masses. This is done above all by advancing platforms that cover urgent international and, to no less extent, domestic questions, platforms that set forth in a comprehensible manner the concrete ways to achieve the goals of the liberation struggle. Participation in the practical implementation of progressive undertakings in states with a socialist orientation is also an important way by which Communists can extend their position among the masses.

It should be emphasized that the question of expanding the influence of Communist parties is directly related to cooperation between Communists and revolutionary democrats. Though when Communist parties have strong positions, and especially when these positions are being strengthened, certain revolutionary democratic circles have an increased tendency to "put pressure" on Communists, at the same time the strength and importance of Communist party influence is one of the basic factors prompting revolutionary democrats to cooperate with Communists. Though there may seem to be a contradiction in putting the question this way, the contradiction is one from real life, from real political relations.

A policy of developing cooperation makes it politically inexpedient to focus attention on ideological issues that are of little urgency at the present stage of the revolutionary process but are quite capable of producing unneeded friction. We are not saying, of course, that Communists should conceal their differences with revolutionary democrats on a number of substantive philosophical questions.

For Communists, for example, the unjustified and utopian character of the efforts by some revolutionary democrats to adopt only a part of Marxism, cutting out many of the important or even central Marxist tenets, is obvious. Communist parties quite naturally also oppose underestimation of the

role of the working class in the historical destiny of the former colonies and dependencies.

The Statement of the meeting of Communist Parties of Arab countries held in April 1975 stressed that "the Communist and Workers' Parties of Arab countries, taking account of the situation within the Arab national liberation movement, consider that the correct way to strengthen progressive patriotic trends within this movement, directed against imperialism and reaction, to isolate the right-wing trends and tendencies and all their inherent dangers, is the struggle to strengthen the role of the working class, its political parties and progressive organizations, to consolidate its union with the peasant masses, the revolutionary intelligentsia, the working people and other national democratic forces toward a solution of the tasks arising at the present stage".

Communists are well aware of the role that Marxist-Leninist ideology must play in the destiny of the multi-million masses of the East, they are aware of their historical responsibility for spreading this ideology in the emerging countries. They are distinctly aware of the full importance that enriching the progressive forces of these countries with the ideas and experience of scientific socialism has for social progress in the former colonies and dependencies.

Preventing an unnecessary exacerbation of ideological differences that are not of a pressing nature does not mean that the ideological dialogue between Communists and revolutionary democrats is laid aside. As the ideological seminars and symposia in Cairo (October 1966), Algiers (May 1967), Baku (September 1967), Alma Ata (October 1969), Prague (June 1972), Baghdad (June 1974) and others—in which Communists and revolutionary democrats both participated—show, friendly comparison of views and constructive discussion are possible and necessary.

In a word, what we are saying is that ideological agreement is not viewed as a *preliminary* condition for cooperation in the liberation struggle. This way of putting the question does not lead to an underestimation of the great significance that elements of ideological proximity and mutual understanding, especially on a number of questions related to the present phase of the liberation movement, have had and continue to

have for the development of cooperation between revolutionary democrats and Communists.

Communist parties proceed from the consideration that the existing ideological differences should not be an insurmountable obstacle to cooperating and closing ranks with revolutionary democracy in the struggle against imperialism, the struggle for the socialist future of the former colonies and dependencies. They quite properly believe that what is now most important is the joint participation of Communists and revolutionary democrats in this liberation struggle which shapes the destinies of their countries. Joint participation in the revolutionary, national liberation movement is the best means not only to increase mutual trust and political cooperation between revolutionary democrats and Communists, it is also a means to their ideological rapprochement.

Revolutionary practice is a reliable propagandist of scientific socialism. It is in the course of the national anti-imperialist and class struggle, in combat cooperation and alliance of revolutionary democracy with all progressive forces, with all advocates of socialism within both national and international framework, that the conditions for revolutionary democracy's evolution toward scientific socialism can be given solid footing. As development proceeds on a non-capitalist basis, as the working class becomes larger, better organized and more class conscious, as the role of the masses in political life increases, a stronger basis is created for scientific socialism.

It may be asked whether this way of framing the question is not equivalent to trusting in an "automatic" social process, in spontaneous development. The answer is no, inasmuch as this treatment presumes the influence of the ideology and policies of scientific socialism and rests on the indisputable premise that revolutionary struggle—the best political teacher—leads to the inevitable political maturation and radicalization of *those* circles of revolutionary democracy that are *capable* of evolving to the left.

Successful cooperation with revolutionary democracy is unthinkable without the great flexibility, patience—even tolerance—that is suggested by the Marxist science of forming political alliances with currents different in a social sense, that is suggested by a consideration of the objective conditionality

of the properties of revolutionary democracy, that is suggested, finally, by a clear understanding of the fact that rapprochement with revolutionary democracy, and the latter's political evolution, can proceed only together with changes in the social conditions in the previously enslaved countries.

Working to develop and expand cooperation with revolutionary democracy, Communists cannot but take account of revolutionary democracy's "variegation" as well as the differentiation that occurs within it. They follow a correspondingly differentiated policy, taking into account the position and correlation of the forces of the various political groups within revolutionary democratic parties and organizations.

There is another major element of the Marxist-Leninist policy of cooperation with revolutionary democracy which is constantly emphasized by Communist parties: the absolute necessity of firmly defending communist principles, of not allowing them to be eroded, of carefully guarding the political independence and purity of the philosophy of the Communist parties.

As the experience shows, the *forms* of consolidation and cooperation between Communists and revolutionary democrats may vary. There is no one method here. And this is understandable—the ways in which the revolution develops are many and the conditions in different countries—their socio-economic structure, history, traditions, etc.—vary.

If because of the peculiarities of the historical development of a particular emerging country a single mass, national party, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist in its goals and expressing the aspirations of laboring people, i. e., of the majority of the people, has been able to rally the progressive champions of independence and social progress, to concentrate in itself all shades of progressive political thought, then the existence of a multi-party system would most likely not further the development of the revolution. Of course, as progressive development and the extension of the social process proceed, the situation is capable of changing and forces standing for some shades of progressive political thought may attempt to form a party. But it becomes vital to decide on the matter in the light of the principal strategic goal—the creation of the preconditions for socialism.

However, where progressive social tendencies are not expressed by any one party and there is a gamut of democratic, revolutionary forces consisting of a number of parties and organizations, any attempt, as the Communist parties stress, to ignore the existence of ideological and political differences, to replace political cooperation with compulsory organized amalgamations, can cause nothing but harm. It can only alienate certain political and social forces from the regime and correspondingly weaken the regime's position. With respect to Communist parties, such attempts equivalent to infringing on the political representation of the working class and other laboring strata, are equivalent to a struggle against the bearers of the ideas of scientific socialism.

Just how important these factors are is shown by the position taken by the Syrian Communists, a position that is a concrete example of the approach to the issue of unity. "By virtue of Syria's historical background," observed Maurice Salibi, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party, "the progressive forces are divided into several parties and groups. Wishful thinking will not change this. It is necessary to examine the relationship of forces, and we must learn how to extend the base of power in order to win the active support of the people for our gains. The progressives should make the most of their democratic rights and build a common front in which each forward-looking group could play its part and bear its share of responsibility for safeguarding the nation's development."¹ The Sudanese Communists took the same position in principle when the question arose as to their entry, conditional upon renunciation of their party autonomy, into a united political organization set up by the government.

Thus, calling for unity with revolutionary democrats, Communists hold that the concrete forms of this unity must correspond to the interests of the progressive development of the countries concerned, must strengthen the position of champions of socialism, must reinforce the democratic bases of public life. It is to be understood that attempts to use the slogan of unity to encroach upon the organizational and political

¹ *World Marxist Review* No. 6, 1967, p. 44.

autonomy of Communist parties run counter to these goals. The call to close ranks is not on the part of Communists a devious maneuver masking an intent to "move aside" or "swallow" their allies; it is an expression of their sincere aspiration for cooperation, and they rightly expect and demand the same goodwill in response.

Should we try to formulate in brief the position adhered to by Communists vis-à-vis revolutionary democracy, the best statement would be: *alliance and struggle*. We would only qualify this by stressing that this is *not* a struggle *against* revolutionary democrats, but in a certain sense *for them*, for their affirmation of progressive positions, for their positive evolution.

Understandably, the goodwill of one party alone is not enough to establish cooperation. Gratifying shifts in the relations between Communists and revolutionary democrats in a number of countries, their active international cooperation would of course have been impossible without a turn toward such cooperation by leading revolutionary democratic groups in these countries. Yet we cannot disregard the fact that that cooperation with Communists remains an issue around which a serious political struggle continues in revolutionary democratic circles. Moreover, this question holds a very important place in the current process of differentiation within revolutionary democracy.

The line of delimitation here passes both between the official positions of particular national democratic parties and between various factions within these parties. There are sufficient grounds for asserting that in virtually every national democratic party there are, alongside forces that sincerely favor cooperation with Communists and are ready for close rapprochement with them, influential circles that have not overcome anti-communist prejudices and continue to misunderstand the historical role of Communist parties in the former colonies and dependencies in the liberation struggle. And what is especially important—there are not infrequently groups that are actively hostile to Communists. It is they that applauded the events in the Sudan and participated in attacks on the Third Congress of the Lebanese Communist Party, they are the groups that salute every outbreak of anti-communist,

and sometimes even anti-Soviet, propaganda in the countries concerned.

Anti-communist prejudices, no matter what nourishes them and no matter what slogans they hide behind, only weaken the forces of revolution. This has been amply confirmed by the more than half a century of struggle for social progress, for a better future for the peoples of all continents, that has passed since the October Revolution. Anti-communist prejudices not only split progressive forces at a time when the enormous tasks of non-capitalist development require the unification of all advocates of social progress, not only provoke senseless struggle against parties that have deep roots in the social life of their countries, but also make revolutionary democratic circles vulnerable to imperialist influence and weaken them in the face of reaction. At the same time, every real step toward the establishment of active and close cooperation among all patriotic, progressive forces strengthens revolutionary democratic regimes and reinforces their non-capitalist orientation.

It is possible that connections between revolutionary democracy and Communists along party lines and by developing state contacts with socialist countries as well as through contacts with the international communist movement will as before play an especially important role in influencing revolutionary democracy's political and ideological evolution. In this connection it is particularly important to emphasize that the Communist parties of socialist and capitalist countries in their relations and contacts with revolutionary democracy, undeviatingly follow the principles of proletarian internationalism. This was decisively demonstrated once again by the protest of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community against the persecution of Sudanese Communists. A reflection of this line was the sharp condemnation—clearly connected with the Sudanese events—of anti-communism in the communique¹ on negotiations between Soviet leaders and Anwar Sadat in October 1971, as well as in the joint communique of the delegations of the CPSU and the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt in July of the same year.

An integral part of the policy followed by Communist parties

¹ See, *Pravda*, October 14, 1971.

in socialist and capitalist countries in closing ranks with revolutionary democracy is the encouragement of cooperation between revolutionary democrats and Communists at the national level, the decisive rebuff to anti-communist tendencies.

The path to closing ranks with revolutionary democracy is as a rule neither easy nor short. But this scarcely reduces the importance of close cooperation with revolutionary democracy for the purpose of achieving important goals—the mobilization of all progressive, patriotic forces for the struggle against imperialism and for non-capitalist development. The *direction* in which revolutionary democracy evolves depends in much, though not entirely, on the development of cooperation, on preventing a confrontation between revolutionary democracy and Communists.

That the issue may legitimately be put this way is confirmed by the generally recognized fact that the creative initiative of the CPSU, supported by Communist and Workers' parties, in the proper evaluation of the social role of revolutionary democracy, the CPSU's initiative in developing fighting cooperation with revolutionary democracy—including through inter-party contacts—in developing contacts between socialist countries and progressive nation states, and the political and ideological influence of the international communist movement, have played a major role in the progressive evolution of the position taken by an influential group of revolutionary democrats, in their rapprochement with the socialist world in the 1960s and 1970s.

Communists have always been noted for their political realism and flexibility, their scientific evaluation of the objective bases of the position of the proletariat's allies, their ability to see things from the perspective of history. The front along which the struggle for socialism is being waged has in our day been lengthened to an unheard-of extent. Not only is the socialist system growing stronger and the scale and geographical dimensions of the socialist system's influence on the course of world events widening, not only are the ranks of the international communist movement swelling and ever more laboring strata enlisting under the banner of scientific socialism. New social forces, including important elements of

the revolutionary movement of the peasant masses, of the petty-bourgeois and intermediate strata in the former colonies and dependencies, strata that are being drawn into the opposition to colonial and semi-colonial dependence, that are being roused from feudal and pre-feudal somnolence to a struggle for national and social liberation—these social forces are acquiring a socialist orientation.

It would be wrong to hold that these forces should arrive at the overall goal of the world revolutionary process (and the movement toward socialism on a worldwide scale is impossible without their participation) in the same way that the peoples of capitalist countries have done so, countries in which a higher phase of social development has been attained and in which there is no need to solve the problems of national and colonial oppression. It is more natural to expect in this connection that new forms and new stages in the general movement toward socialism will occur in the former colonies and dependencies.

Political grumbling and impatience are alien to Communists. They remember well Lenin's words: "To imagine that social revolution is *conceivable* without revolts by small nations in the colonies and in Europe, without revolutionary outbursts by a section of the petty bourgeoisie *with all its prejudices*, without a movement of the politically non-conscious proletarian and semi-proletarian masses against oppression by the landowners, the church, and the monarchy, against national oppression, etc.—to imagine all this is to *repudiate social revolution*."¹

Seeing clearly the political and ideological weaknesses, the vacillation of revolutionary democracy, taking into account the possibility of political zig-zags within revolutionary democracy, Communists at the same time cannot but hold that revolutionary democracy is an important force capable of participating jointly with Communists in the liberation struggle in the previously enslaved countries.

Nor do Communists forget that the issue of revolutionary democracy is part of the question of the allies of the international communist and workers' movements, of intermediate strata on an international scale. This is one of the important sectors of the international proletariat's struggle to

exercise political and ideological influence over the peasant, semi-proletarian and petty-bourgeois masses of the former colonies and dependencies.

Lenin taught us to see and take account in practical politics of the specific nature of the historical and socio-economic conditions of countries struggling against colonial and semi-colonial oppression, to see the inevitable originality of the forms of social progress and the peculiarities of the forces of revolutionary democracy in these countries. He taught us to seek and find ways to establish a rapprochement and alliance with these forces in the common struggle not only against imperialism but also against capitalism. It is this course that the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties are pursuing.

Recognizing their own responsibility for the development of the world revolutionary process, Communist parties in the socialist, capitalist and developing states take the initiative and carry out a consistent policy of establishing and strengthening the alliance with revolutionary democracy. As we know, the 24th Congress charged the Central Committee of the CPSU with expanding and strengthening its ties with the revolutionary democratic parties of developing countries.¹

Combat solidarity and close cooperation—this is the only way of developing relations between Communists and revolutionary democrats that corresponds to the interests of the peoples and the interests of the struggle for national liberation.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 355.

¹ See, *24th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1971, p. 216.

REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATS' POLITICAL EVOLUTION. THEIR HISTORICAL ROLE

The existence and even widening of political shadings and differences within revolutionary democracy should be connected with—in addition to the objective and subjective factors already examined—the continuing political evolution of revolutionary democracy. It is this side of the matter that is of special significance under present conditions.

This evolution is a peculiarity of peasant and petty-bourgeois democracy, a peculiarity manifesting the *transitional* character of revolutionary democracy itself as a political force, and of at least a part of its social basis. This peculiarity has always been a property of revolutionary democracy. The amplitude of revolutionary democracy's political dynamic can be illustrated in the example of individual human destinies: on the one hand, the names of men who have become renowned Communists, on the other hand, the names of those who have degenerated and taken part in bourgeois reaction. The political evolution of revolutionary democracy presently occurs as a rule in a situation where the socio-economic bases for reactionary transformation and divergence from the forces of proletarian socialism are not as substantial as they were previously.

The almost universal evolution of the forces of revolutionary democracy is the result of a dual process: the dynamic of the political views, positions and ideology of given revolutionary democratic groups and a simultaneous increase of the influence—chiefly as a result of the first factor, but also because of some other factors—in national democratic parties of factions with a definite (left or right) political coloration and a corresponding weakening of the position of circles with an opposing orientation. Naturally, shifts in the social milieu with

which revolutionary democracy is connected are the underlying cause of both aspects of this process.

Bearing in mind that revolutionary democrats turn to socialist slogans under the impact of lessons drawn from revolutionary practice,¹ without having mastered the theory of scientific socialism, one can say that the capacity for progressive evolution is one of the most important features of revolutionary democracy, a feature that determines its historical prospects.

The 1960s provide examples of political evolution toward the left, toward Marxism-Leninism, among forces and organizations that were at first basically revolutionary democratic. We refer above all to the path trod by Cuban revolutionaries, Fidel Castro's comrades-in-arms from the Movement of 26 July, the Revolutionary Directorate of 13 March, and other organizations. We refer also to the passage to a Marxist-Leninist position of the revolutionary democrats of Nigeria. The same is true of the People's Progressive Party of Guyana, which, like the Nigerian Marxists-Leninists, took part in the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in 1969.

Events in countries with a socialist orientation show that there are major reserves for revolutionary democracy's political evolution. One might even say that the tendency for such evolution is built into revolutionary democracy.

One of the most indicative examples of progressive evolution to date in countries with a socialist orientation is provided by Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s—to which Soviet scholars have already turned their attention.² There has also been a major

¹ It is worth noting that Lenin granted the possibility of arriving at profound socialist convictions "not through Marxism, not starting with the idea of the class struggle of the proletariat". (See, V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 497.)

² We should keep in mind that in this and some other similar cases description of the shifts that have occurred inevitably cover, too, that period of radicalization marked by the transition from a "pure" nationalist to an "initial" revolutionary democratic position. However, for the aspect of interest to us this is not important in principle, the more so as it is not always possible in practice to precisely delimit this period, to pinpoint the *moment* of the transition to revolutionary democratic position.

shift to the left among influential revolutionary democratic groups in Syria, Iraq, Tanzania, Burma and elsewhere.

The evolution of those revolutionary democrats moving toward the left has proceeded, as it were, along two lines: through the reinforcement and radicalization of the *democratic* program already adopted, the program with which they entered battle, and through the acquisition of a new, *socialist* orientation.

At the same time, events have shown that we cannot assume that revolutionary democrats can evolve politically only in a progressive direction. This is far from being the case when we consider the heterogeneity of the forces of revolutionary democracy, as well as revolutionary democracy's disposition toward vacillation, a disposition that may lead to major backward steps even among those who are going the way of radicalization.

The political life of *every* country with a socialist orientation provides examples, too, of negative evolution among some revolutionary democratic groups. Depending on the influence that these groups have, and also on some other factors, this negative evolution is reflected to varying degrees in domestic and foreign policy, producing political zig-zags and even leading to an overall turn toward reaction, as has occurred in some instances.

The history of revolutionary democratic parties and organizations to date permits the conclusion that the evolution of their political and ideological positions depends on the following factors or groups of factors.

First. This evolution depends on the course of the international struggle between socialism and imperialism, on the strengthening and advance of world socialism. In this, not only the overall correlation of forces between imperialism and socialism, but also the balance in a given area of the world is of importance, not only the general tendency of world development but also the concrete stages and turns of the struggle, as well as the course of the struggle in a particular region.

The enormous importance of this factor should not, in our view, be seen only or so much in an elementary political balance. This factor should be viewed first and foremost within

the framework of the regularity, most important in this case, pointed out by Lenin—petty-bourgeois, non-proletarian masses and their political leadership turn toward socialism, come over to the side of the working class, on an international scale inevitably in connection with the fact that the working class is emerging victorious on *this* scale and inevitably *to the extent* that this superiority is revealed and in proportion to the emerging victory of the working class.

Second. This evolution is a function of the totality of the domestic conditions of a given country, of the level of its socio-economic development, of the correlation of class forces, of the strength of the native bourgeoisie and proletariat. With this group of factors in mind, it is worth taking a closer look at two of them.

We should first mention "simple" economic necessity, the search for a way to solve the most urgent and acute economic problems. This search is conditioned not only by the ideological, usually nationalist (anti-imperialist), credo of the forces taking over the helm of state; it also becomes a burning political necessity in order to strengthen or even simply to retain the power won. Revolutionary democrats not infrequently face the dilemma of moving ahead "at full steam" or perishing.

What we are dealing with here, it would seem, is a phenomenon similar to that noted by Engels in his analysis of the Paris Commune. Speaking of the wonderful correctness "of much that nevertheless was done by the Commune, composed as it was of Blanquists and Proudhonists",¹ he emphasized in another passage: "It does the Commune the greatest honour that in all its economic measures the 'driving spirit' was not any set of 'principles', but simple, practical needs. And therefore these measures—were not at all in accordance with the spirit of Proudhonism, but certainly in accordance with the spirit of German scientific socialism."²

Another factor is the sinister role that new bourgeois and pro-bourgeois social forces—primarily the administrative

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1973, p. 186.

² *Ibid.*, p. 354.

bourgeoisie in the city and the growing kulak and capitalist elements in the village—can play in revolutionary democracy's evolution. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie is especially dangerous because in countries with a socialist orientation it is to a great extent composed of degenerating elements of revolutionary democracy and can in effect serve as a "transmission belt" between revolutionary democracy and neo-colonialists and groups oriented toward capitalism. The growth of kulak elements frequently brings in its train a strengthened position for those factions of revolutionary democracy that already represent the well-to-do elements of the village.

Third. The evolution of revolutionary democracy should be seen in connection with the policy of imperialism. Clashes with the imperialist powers and the loss of illusions with respect to the policy of the "Western democracies" is one of the most effective of the factors making for a leftward swing of revolutionary democracy. This is confirmed by the political development of almost all revolutionary democratic groups. Cheddi Jagan observed at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969: "Not only theory, but practice has taught us that this is where we belong. Repeated attacks against us by the conservative Churchill, Macmillan and Home governments and by the liberal Kennedy Administration, and betrayal by the social-democratic Attlee and Wilson governments have established that only the international communist movement in alliance with the democratic and progressive forces in the capitalist states, and the liberation movements in the colonial and neo-colonial countries and not conservative, liberal or social-democratic leadership can liberate the working people of Guyana and elsewhere from imperialist exploitation and oppression."¹

Much therefore depends on the tactics imperialism employs. Crude pressure on progressive nation states, open hostility to progressive regimes and total opposition to their goals can frighten certain revolutionary democratic circles and throw them to the right. But revolutionary democracy's principal

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969.* p. 610.

forces not infrequently react to this by undertaking a more determined struggle against imperialism and for social progress. On the other hand, a policy of seeming friendliness to and flirting with revolutionary democracy has at times brought imperialism greater results.

In this regard, it is appropriate to emphasize that the question of the political evolution of revolutionary democracy under present conditions goes far beyond the national framework not only because of its importance but also because of the factors involved in this process and because of the forces contributing to it. It has already become an issue in the international political and ideological struggle between imperialism and socialism.

Fourth. Shifts in the ideological and political positions of revolutionary democracy depend in large measure on the policy followed by socialist states. An important role is played not only by the proper strategic orientation of policy but also to a major degree by the extent to which the practical implementation of this policy takes into account the specific features of the situation in the emerging states, the political, ideological and psychological properties of the forces of revolutionary democracy and their leaders. A creative approach to cooperation with the forces of revolutionary democracy, a coupling of adherence to principles with flexibility, is to a great extent responsible for the fruitfulness and effectiveness of the policy conducted by the Soviet Union and the socialist community in their relations with states that have a socialist orientation.

Fifth. The political development of revolutionary democracy also depends on the particular factors that have shaped it, the progressive and reactionary influences—both at the national and at the international level—that it has experienced, the nature of its ties and the history of its relations with other political parties and organizations in the country concerned.

Ingrained anti-communist prejudices and traditions, as well as militant, active adherence to religion, have an important negative influence on revolutionary democracy's political evolution.

And of course, we must not forget that much depends on the policy and tactics of local Communists.

Sixth. Of great significance to the evolution of revolutionary democracy is the personality of the leader of the revolution, of the revolution's most influential figures. The fact is that the role of the leader, the impact made by his personality, important in the public life and in the activity of parties and organizations in developed countries, is especially great in developing countries.

Events have already shown that the outlook and even the personal features of the leader or leaders of the revolutionary movement, his or their political ties, can be of great significance for the evolution of revolutionary democracy's ideological platform and practical activity. It is impossible, for example, to deny the colossal personal role that Fidel Castro has played in the ascending line followed by the Cuban revolution as a whole and its non-communist participants in particular. With respect to the experience of countries with a socialist orientation, the great impression made by Nasser's personality on the course of events in Egypt is undeniable. The message of the Central Committee of the CPSU, of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and of the Soviet Government to the Egyptian leadership on the death of Nasser noted: "Connected with the name of Gamal Abdel Nasser is the pursuance in the United Arab Republic of fundamental socio-economic transformations in the interests of the working masses of the Egyptian people. His name is inseparable from the courageous struggle of the people of Egypt against the triple imperialist aggression in 1956 and the struggle of the Arab countries to eliminate the vestiges of the 1967 Israeli aggression. The United Arab Republic has occupied a vanguard position in the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples and considerable credit for this was due to the late Gamal Abdel Nasser."¹ To one degree or another, the above-mentioned is also true with respect to the leaders of a number of other revolutionary democratic parties and regimes.

Seventh. An active factor in the ideological and political evolution of the forces of revolutionary democracy is the spread of socialist ideas, of Marxist literature, Marxist litera-

¹ *Pravda*, September 30, 1970.

ture's creative treatment of the urgent problems of socio-economic transformations in developing countries, particularly in countries with a non-capitalist orientation, the familiarity of revolutionary democratic forces with the experience and achievements of socialist countries in building socialism and communism.

We should also like to touch on the so-called "generational change". This should probably not be treated as a special "factor", but it has made a certain impact in recent years. In countries emerging from colonial and semi-colonial oppression, there has now begun a process of supplementing the old guard leaders with younger cadres who did not grow up in the atmosphere of colonial domination and are free of the political and psychological complexes associated therewith, who are often more familiar with socialist ideas, with Marxist literature, and have not infrequently been educated in socialist countries. Just as in other states, this process is not identical in all countries with a socialist orientation. Its effect varies, but in at least some cases it has contributed to a radicalization of revolutionary democracy.

The question of revolutionary democracy's historical role is inseparably bound up with the potential and prospects for its political evolution.

As a social phenomenon, as a progressive force in the national liberation movement in the colonies and dependencies, revolutionary democracy is not something entirely new and previously unknown. Quite the contrary, it already has a history. At the beginning of the century, Lenin wrote of revolutionary democrats in countries enslaved by imperialism. Lenin's conclusions and approach are of principled significance and provide a methodological reference point for our evaluation of the activity and ideology of contemporary revolutionary democrats in the former colonies and dependencies.

The revolutionary democrats of today are in many ways similar, roughly speaking, to their predecessors who caught Lenin's attention. They reflect the interests of social strata that are basically the same, strive to improve the lot of the masses, and advance a democratic program of struggling against imperialism. They have anti-capitalist sentiments, and their

socialist constructs contain many propositions characteristic of revolutionary democrats 50 or 60 years ago.

At the same time, there are also very substantial differences between revolutionary democracy today and its predecessors. These differences stem chiefly from the character of our era, from the action of present-day social conditions. The capitalist formation has today a completely different position in the world and in the historical process. A new correlation of class forces has taken shape in the international arena.

The specific features of our era, an era of transition from capitalism to socialism on an international scale, have given contemporary revolutionary democracy the principal quality distinguishing it from its predecessors—its new historical meaning and the new import of its program and activity.

The revolutionary democracy that Lenin wrote about operated in an era when capitalism held undivided sway. While Europe and America, from which Sun Yat-sen and his confederates borrowed their ideas of liberation, had, as Lenin stressed, advanced to the stage of emancipation from the bourgeoisie, the objective conditions of China and of other enslaved countries as well placed on the order of the day the question of liberation from only one specific, historically distinctive form of this oppression and exploitation, namely feudalism¹ (or even from pre-feudal relations in some countries).

Economic necessity at that time consisted of destroying feudalism and pre-feudal forms in all their aspects and manifestations, after which rapid capitalist progress would inevitably follow. Neither the overall situation in the world² nor the correlation of social forces in China permitted another turn of events. Now, however, the situation has changed. Of course, even today economic necessity consists of purging

¹ See, V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 166.

² As some other Lenin's remarks show, he, like Marx and Engels, did not at that time, i.e., when no socialist state yet existed, consider non-capitalist development possible (see his letter to A. M. Gorky, January 3, 1911, and his letter to Inessa Armand, November 25, 1916—*Collected Works*, Vol. 34, p. 438; Vol. 35, p. 249).

emerging countries of socially retrogressive features—but not necessarily in the interests of capitalism. Both the correlation of social forces in these countries and, especially, the international situation permit a different course of events.

On the strength of this, the socialist aspirations of present-day revolutionary democracy are not a carrying over of socialist slogans to the soil of a pre-bourgeois society fated to pass through the trials of capitalism, but to a social actuality that can be directed toward non-capitalist development.

Moreover, inasmuch as today's democratic reforms, the liquidation of feudal and pre-feudal forms of exploitation, the elimination of colonial dependence, are not equivalent to clearing the ground for capitalist development, since the progressive, socially reforming activity of revolutionary democracy does not objectively mean planting the seeds of capitalism, this changes in a major way revolutionary democracy's relationship to the working class, strengthening and broadening the community of goals of proletarian and peasant, petty-bourgeois revolutionaries.

The dialectic of social relations today is such that contemporary revolutionary democracy *can* implement a program, revolutionary *in a new way*, leading not to capitalism but toward socialist development.

Such is, in the present situation, the possible historical framework—qualitatively different and of a much greater range than previously—for the progressive activity of revolutionary democracy. Of course, the fact that revolutionary democracy has a new historical potential does not by itself predetermine either the scale or the consistency of its activity, does not determine *to what extent* revolutionary democrats will wish or be able to realize the opportunity.

We know that in carrying out the democratic program of the present stage of the national liberation struggle revolutionary democrats in power have oriented their countries toward socialism. Revolutionary democracy has already made a major contribution toward discrediting capitalism among the public in the Third World countries. At the international level, revolutionary democracy is part of the worldwide anti-imperialist front, an important link in the alliance of the forces of national liberation with world socialism, with the interna-

tional workers' movement. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, remarked in the report of the Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Party: "In the struggle against imperialism, an ever greater role is being played by revolutionary democratic parties, many of which have proclaimed socialism as their program goals."¹

Even in countries where revolutionary democratic regimes have been victims of coups, their activity has borne fruit. Events have already shown that some of the results of progressive measures by revolutionary democrats in these countries have, despite all the efforts of reaction, an irreversible character. Moreover, the "heritage" left by revolutionary democrats appears to make for the development of a less reactionary capitalism.

In a way, revolutionary democrats represent a crystallization of the properties and contradictions of the modern national liberation revolutions, they express the strong and weak points of these revolutions. And, speaking of the social import of revolutionary democrats' activity, it is of course impossible to ignore the grave contradictions and inconsistencies that are inherent in their activity and unquestionably introduce important contradictions into their overall historical role, too. It would appear, however, that this contradictoriness and inconsistency do not nullify the progressive sides of revolutionary democracy's activity.

Recognition of the basically progressive role of revolutionary democracy presumes an understanding of the fact that a complete and comprehensive—and even more a final—answer to the question of how great revolutionary democracy's potential is can be given only by subsequent social development. This is not just because some evaluations will inevitably be made more precise by the course of events, but above all because of the properties of revolutionary democracy, its transitional character, its capacity—not everywhere identical—for political evolution. This is the more true since present-day revolutionary democrats can play in a new way not only a progressive role, but also, given degeneration, a new

reactionary role because of their occasional anti-communist tendencies—which, naturally, their historical predecessors lacked—and because the possibility that these tendencies will increase is not excluded.

We must also recognize that it is these specific features of revolutionary democracy and its practical activity that constantly put the question of the degree to which the socialist orientation—a major progressive achievement of the liberation struggle—is ensured in countries headed by revolutionary democrats. After all, alongside conspiracies and the subversive activity of domestic reaction and neo-colonialism, the gravest danger for this orientation is in the weak sides of revolutionary democracy itself, in its inconsistency, especially in those circles that are slipping toward reactionary degeneration.

To date, in none of the countries led by revolutionary democrats has development passed beyond the framework of the democratic stage or even approached the completion of this stage. Only the future will show definitely whether revolutionary democracy—transforming itself from within, developing politically and ideologically—will be able to meet the goals of this stage, to contribute to the creation of a number of important prerequisites for the passage of the social process to a higher stage. And it is in this that revolutionary democracy faces its greatest historical test.

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 28.

CONCLUSION

We are more than a quarter-century removed from the first steps of a momentous historical process—the disintegration of the colonial system and the creation on its ruins of the emerging nation states of Asia and Africa. The peoples of these states have accumulated no little experience of social development and of the liberation struggle under conditions of independence. Class contradictions are making themselves increasingly felt in the formerly enslaved countries. Given this, the perspicacity of Lenin's thoughts on the revolutionary process in the oppressed East is especially evident.

It has been fully confirmed that the course of events here, too, is determined by regularities in the development of the revolutionary movement that hold true for all of history and throughout the world; that the struggle of the peoples of the former colonies and dependent countries is increasingly inspired by the ideals of socialism and national and social liberty—by ideals that the international working class and progressive humanity have elaborated; that this struggle is merging with the struggle of laboring people throughout the world against imperialism.

Life shows just as persuasively that, compared to areas where the capitalist formation has developed, the revolutionary process is of a rather exceptional character in those countries, which are much less developed in a socio-economic respect and much more populous, countries which have gone through the epoch of colonial and semi-colonial subordination and are distinguished by an enormous diversity of conditions.

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The distinguishing features of the liberation process in the countries of the oppressed East found clear expression in the national, anti-imperialist revolutions that unfolded in the postwar period: in the nature of the contradictions that engendered them, in their goals and moving forces, in the role of the socio-class factor in these revolutions and, especially, in the anti-capitalist tendencies that emerged as they developed. These features are evident, too, in the unique forms in which these tendencies were realized—forms that varied from one country and one region to another, in the forms of the movement toward socialism and of the establishment of a new society in the process of the transition from colonial and pre-capitalist structures.

The history of the countries with a socialist orientation emerging from the colonial yoke permits us to speak of at least two basic varieties (chiefly from the perspective of objective socio-economic conditions) of the process of realizing anti-capitalist tendencies in these countries. The difference lies in the level of their social development.

In some cases, this process occurs in a situation characterized by profound backwardness, where the necessary material prerequisites—and in this connection the corresponding social factors, too—for socialist development (which usually take shape spontaneously within capitalism) are lacking. A progressive political superstructure, no matter who heads it, faces here a lengthy and extremely complex task of creating, by special methods and by-passing capitalism, these prerequisites before the question of a transition to the socialist phase can be raised. Of course, another factor determining the success of this process in these countries is the problem of a parallel class shift in the superstructure.

In other cases the process occurs in conditions where capitalism has to one extent or another already done the "preliminary work" and where certain of the prerequisites for carrying out reforms of a socialist character have already taken shape: the ranks of the working class are considerable, there is a necessary minimum of productive forces, social contradictions are noticeable and there are bases for an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry. The appropriate political superstructure is still lacking, so the transition to socialist

development here depends primarily on a change in the character of the superstructure and of the correlation of class forces in it. In other words, the matter turns primarily on the "readiness" of the superstructure. This does not, of course, mean that major socio-economic reforms that quite naturally serve as one of the bases for shifts in the area of power are not carried out simultaneously.

Anti-capitalist tendencies are a new and extremely important aspect in the development of the modern national, anti-imperialist revolutions, of the national liberation movement as a whole. There are substantial prerequisites for these tendencies in the socio-economic, political and ideological bases, in the moving forces of these revolutions, and the more so in the international situation in which these revolutions develop.

The following are some of the internal prerequisites and manifestations of anti-capitalist tendencies in the development of the modern national liberation movement: the internationalization of the objective and subjective bases of the national liberation revolutions and of the contradictions engendering them, the connection between these contradictions and the worldwide contradiction between imperialism and the forces of democracy and socialism; these revolutions' bias against the existing economic and political relations of world capitalism and their clash with neo-colonialism; the socially transforming, anti-capitalist potential of the general democratic program of the new stage of the national liberation revolutions and the advancement of a socialist orientation as the way to bring the process of the national liberation and the independent development of the previously enslaved countries to its conclusion; the aggravation of social conflicts in the emerging countries; the special difficulties and contradictions that the development of native capitalism runs up against in these countries and that are redoubled by the degree to which its historical potential is circumscribed and by its internal defects and weakness; the weakness of the bourgeoisie and pro-bourgeois forces in the majority of enslaved countries, the influential role of the anti-capitalist sentiments of the petty-bourgeois, peasant, intermediate strata; the existence of a socialist, internationalist current in the person of Third World

Communist parties; the dominant ideological atmosphere in these countries, the wide popularity of socialist slogans.

The international prerequisites for these tendencies stem from the new historical conditions in which the national liberation revolution develops, the qualitatively different social map of the world and of international relations, the global role of socialism as a worldwide political, economic, military and ideological force. They stem likewise from the development of national liberation revolutions as a constituent part of the world revolutionary process, from the intimate interaction and alliance of the forces of national liberation with the socialist system, with the international proletariat, from the class influence exerted on these forces by world socialism and the international communist movement.

We may say that the anti-capitalist tendencies in modern national liberation revolutions have dual social consequences. They lead to these revolutions' increasingly anti-imperialist character and bring important elements of socio-class antagonism into the conflict between imperialism and revolutionary nationalistic forces in the newly independent countries, forces that represent petty-bourgeois and peasant strata first and foremost. And this effect is far from being cancelled by the increased tendency of certain circles of the native bourgeoisie to come to an agreement with imperialism.

At the same time, these tendencies manifest themselves in their "pure form": they work for socialism, contributing to one extent or another to the turn of the public—in the final analysis, the entire development—of the former colonial and dependent countries toward a socialist orientation. This is reflected most clearly in the emergence of a group of new states that have chosen a non-capitalist way of development.

Of key significance is the question of *how effective* anti-capitalist tendencies are *in this respect, to what extent* they are realized in practice in the position of specific social groups, in the correlation of class forces and in the course of the class struggle in emerging countries, in the crystallization of the direction of their social development.

It is reasonable to presume that these tendencies can either lead to the final triumph of the socialist orientation in the present phase of development of the former colonies and

dependencies (given the appropriate evolution of revolutionary democracy), can lead to a strengthened position for scientific socialism and, consequently, to the defeat of neo-colonialism's social strategy, or they can simply magnify the difficulties in the way of a capitalist transformation of these countries, this in turn preparing the soil and increasing the preconditions for the development and victory of the anti-capitalist struggle—this time as a socialist struggle—at a latter stage and on a higher class basis. History will tell us *to what extent* each of these two possible variants will be realized.

Considering the prospects, we can proceed from the certain premise that the international preconditions that favor the development of anti-capitalist tendencies in the national liberation revolutions, that favor a socialist orientation in the former colonies and dependencies—tendencies that are connected with the dynamic of world socialism and with a change in the correlation of class forces in the international arena—will be strengthened.

However, the ultimate impact of these tendencies—and especially of the historical process in the emerging countries—depends primarily upon the course of events *within* these countries. While the decisive role for the entire revolutionary progress, and thus for the destinies of the world's liberation forces as a whole, belongs to the socialist system, the decisive role in the transformation of society at the national level belongs to the forces of national liberation.

Yet the general backwardness of the countries that have cast off the colonial and semi-colonial yoke, their economic weakness and dependence on imperialism, create enormous obstacles for the development and especially for the practical implementation of anti-capitalist tendencies.

The reverse side of the underdevelopment of bourgeois and pro-bourgeois forces is to one extent or another the weakness of the working class, the dominant position of groups with a petty-bourgeois orientation with all their political prejudices and vacillation: The national liberation coloration of the struggle expands the social basis for anti-capitalist tendencies but at the same time cloaks the class meaning of this struggle, in certain respects slows down the social maturation of the masses.

The dominant ideological atmosphere also has a contradictory effect: socialist "sympathies" do not always lead to a heightening of political consciousness as a whole among the masses and the public of the former colonies and dependencies, do not always outweigh the negative impact of reactionary-nationalistic, religious and patriarchal ideas.

At the present stage, the political behavior and evolution of revolutionary democracy is of enormous import for the dynamic, for the very fate of anti-capitalist tendencies. As has been noted, it has been virtually proved that revolutionary democrats can lead the transition of the newly independent countries to a socialist orientation. Of fundamental importance now is whether or not revolutionary democracy has a higher socio-political potential—whether or not it is able successfully to conclude the democratic stage of development, to move even farther in the direction of a political and ideological rapprochement with the international working class.

The communist movement in the previously colonial and dependent world is called on to play a most important role. The prospects for the socialist orientation of the newly independent countries to a great extent depends on a strengthening of the position of the Communist parties, on shifts toward turning them into mass parties, on the extension of their influence to broader strata of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia, to trade union and other important organizations of working people, and, finally, on the success of the Communists' consolidating into a single national front of all anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist forces.

Nor can we ignore the active role played by imperialist policy. Imperialism's efforts to integrate the emerging countries into the world capitalist system have without question a serious impact on the practical implementation of the anti-capitalist tendencies of the contemporary national liberation revolutions. Important, too, is whether the imperialist powers will adhere on this question to a global strategy, whether they will carry out a more or less common policy.

Finally, tendencies in the development of the world economy in coming years will have a major influence on the course of the struggle.

An absolute condition for the successful development of anti-capitalist tendencies is the strengthening of the alliance of the forces of national liberation in the countries concerned with world socialism, an expansion of comprehensive cooperation and close ties between these countries and the socialist system. Without this, no turn toward a socialist orientation can be stable, without this, as a matter of course, a successful movement ahead along this path is impossible.

In any case, one thing is undeniable: the further development of anti-capitalist tendencies will not only have a decisive impact on the course of events at the present stage of the national liberation revolutions, it will also determine to a major extent the overall historical results of these revolutions.

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